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CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS 
A. INTRODUCTORY 
The events of almost six years of armed conflict during World 
War II clearly demonstrated the deficiencies which existed in the 1929 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,! 
the treaty by which most of the belligerents in that conflict were 
bound in their treatment of prisoners of war.2 Almost before that con-
flict had ended, the International Committee of the Red Cross (the 
ICRC)3 began a series of conferences of technical experts, government 
experts, national Red Cross officials, and other specialists, in order to 
obtain a cross section of views as to what was needed to bring the law 
for the protection of prisoners of war into the second half of the twen-
tieth century. By 1948 a draft convention, with a number of innova-
tions, had been prepared and it was submitted to the XVIIth Interna-
tional Red Cross Conference which met in Stockholm in August of 
that year.4 The ICRC draft was modified and approved by the Red 
1 Citations for all treaties and cases referred to in the text or notes will be found 
in the appropriate table, beginning at pp. LVII and LXV, respectively. Citations for, 
and the full names of, all works to which reference is made will be found in the 
Table of Abbreviations, Articles, Books and Documents, beginning at p. XIX. 
!! The Soviet Union and Japan were not Parties to the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-
War Convention. Japan signed that Convention but did not ratify it. The Soviet 
Union did not participate in the drafting of the Convention and never adhered to it. 
:I The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a century-old human-
itarian organization composed entirely of Swiss citizens which maintains a strictly 
neutral status in all armed conflicts, offering its services equally to both sides. 
Since 1864 it has been the motivating force behind the series of humanitarian 
"Geneva" Conventions. See note 276 infra. Its status and activities in wartime are 
officially recognized and formalized in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, note 4 infra. 
At its behest a Diplomatic Conference had been called by the Swiss Federal Council 
to meet early in 1940 to revise the 1929 Convention, but the outbreak of hostilities 
in September 1939 had prevented this Conference from convening. 
4 Actually, there were four draft revised or new conventions prepared by the 
ICRC and presented to the Red Cross Conference. See Draft Revised Conventions 
4,34,51, & 153. The Prisoner-of-War Convention was the third of the group and 
is therefore f;ometimes referred to as the "Third Convention." The four conventions 
are known collectively as the 1949 Geneva Conve'/ttions for the Protection of War 
Victims. 
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Cross Conference.5 The Swiss Federal Council had already instituted 
action for the convening of a Diplomatic Conference to consider the 
matter and that Conference met in Geneva in April 1949. Using the 
Stockholm approved draft as the working document, after almost four 
months of discussions, negotiations, compromises, agreements, and 
disagreements, the Diplomatic Conference completed the drafting of, 
among others, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.6 
Of course, the law relating to prisoners of war began to develop 
long before the drafting of the two treaties just mentioned. A com-
plete and detailed presentation of the development of custom and law 
applicable to the prisoner of war over the period of the recorded his-
tory of mankind is beyond the scope and purpose of this study. Our 
concern is with the status of the prisoner of war under international 
law today, and, of even more importance, tomorrow. However, as is 
true of the study of most areas of contemporary life, some knowledge 
of the pertinent history of the subject under discussion will serve not 
only to ensure a better understanding of present-day law and proce-
dures, but also to furnish a basis for the proper interpretation of some 
of the applicable rules which have had their origin in the need to solve 
a particular problem in time past. Accordingly, it is considered ap-
propriate to lay a foundation for the discussion in depth which follows 
by beginning with what is admittedly an extremely abbreviated his-
tory of the treatment of prisoners of war over the ages.7 
B. HISTORICAL 
In the early days of recorded history the concept of the "prisoner 
of war" was completely unknown. It necessarily follows that there was 
5 Revised Draft Conventions 5. 
6 See Appendix A. Inasmuch as the complete Convention is reproduced in Ap-
pendix A, when specific articles are cited or quoted they will not be footnoted. 
Fifty-nine Governments participated in the Diplomatic Conference. Sixty-four 
(including the Holy See) signed the Conventions at the conclusion of the Confer-
ence. For a complete list of the subsequent ratifications and adherences, up to 
1 June 1977, see Appendix B. In this study the 1949 Prisoner-of-War Conven-
tion will normally be referred to as "the Convention" or "the 1949 Convention." 
7 The three most comprehensive recent histories in English of the treatment of 
prisoners of war over the. ages are, unfortunately, all in manuscript form. They 
are, in the chronological order of their preparation: Vizzard, Prisoner of War 
Policy in Relation to Changing Concepts of War (Ph.D. thesis, UniVersity of Cali-
fornia, 1961) (Vizzard, Policy) ; United States Army, Office of the Provost Mar-
shal General, A Review of United States Policy on Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(1968) (PMG Review); and Grady, The Evolution of Ethical and Legal Concern 
for the Prisoner of War (Dissertation, Graduate School of Theology, The Catholic 
University of America, 1970) (Grady, Evolution). The author is indebted to Mr. 
David Ellis, then of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, Department of the 
Army, for making copies of the latter two available. These three manuscripts are 
the source of much of the material which appears in this section. 
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no such thing as a set of customs or rules protecting individuals, either 
combatant or noncombatant, man, woman, or child, taken captive in 
battle. They were, in fact, quickly slaughtered; and the victor well 
knew that this would be his fate, too, should he be less fortunate on 
the occasion of the next battle. The Old Testament is replete with 
stories of the slaughter of persons captured in war, both soldier and 
civilian;8 and the practice was one which was, and long continued to 
be, followed by all nations. During this period, and for many centuries 
thereafter, the captive taken in war became the private property of 
his captor, who exercised the power of life or death over him. 
As early as several millennia B.C., Egyptian and Mesopotamian 
civilizations began to make slaves of prisoners of war rather than kill-
ing them. This change in practice was based on economic, rather than 
humanitarian, considerations. The agricultural economy which was 
just beginning to develop in that area required manpower to work 
in the fields; and prisoners of war as slaves constituted such manpow-
er. However, the custom was apparently not widely adopted by other 
contemporary or later civilizations until the advent of the Roman era. 
When Greece became the center of Mediterranean civilization, there 
was no improvement in the lot of the prisoner of war, unless he was a 
Greek of another City-State, in which event he could be ransomed. In 
a few cases there were exchanges of prisoners of war captured by the 
two sides. In general, however, the fate of most captives of this period 
was mutilation and death, only a few being enslaved by their captors 
or sold into slavery elsewhere in Greece.9 
The Romans at first followed in the footsteps of their predecessors. 
However, by the beginning of the Christian era both exchanges of 
prisoners of war between opposing generals and ransoming had be-
come quite common. Later, as the Romans-like the Egyptians 2,000 
or more years earlier-came to realize the economic value of the pris-
oner of war, enslavement became the prevailing practice.10 In the 
course of time the genius of the Roman law even evolved rules con-
trolling some aspects of the treatment of these slaves; for example, it 
prohibited the Roman master from the wanton killing of his slave. 
Generally speaking, during this early period of recorded history the 
slaughter of prisoners of war was also the general practice in Asia. 
At certain periods there were exceptions in a few Asiatic countries. 
Thus, both Sun Tzu's The Art of War, which probably dates from 
about the fourth century B.C., and the Manu. Sriti, a Sanskrit treatise 
8 See, e.g., Numbers 31 :7-8,17; Deuteronomy 3:6, 20:13-17; Joshua 6:21, 10:35, 
37,39,11:11; I Samuel 15:3. But see II Kings 6:22-23. 
!l 2 Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and RDm6 
251-52,257-63 (1911). 
lOIbid., 253-57,263-66; Davis, Prisoner of War 523. But see Creasy, Decisive 
Battles of the World 126 (describing German reciprocal killing of Roman prisoners 
of war in A.D. 9 during Arminius' victory over Vars' legions). 
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on law which probably dates from the period between 200 B.C. and 
A.D. 200, forbade the slaying of prisoners of war. Absorption into 
one's own army, enslavement, or ransom were the alternatives. 
With the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe entered the Dark Ages. 
Neither combatants nor noncombatants had any rights. During this 
period the Catholic Church engaged in the ransoming of Christian 
prisoners of war; and while the Church made a number of efforts to 
improve the lot of the prisoner of war, these efforts related only to 
warring members of the Church and non-Catholic prisoners of war 
could expect no help from this source. 
The era of chivalry saw a definite code evolve under which captured 
knights were well treated and were held for ransom. They might even 
be released on parole to raise the ransom,l1 but this code applied only 
to the knight, not to the foot soldier. For him there was no system 
of ransom; and when captured he could expect to be treated with his-
toric ruthlessness. Massacres and enslavement of prisoners of war 
were still the order of the day during the Crusades. The Crusaders 
massacred all captured Saracens and enslaved all captured Eastern 
Christians ;12 while the Saracens, with equal ferocity, massacred all 
captured Christians.13 
11 Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages 156-85 (1965). Richard the 
Lion-Hearted of England was thus released before his full ransom had been paid 
to Emperor Henry VI. 
12 Although the Third Lateran Concilium (1179) is often stated to have made a 
pronouncement against the enslavement of Christian prisoners of war (see, for 
example, Marin, Recueil 655), this was actually limited to shipwrecked Christians 
(5 Hefele, Histoire des Conciles 1105) and apparently had little effect on actual 
practice. 
13 The uniformity of the practice in this early era is attested to by the following 
statement from Khadduri, War and Peace (at 126-27): "The practice of taking 
prisoners of war as part of the spoil is very old and goes back to antiquity. The 
Persians treated their captives with relentless cruelty: they were blinded, tortured, 
and finally killed or crucified. The Hebraic rule was no less severe than Persian 
practice. The Muslims, regarding captives also as part of the spoil, often treated 
them no less cruelly than their predecessors." Actually, the Koran provided that 
captured non-Muslims were to be held as prisoners of war during the continuance of 
hostilities and "[t]hen either release them as a favor, or in return for ransom." 
Quran,47:4 (M. Z. Khan trans., 1971). In al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of 
International Law and the Western Approach 190, the author quotes a more popular 
version of this Koranic statement and interprets it to mean that "the Islamic state 
has the choice only between two alternatives; either to set free the prisoners of 
war gratuitously or to claim ransom. The verse unequivocally does not entitle the 
Muslims to enslave their prisoners of war ... !' He then goes on to argue that a 
policy of enslavement could only be justified as a sanction by way of retaliation 
"and not as a right ab initio." Ibid., 190-91. But see Mahmud, Muslim Conduct of 
State 74-76. By the thirteenth century the Muslims had developed rules of war 
which, at least, prohibited the mutilation of prisoners of war. Marin, Recueil 
656-57. 
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The breakdown of feudalism, the increased use of mercenaries, and 
the rise of nationalism, all of which occurred during the Renaissance, 
contributed to an evolution in fundamental concepts which began to 
make its appearance during the seventeenth century.14 (The religious 
wars of the Reformation were the exception, continuing the traditional 
brutal treatment and slaughter of prisoners of war.) By the end of the 
Thirty Years' War (1648), a prisoner of war had come to be consid-
ered as being in the custody of the enemy State, rather than of the 
individual captor. There was by then a better than even chance that 
he would not be killed or enslaved, but he still had little or no pro-
tection against other types of maltreatment. This basic change in con-
cept did, however, serve as a foundation upon which the principle of 
humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war could be erected.15 It re-
mained for Montesquieu, in his Esprit des lois,16 and Rousseau, in his 
Contrat social,17 to do the theoretical work, and for events emanating 
from the American and French Revolutions to lead to the practical 
changes which form the basis for the modern treatment of prisoners 
of war.IS 
The 1785 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the 
United States contained a provision (Article XXIV) which probably 
constituted the first international attempt to provide in time of peace 
for the protection of prisoners of war in the event that the then friend-
14 It was during this period that the great classical writers (among whom were 
Vitoria, Suarez, GentiIis, and Grotius) made their tremendous contributions to in-
ternational law, and particularly to the law of war. See, e.g., Grotius, War and 
Peace, Book III, Ch. VII. 
Hi Davis, Prisoner of War 525 & 540; Flory, Prisoners of War 158-60. Article 
LXIII of the Treaty of Westphalia (Munster, 30 January 1648) provided for the 
release of all prisoners of war by both sides without the payment of ransom. So 
also did Article XIV of the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). During the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries the practice of exchanging prisoners of war, both during 
and after the cessation of hostilities, became firmly established as a norm of in-
ternationallaw. 
16 Published in 1748. Montesquieu asserted that the only right that the law of 
war gave over prisoners of war was to secure them in such a way that they could 
not further -participate in the hostilities. 
17 Published in 1762. Rousseau advanced the theory that war was a relationship 
between States and that individuals were enemies only through accident and as 
soldiers. 
IS The following pertinent statement appears in Draper, Recueil, at 101: "The 
18th century evolved the important idea that captivity was a device whereby the 
prisoner [of war] was to be prevented from returning to his own force and con-
ducting the fight again. As a corollary to this idea it came to be accepted that the 
prisoner [of war] was not a criminal but a man pursuing an honourable calling 
who had had the misfortune to be captured. The practical implication of this was 
that the prisoner [of war] should not be put in'irons and thrown into a penal 
establishment with the local convicts." To the same effect, see 2 Lauterpacht-
Oppenheim 367-68. 
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ly relations between the two countries should be disturbed by war.1!! 
Considering the lack of existing precedent at the time the Treaty was 
drafted, the provisions designed "to prevent the destruction of prison-
ers of war" are amazing in their breadth and scope. Seven years later, 
in 1792, the French National Assembly enacted a decree which at-
tempted unilaterally to establish a formal code of humanitarian rules 
governing the treatment of prisoners of war.20 It proved to be in ad-
vance of its time,21 but the rules which it contained have since been 
incorporated into the various conventions for the protection of prison-
ers of war which were drafted more than a century later and which 
have been widely accepted by the nations of the world. 
Despite the difficulties encountered during the Napoleonic Wars,22 
19 Substantially the same provision was contained in a new treaty between the 
same nations which was entered into in 1799. This treaty lapsed in 1810. It was 
revived by Article XII of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1 May 1828. 
This latter remained in force for almost a century but was not revived after World 
War I. A very similar provision may be found in Article XXII of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico, which was signed in 
1848. Even the 1805 Treaty of Peace and Amity between the United States and 
Tripoli and the 1816 Treaty of Peace and Amity between the United States and 
Algiers contained provisions for the benefit of prisoners of war. 
20 Decre~ rendu par l'Assemblee nationale Ie 4 mai 1792 concernant Ies militaires 
faits prisonniers de gue1-re (Decree of 4 May 1792, of the French National Assem-
bly, 1 DeClercq, Recueil des traites de la France 217. The decree read in part as 
follows (trans!. mine) : 
1. Prisoners of war are under the safeguard and protection of the [French] 
nation. 
2. All cruel acts, violence or irisults committed against a prisoner of war 
shall be punished as if committed against a French citizen. 
3. Prisoners of war shall be transported in the rear of the army to special 
places which the commanding generals shall have designated. 
The skeptic might be inclined to ascribe to this action of the French Revolutionary 
legislature the same motives which impelled the Chinese Communists to institute 
their so-called Lenient Policy towards United Nations Command prisoners of war 
during the Korean hostilities. U.K., T1·eatment. 31. 
21 It is, indeed, a paradox that one of the worst war crimes committed against 
prisoners of war in modern times, prior to World War II, was the killing at Jaffa 
in 1799, by Napoleon Bonaparte (then a general serving under the French Direc-
tory), of more than 3,500 Arab prisoners of war for whom he was unable to spare 
a guard from his already understrength army. British Manual para. 137 n.l. (Con-
cerning a modern massacre of prisoners of war, smaller in total numbers, but of 
similar inhumanity, see Whiting, Massacre at Malmedy 45-46 & 52-54.) Napoleon 
is also charged with having "destroyed the old exchange system, which has never 
been fully restored." Laws, Exchange 604-05. See also, Lewis, Napoleon 66-82. 
22 Even at this early date the treatment of prisoners of war had become a sub-
ject for legislative investigations, which res1;llted in findings of exemplary treatment 
of prisoners of war by one's own country and unprecedented cruelty in the treat-
ment of prisoners of war by the enemy. United Kingdom, Foreign Office, Report of 
the Committee of the House of Commons 1'elative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (1798). 
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the treatment of prisoners of war continued to improve.23 Obviously, 
the nations of Europe and the New World were slowly but surely ar-
riving at the realization that the mutual maltreatment of prisoners of 
war was an anachronism which had no place in nineteenth-century 
civilization. An opinion of the King's Advocate, written in 1832, clearly 
demonstrates the extent to which prisoners of war had gained the right 
of protection, and the sanctions which, it was suggested, nations were 
prepared to take to ensure that such protection was forthcoming.24 He 
stated: 
... cases may possibly occur in which the treatment of Prisoners 
of War by a nation may be so barbarous and inhuman as to call 
upon other powers to make common cause against it, and to take 
such measures as may be necessary to compel it to abandon such 
practice, and to conform itself to the more lenient exercise of the 
rights of war, adopted by other States .... 25 
The advent of the American Civil War (1861-65) created prisoner-
of-war problems which probably exceeded any previously known.26 
A system of exchange during the course of hostilities was agreed upon 
but did not operate successfully.27 A Code drafted by Dr. Francis Lie-
ber for the use of the Union army:!8 contained a number of articles 
dealing with prisoners of war,20 but these can scarcely be said to have 
23 Although there is some question as to whether it was ever legally in force, the 
extensive provisions of the Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War between 
G)'eat Britain and the United States of America, signed at Washington, on 12 May 
1813, indicate the great breadth of the rules which had evolved for the protection 
of prisoners of war by the beginning of the nineteenth century. For a discussion 
of this agreement and of one of 1820 between Colombia and Spain, see Basdevant, 
Deux conventions 5. See also Anon., A Treaty for the Regulation of War in 1820, 
13 I.R.R.C. 52. 
24 Unfortunately, although, as we shall see (p. 26 infra), the 1949 Convention 
specifically provides that every Party undertakes to "ensure" respect for the 
agreed-upon rules for the protection of prisoners of war, third-party States are 
extremely reluctant to intervene even in cases of the most blatant violations. 
25 3 McNair (ed.), International Law Opinions 119 (1956). 
26 See Laska & Smith, 'Hell and the Devil': Andersonville and the Trial of 
Captain Henry Wirz, C.S.A., 1865, 68 Mil. L. Rev. 77. For a fictional, but sub-
stantially factual, presentation of the treatment, or maltreatment, of prisoners of 
war during this conflict, see Kantor, Andersonville. 
27 See p. 398 infra. 
28 United States Army, General Orders No. 100, 24 April 1863, Instructions for 
the Government of the A1'mies of the United States in the Field, more generally 
known as the "Lieber Code." For comments on these Instructions, see Marin, 
Recueil 662-64; Coursier, Lieber 377; Baxter, Codification 171. Article 56 of the 
Instructions provided: 
A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor 
is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, 
or disgrace, by cruel punishment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any 
other barbarity. 
29 Articles 56, 59, 71-80, and 105-110. 
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done more than to assure them of some basic protection. Moreover, 
while this Code had been prepared by Dr. Lieber, and it undoubtedly 
benefited from his prestige, it was, nevertheless, simply a unilateral 
act of the U. S. Government and it had no international status-except 
that it did provide an important source for the drafting of subsequent 
codes on the subject. 
The balance of the nineteenth century saw a number of efforts, both 
unofficial and official, to codify the law of war, including that relating 
to prisoners of war. The Swiss international jurist, Bluntschli, pro-
duced two significant works on the subject at this time ;30 and Field, an 
American, made a major contribution to the growing literature on the 
subject shortly thereafter,31 Then in 1874 an international conference 
called by the Tsar of Russia convened in Brussels and made the first 
attempt by governments to codify the law of war. While the Declara-
tion of Brussels32 which emanated from that conference never entered 
into effect as an international agreement, it unquestionably had a 
very considerable influence on subsequent governmental codification 
efforts which were successful. And finally, in 1880 the Institute of In-
ternational Law produced the Oxford Manual,33 another influential, 
but unofficial, codification of the law of war. 
These numerous attempts by diplomats and international jurists to 
codify the law of war, including the rules relating to the treatment of 
prisoners of war, not only constituted important source material, but 
also contributed greatly to the international climate which made pos-
sible the successful drafting of the Regulations Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land attached to the Second Hague Conven-
tion of 1899. This was the first effective multilateral codification of 
the law of war. Its impact on the rules governing the treatment of 
prisoners of war and subsequent codifications on that subject was im-
measurable.34 
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) was the only major conflict to 
30 Bluntschli, Das moderne Kriegsrecht, based on his friend Lieber's works, and 
Das moderne Volkerrecht. • 
31 Field, Draft Outlines of an International Code. Influenced, no doubt, by events 
in the American Civil War (1861-65), Field was probably somewhat less human-
itarian than Bluntschli. 
32 Articles 9-11 and 23-34 of the Declaration dealt with prisoners of war. Al-
though the Declaration did not become effective, in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-
78), the Tsar ordered that Russian troops comply with its provision and in July 
1877 he issued a "Regulation concerning prisoners of war" which was extremely 
humane. Scott, Resolutions 17, 19. 
33 Articles 21-23 and 61-78 of the Manual dealt with prisoners of war. 
34 The foregoing discussion should not be construed as in any manner denigrat-
ing from the affirmative effect of the successful drafting and ratification of the 
1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in 
Armies in the Field. This was, of course, the first of the series of Geneva humani-
tarian conventions. (See note 276 infra.) 
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occur while the Second Hague Convention of 1899 and its Regulations 
were in effect.35 They were soon replaced by the Fourth Hague Con-
vention of 190736 and by the Regulations .attached to that Conven-
tion.31 It was this Convention which was in effect during World War 
1,38 and practically all of the belligerents found the prisoner-of-war 
provisions to be inadequate. As a result, the prisoner-of-war provisions 
of those Regulations were supplemented by a great many special mul-
tilateral and bilateral agreements which were entered into during the 
course of the conflict.39 This clear evidence of its inadequacy4° enabled 
the ICRC to promote and secure the drafting of a new agreement deal-
ing exclusively with prisoners of war, which was completed and signed 
in Geneva in July 1929.41 When World War II commenced there were 
more than 40 Parties to this Convention.42 As had been realized,43 its 
application during that conflict demonstrated once again that a num-
ber of material provisions for the adequate protection of prisoners of 
31i Despite some partisan claims (see, for example, Takahashi, Russo-Japanese 
War 102), the treatment of prisoners of war in this conflict was probably almost 
exemplary on both sides. Franklin, Protection 78-79; Ariga, Guerre russo-
japonaise 93-130. 
36 Article 4 of this Convention provided that it replaced the cognate 1899 Con-
vention as between the Contracting Parties. 
31 There were only very minor differences between the prisoner-of-war provi-
sions of the Regulations attached to the two Conventions. For a detailed discussion 
of the law and practice of this era, see DuPayrat, Le prisonnier de guerre dans la 
guerre continentale. 
38 While it had a si omnes (general participation) clause, and at least one of the 
belligerents (Serbia) was not a Party to the Convention, all of the belligerent 
Parties apparently accepted it as being in force. 2 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 234. 
39 See, e.g., the Agreement between Great Britain and Germany concerning 
Combatant and Civilian Prisoners of War, executed at The Hague, 2 July 1917; 
Agreement between the British and German Governments concerning Combatant 
Prisoners of War and Civilians, 14 July 1918; the Final Act of the Conference of 
Copenhagen, executed by Austria-Hungary, Germany, Rumania, Turkey, and Russia 
on 2 November 1917; the Agreement between the British and Turkish Governments 
respecting Prisoners of War and Civilians, executed at Bern on 28 December 1917; 
the Agreement between France and Germany concerning Prisoners of War, exe-
cuted at Bern on 26 April 1918; and the Agreement between the United States of 
America and Germany concerning Prisoners of War, Sanitary Personnel, and 
Civilians, executed at Bern on 11 November 1918. 
40 Once again the momentum for improvement provided by international jurists 
should not be overlooked or underestimated. See, e.g., PhiIIimore & Bellot 47; and 
PhiUimore, Suggestions 25. Similarly, the "Final Report of the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War Committee," 30 I.L.A. Rep. 236 (1921), contained a set of "Pro-
posed International Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners of War." 
41 The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 
July 27,1929, herein referred to as "the 1929 Convention." 
42 See note 2 supra. 
43 See note 3 supra. 
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war had been omitted;t4 and very quickly after the end of hostilities 
the ICRC succeeded in securing the convening of another Diplomatic 
Conference in Geneva. This Conference drafted a new prisoner-of-war 
convention45 with many comparatively novel provisions directed at fill-
ing the voids which World War II had exposed in the then-existing 
law. This 1949 Convention has now been ratified or adhered to by 143 
nations.46 It is with the application of its provisions-intended, actual, 
and to be expected-that the discussion which follows will be con-
cerned. 
Writing in 1886, a noted American military lawyer, William Win-
throp, said: 
Modern sentiment and usage have induced in the practice of 
war few changes so marked as that which affects the status of 
prisoners of war.47 
While that statement was undoubtedly true in 1886-and is still true 
when the treatment of prisoners of war today is compared with that 
which they received a number of centuries ago-the experiences of 
World War II and those after it make the situation far less roseate 
than when Winthrop wrote. As has been said: 
A comparison between the conditions under which prisoners 
were held captive during the Napoleonic wars and those obtain-
ing in Germany, Japan and Russia during the late war [World 
War II] reveals a progressive change for the worse, which runs 
exactly parallel to the progress of dictatorship from Napoleon, 
through Kaiser Wilhelm to Hitler and Stalin.48 
H It should not be assumed that the 1929 Convention was completely without 
value. As the late Josef Kunz, an eminent scholar in this field, said: "[T]he fact 
that millions of prisoners of war from all camps, notwithstanding the holocaust, 
did return, is due exclusively to the observance of the Geneva Prisoners of 'Var 
Convention .... " Kunz, Chaotic Status 37, 45. The American Red Cross attributed 
the fact of the survival of 99 percent of the American prisoners of war held by 
Germany during World Wat: II to compliance with the 1929 Convention. New York 
Times, 2 June 1945, at 8, col. 6. Conversely, it may validly be assumed that millions 
of Russian prisoners of war held by the Germans, Germans held by the Russians, 
and Allied prisoners of war held by the Japanese did not return because the 1929 
Convention was not technically applicable and was not applied. 
45 The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of P1·isonel·S of War of 
August 12,1949, Appendix A. 
46 For a complete list of ratifications and adherences up to 1 June 1977, see 
AppendixB. 
47 Winthrop, Military Law 1228. To the same effect, see British Manual para. 
·122. Spaight called prisoners of war "spoilt darlings." Spaight, Wal· Rights 011 
Land 265. Thirty-six years and two W orId Wars later he was more realistic. 
Spaight, Air Power, Ch. XV, passim. 
48 Laws, Prisoners of War 94. A similar pessimism is found in Freeman, Recueil 
309, where the author says: "Considering the experience of United Nations troops 
in the Korean campaign, an excess of optimism about such matters [application 
of the Convention] is hardly justified should the inferno of war be unleashed again." 
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The extent to which there will be compliance with the provisions 
for the protection of prisoners of war contained in the 1949 Geneva 
Prisoner-of-War Convention still largely remains to be seen. Unfor-
tunately, very little that has occurred in this area during the quarter 
century since its drafting augurs well for the future. 
C. APPLICABILITY 
The first question which arises with respect to any treaty, and which 
is very much present in the case of the 1949 Geneva Convention is, 
when and under what circumstances is it to be applied? 
Under Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention of 1907 hostilities 
are instituted by a "reasoned declaration of war or [of] an ultimatum 
with conditional declaration of war"; and under Article 2 of that 
Convention the belligerents have the duty to notify neutrals of the 
existence of a state of war. Of course, were those provisions uniformly 
complied with by States, the subject under discussion would cause 
few difficulties, as there would never be any question as to the existence 
of a legal state of war and of the consequent applicability of the 
1949 Geneva Convention. Unfortunately, more often than not, the 
above-cited provisions of the Third Hague Convention of 1907 have 
been honored in the breach. In 1914, just seven years after they had 
become a part of international legislation, Germany attacked Belgium 
without a prior declaration of war and started a policy which has 
been followed all too frequently since that time. 
Despite the experiences of World War I, the subsequently drafted 
1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention did not contain a provision 
specifying the conditions under which it was to become applicable. It 
was apparently believed that in future armed conflicts- there would be 
compliance with the provisions of the Third Hague Convention of 
1907, and that there would therefore be no question concerning the 
applicability of the 1929 Convention. Events did not bear out this 
expectation. Thus, during World War II a number of Powers found 
it profitable not to make a formal declaration of war before embark-
ing on hostilities. The German attack on Poland in 1939, the Soviet 
attack on Finland that same year, and the Japanese attacks on the 
United States and the United Kingdom in 1941 are but a few of the 
many well-known instances of the commencement of hostilities during 
World War II without a prior declaration of war.49 In addition, Pow-
ers have denied the existence of a state of war and, therefore, the 
applicability of the law of war protecting prisoners of war, by con-
49 2 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 292-93. But there were a number of cases of com-
pliance with the provisions of the Third Hague Convention of 1907 during both 
World War I (ibid., at 294 n.2) and World War II (ibid., at 295 n.3). Italy had 
signed this Convention, but had never ratified it. Nevertheless, Italy did formally 
declare war on France in June 1940 before commencing hostilities. 
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testing the legitimacy of the enemy government in cases in which a 
sovereign State temporarily disappeared because of capitulation, oc-
cupation, or annexation, or a combination of these, even though its 
allies continued to fight. At the very opening phase of World War II 
Poland was overrun and dismembered, part of its territory going to 
Nazi Germany and the remainder to the Soviet Union. Thereafter the 
German Government refused to consider that members of the Polish 
armed forces who had been captured during the course of hostilities 
retained the status of prisoners of war. 50 Similarly, Germany refused 
to recognize the right of any government to speak for prisoners of 
war who, before the respective capitulations and military occupa-
tions, had served in the armed forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Yugoslavia, etc.; and it took this position whether or not there was 
a government-in-exile in existence and functioning.51 In 1940 France 
agreed to an armistice with Germany (and to another with Italy) 
under which a large part of its territory remained occupied while 
the remainder was technically unoccupied and self-governing; and it 
ceased to be a belligerent. Thereafter, while active hostilities contin-
ued with Germany and Italy on one side and France's former allies 
(principally the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth countries) 
on the other, the German Government took the position that the mem-
bers of the French armed forces who had been captured during the 
hostilities were no longer entitled to prisoner-or-war status, their 
rights thereafter being subject to negotiations between Nazi Germany 
and the Vichy French Government.52 Finally, it had been found ad-
vantageous on occasion to deny the existence of a state of war in a 
particular case by the use of subterfuge or perversion of the facts. 
Thus, the Sino-Japanese conflict, which dated at least from the J apa-
nese attack at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937 and which lasted until 
the end of World War II in 1945, was designated by the Japanese as 
an "incident" which, they claimed, did not bring the law of war-
including that relating to prisoners of war-into effect. This estab-
lished a pattern by which international armed conflict was termed 
an "incident," a "police action," a "police operation," etc.,li3 thereby 
50 2 lCRC Analysis 5. 
51 Bastid, Droit des gens 334; 1 rCRC Report, 35-36, 189-90; Olgiati, Croix 
Rouge 705. According to one author, Germany took the position that prisoners of 
war from Poland and Yugoslavia could not, after the capitulations of those coun-
tries, continue to be considered as prisoners of war because "their respective States 
having ceased to exist, the position of Power of Origin of these captives belonged 
henceforward to the Reich." Wilhelm, Status 10-11, 35 R.l.C.R. 525. 
52 1 JCRC Report, 546-47. The so-called Scapini Mission appointed by the Vichy 
Government replaced the Protecting Power for French prisoners of war held by 
the Germans after the 1940 Franco-German armistice agreement. See Pictet, 
Recueil 87-88. 
53 I.M.T.F.E. 1003 & 1008; 1969 Reaffirmation 94. 
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purporting to establish a base upon which to deny the applicability 
in a specific conflict of the law of war in general and the law relating 
to prisoners of war in particular.54 
Could a country legitimately claim that there was no war, and hence 
that the Prisoner-of-War Convention was not applicable, because hos-
tilities had not been preceded by a formal declaration of war? Could it 
deny the applicability of the Prisoner-of-War Convention by giving 
some name other than "war" to the armed conflict in which it was 
concededly engaged? Where a country had been overrun and its ter-
ritory completely occupied by its enemies, could the latter claim that 
the occupied country had ceased to exist as a nation, that a state of 
war no longer existed between occupier and occupied, and that indi-
viduals captured during the hostilities while serving in the armed 
forces of the occupied country were no longer entitled to prisoner-of-
war status? Would the answer to this latter question be different if 
the allies of the occupied country were still actively at war with the 
occupier and if they were, perhaps, furnishing facilities on their soil 
for a government-in-exile and an armed force of the occupied coun-
try? What if only part of the territory of a country had been occupied 
but it had signed an armistice with its occupier and was no longer 
an active belligerent? As we have seen, all of these situations had 
occurred during World War II. All of them could occur again in any 
future war. All of them urgently required that an agreed solution be 
reached in advance of the event. The 1946 Preliminary Red Cross 
Conference recommended that the 1929 Convention be amended to in-
clude a provision making it applicable "from the moment hostilities 
have actually broken out, even if no declaration of war has been made 
and whatever the form that such armed intervention may take."55 The 
Government Experts who met the following year concurred in the 
need for a provision of this nature, redrafting it to make the Con-
vention applicable "at the outbreak of any armed conflict, whether 
the latter has, or has not[,] been recognised as a state of war by the 
parties concerned."56 Based upon the suggestions it had received, the 
ICRC drafted a new provision57 which was approved by the Interna-
tional Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in 194858 and was adopted 
by the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in 194959 with only minor 
editorial changes. 
The first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention now provides: 
The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
54 I.M.T.F.E. 1009 & 1209. 
55 1946 Preliminary Conference 15 & 70. 
50 1947 GE Report 103. 
57 Article 2, Draft Revised Conventions 52. 
5S Article 2, Revised Draft Conventions 51. 
59 1 Final Record 243. 
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more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war 
is not recognized by one of them. 60 
The foregoing provisions appear to be plain and unambiguous. They 
are among those provisions of the Convention which have been given 
both uniform interpretation and general approval by the commenta-
tors.Gl Nevertheless, they have been less than fully successful in secur-
ing the application of the Convention even in situations which appear 
to fall directly within their ambit. 
Clearly, the quoted portion of Article 2 is an attempt to cover two 
situations in such broad terms as to include all possible contingencies: 
(1) "Cases of declared war": This is the classical situation, the 
armed connict which is instituted in compliance with the provisions 
of the Third Hague Convention of 1907 discussed above. It presents 
no particular problems. The number of cases which will fall within 
its terms is comparatively negligible. Apart from the obvious reluct-
ance of a number of nations to declare war formally, they are now 
confronted not only with the prohibitions of the United Nations Char-
ter but also with the general desire to avoid any use of the term 
"war."62 
(2) "Any other armed conflict which may arise": The terminology 
selected here was intended as a catchall, to include every type of hos-
GO This article is one of the "Common Articles" so called because they appear 
in identical form, mutatis 1nutandis, in all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
for the Protection of War Victims. 
61 See Stone, Legal Controls 313 n.85, where the author states: "So Art. 2, para. 
1, of the revised Prisoners of War Convention, 1949, declaring its provisions ap-
plicable not only to declared war but also to "any other armed conflict ... even if 
the state of war is not recognised" by a belligerent Contracting Party, is a wel-
come recognition of the need to place the point beyond doubt." And in Pictet, Com-
mentary 22-23, the following appears: "By its general character, this paragraph 
deprives belligerents, in advance, of the pretexts they might in theory put forward 
for evading their obligations. There is no need for a formal declaration of war, or 
for the recognition of the existence of a state of war, as preliminaries to the appli-
cation of the Convention. The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient .... 
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of mem-
bers of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even 
if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war." And, finally, in Soviet 
International Law 420, this statement is made: "The absence of a formal declara-
tion of war does not deprive hostilities, which have in fact begun, of the character 
of war from the point of view of the need to observe its laws and customs. The 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 require that their signatories apply these Conventions, 
which are a component part of the laws and customs of war, in the event of a dec-
laration of war or in any armed conflict, even if one of the parties to the conflict 
does not recognise the existence of a state of war." 
62 The 1969 Reaffirmation states (at 11): "By avoiding the words 'law of war', 
the ICRC is also desirous to take account of the deep aspiration of the peoples to 
see peace installed and the disputes between human communities settled by pacific 
means." It is extremely doubtful that diction alone can change human nature. 
Fortunately, there has so far been no attempt to substitute the term "prisoner of 
armed conflict" for "prisoner of war" ! 
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tility which might occur without being "declared war." The words 
selected were certainly broad enough to accomplish the desired result, 
viz., that the Convention should be applicable "on the outbreak of de 
facto hostilities, even if war has not been previously declared, and 
irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict."63 A resolution adopt-
ed by the World Veterans Federation in 1970 demonstrates the public 
understanding of the interpretation to be given to this provision. That 
resolution recalls "that the [1949 Geneva] Conventions apply to armed 
conflict of any nature . .. without regard to how that conflict may be 
characterized."64 (Emphasis in original.) The ICRC has been equally 
comprehensive in its interpretation of this provision. The documents 
prepared by it for the use of the 1972 Conference of Government Ex-
perts state: 
... There is no need for a formal declaration of war or for rec-
ognition of the existence of a state of belligerency for the appli-
cation of the Conventions. The occurrence of de facto hostilities 
is sufficient. Thus any disagreement arising between two States 
and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces 
is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2 common to 
the Conventions, even if one of the Parties to the conflict denies 
the existence of a state of belligerency.65 
In one of the few cases concerning the 1949 Convention to reach 
the courts, a major issue was the applicability of the 1949 Prisoner-
of-War Convention in hostilities resulting from the "military con-
frontation" between Malaysia and Indonesia (1963-66). The Privy 
Council said: 
The trials of the accused were conducted on the assumption, 
which their lordships do not call in question, that there was an 
armed conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia bringing the 
[prisoner-of-war] Convention into operation. Article 2 applies the 
Convention not only to cases of declared war but to 'any other 
armed conflict' which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties even if the state of war is not recognised by 
one of them. The existence of such a state of armed conflict was 
something of which the courts in Malaysia could properly take 
63 Pictet, New Geneva Conventions 468. The author goes on to state: "It is in-
admissible that a state should be entitled to disregard treaty stipulations simply 
by opening hostilities without previous notification to the adversary, or by giving 
such proceedings any other name." 
64 U.N., Human Rights, A/8370, para. 160. 
ou 1972 Commentary, part one, at 9. This was the position taken by the Indian 
government in 1963 when it contended that the refusal of the Peoples Republic of 
China to allow the ICRC to visit Indian prisoners of war held in China violated 
"the provisions of the Geneva Convention [which] apply to such situations even 
if a state of war [in the legal sense] does not exist." 2 Cohen & Chiu, People's 
China 1573-74. 
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judicial notice, or if in doubt (which does not appear to have been 
the case) on which they could obtain a statement from the Ex-
ecutive.66 
Despite the foregoing, in at least two instances-one unofficial and 
one official-the applicability of the Convention has been challenged 
or denied because there was no "state of war" or no "declaration of 
war." Thus, a leading scholar in the field of international law in the 
People's Republic of China apparentJy went out of his way to question 
the applicability of the Convention to certain American airmen shot 
down during the hostilities in Korea (1950-53) because "no state of 
war exists between China and the U.S."67 And of even more impor-
tance was the refusal of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 
to apply the Convention to American airmen shot down while flying 
combat missions over that country (c. 1965-73), on the ground that 
there had been no declaration of war.58 
66 Public Prosecutor 'V. Koi, [1968] A.C. 853-54. 
67 The full story of this incident, set forth by Professor Cohen in his contribu-
tion on the People's Republic of China to what was originally the Harbridge House 
study on prisoners of war, is worthy of quotation: "In the 1954 dispute over the 
post-Korean-armistice conviction of eleven United States Air Force personnel for 
espionage, another leading Chinese scholar of the day, Ch'en T'i-ch'iang, used 
language that unnecessarily suggested a more restrictive view of the applicability 
of the GPW Convention. The United States had argued that prior to the armistice 
the fliers had been shot down either over the 'recognized combat zone in Korea or 
over internati.onal waters.' Instead of simply limiting his argument to the official 
Chinese position that the fliers had been shot down deep in Chinese territory after 
secretly entering for purposes of espionage rather than combat, Ch'en ambiguously 
stated: 
Only captured members of the armed forces of a belligerent can be considered 
prisoners of war by the captor side. No state of war exists between China and 
the U.S. U.S. spies who have intruded into China for espionage purposes are 
not prisoners of war. 
Ch'en's remarks were only the murky dicta of a single publicist, to be sure, but 
they suggested the possibility that the PRC could some day choose to read the 
phrase 'any other armed conflict' in article 2 restrictively, as North Vietnam ap-
pears to have done, in spite of the more conventional position voiced by Chou 
Keng-sheng vis-a.-vis India." Miller, The Law of War 239-40. Technically the state-
ment by Ch'en was correct; but he made a poor choice of words. In the absence of 
armed conflict between two States, a national of one who illegally intrudes into the 
territory of the other does not become a prisoner of war. The situation of which 
Ch'en writes is exactly the same as the Powers case in the Soviet Union, except that 
in China the individuals who illegally intruded were undeniably members of an 
armed force. (This assumes, of course, the validity of the Chinese factual position.) 
68 A news article from Cairo which appeared in the New York Times, 12 Febru-
ary 1966, at 12, col. 3, stated: 
The sources quoted the [North Vietnamese] Ambassador as having rejected 
the American contention that United States airmen captured in attacks on 
North Vietnam should be treated as prisoners of war under the terms of the 
Geneva conventions. 
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It is apparent, unfortunately, that no matter how clear and unam-
biguous the provisions of the Convention in this respect may conced-
edly be, some Parties will continue to insist that, and to find reasons 
why, the hostilities in which they are engaged do not come within 
the purview of the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 2; and 
they will frequently, absent strong pressure from friendly Parties, 
for this reason refuse to apply the Convention for the protection of 
prisoners of war captured by them during the course of international 
armed conflict. There appears to be wide agreement that what is need-
ed in this field is not new law, but some method of ensuring the ap-
plication of, and compliance with, existing law-the 1949 Convention.GlI 
At the 1971 Conference of Government Experts several of the par-
ticipants sought a solution to the problem created where one of the 
parties to an international armed conflict denied the applicability of 
the Convention.70 The solutions offered there were, in general, con-
cerned with methods of ensuring the presence of a Protecting Power.'I1 
While there can be no question of the importance of the Protecting 
Power in ensuring the application of (and compliance with) the pro-
visions of the Convention, this does not solve the problem which exists 
when one party to an international armed conflict insists that there are 
no hostilities within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention and 
that, therefore, there is no basis for designating a Protecting Power. 
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference two proposals were made which 
can be related to this problem. The Greek representative suggested 
that the existence of a state of belligerency (which would, of course, 
unquestionably bring the law of armed conflict into effect) should be 
He was reported to have told influential Egyptians that this was impossible 
"because this is a case where no war has been declared" by either country. 
Another article published five months later (New York Times, 12 July 1966, at 
7, col. 5) said: "The Tanyug dispatch, dated Pnompenh, Cambodia, said that North 
Vietnam 'does not consider these United States citizens as prisoners of war for it 
has not declared war on the United States.''' Direct evidence of the effect of the 
foregoing may be found in the words of one of the American prisoners of war re-
patriated during the hostilities. He stated: "Any attempt on our part to bring up 
the fact that we were prisoners of war ... resulted in it being very forcibly brought 
to our attention that we were not prisoners but criminals, because our country had 
not declared war, and had to answer for this." Overly, "Held Captive in Hanoi," 
Air Force & Space Digest, November 1970, at 86, 90. For the ICRC position that 
the American prisoners of war held in North Vietnam were entitled to the protec-
tion of the Convention, see AEI, Problem 24. 
09 U.N., Human Rights, A/7720: Reply of India, par. 2, at 77-78; Reply of the 
United States, para. 2, at 91. The ICRC subsequently pointed out that the problem 
was not novel and it listed 10 ,private organizations which had put forward initia-
tives in this regard. 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 22. 
70 1971 GE Report, paras. 534 & 537. 
71 Ibid., para. 538. 
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decided by the Security Council of the United Nations.7!! A French 
proposal, which was actually concerned with the problem of a substi-
tute for the Protecting Power,73 would have established on a perma-
nent basis, a "High International Committee for the Protection of 
Humanity," consisting of 30 members elected by the Parties to the 
Conventions from nominations made by the Parties, by the Hague "In-
ternational [Permanent] Court of Arbitration" and by the "Interna-
tional Red Cross Standing Committee." Nominations were to be made 
from 
amongst persons of high standing, without distinction of nation-
ality, known for their moral authority, their spiritual and intel-
lectual independence and the services they have rendered to 
humanity-
In particular, they may be selected from amongst persons dis-
tinguished in the political, religious, scientific and legal domains, 
and amongst winners of the Nobel Peace Prize-74 
While this proposal was not incorporated into the conventions, it was 
the subject of a resolution adopted by the Diplomatic Conference 
recommending that consideration be given as soon as possible to the 
advisability of setting up an international body to perform the func-
tions of a Protecting Power in the absence of such a Power.7I:i 
These two proposals are mentioned here' because they suggest al-
ternative approaches to the attempt to solve the problem of how to 
ensure application of the 1949 Conventions in international armed 
conflict: one, by the use of an established and continuing political 
body; the other, by the use of a new body created specifically for the 
purpose and which is made as neutral and apolitical as it is possible 
to do in these days of hypernationalism. 
The suggested use of the Security Council (or, indeed, of any poli-
tical body) is not considered to be a feasible solution. That body is 
composed of representatives of States, voting on the basis of decisions 
reached in Foreign Offices-decisions which are, in turn. made on the 
basis of national self-interest and political expediency, and which are 
not necessarily consonant with the facts. It is inconceivable, for ex-
ample, that the Security Council would ever have reached a decision, 
over the opposition of North Vietnam (and, of more importance, of 
the Soviet Union and, toward the end, of the People's Republic of Chi-
na), that the situation in Vietnam demanded the application of the 
7:! 2B Final Recol'd 11 & 16. Further amplification of the proposal, which was 
clearly required, was not forthcoming and its adoption was not pressed. 
7:1 For a discussion of this problem, see pp. 269-275 infra. 
74 3 Final Record Annex. 21, at 30. 
75 Resolution 2, 1 Final Record 361. Some months after the signing of the Con-
vention in 1949 the French Government queried the signatory Governments with 
respect to the possible implementation of the Resolution. The Governments so con-
sulted displayed a complete lack of interest. 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 21. 
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humanitarian conventions which govern the law of international armed 
conflict. 76 
On the other hand, it is believed that a true and effective solution to 
this problem could be attained by a Protocol to the four 1949 Conven-
tions assigning the power to make a determination as to the existence 
of a state of international armed conflict, thereby automatically bring-
ing the Conventions into effect, to a preselected international commis-
sion; by making the decision reached by that commission as to the 
existence of a state of international armed conflict binding not only 
on the States directly involved but also on all other Parties to the 
Protocol and Conventions; and by providing for the automatic im-
position of some type of workable sanctions (such as a ban on the 
supplying of arms) whenever the commission so created determines 
that its decision is not being respected by a State party to the inter-
national armed conflict in that such State has, despite the interna-
tionally sponsored decision as to the existence of an international 
armed conflict which brings the law of armed conflict into effect, con-
tinued to deny the applicability of such law. Such a specially consti-
tuted commission of perhaps 25 private individuals, each of whom is 
of sufficient personal international stature to be able to rise above 
the politics of his or her own country, each of whom would act as 
an individual and as his or her personal moral and ethical principles 
dictated, detached and unaffected by Foreign Office instructions, could 
well constitute an acceptable, effective international body.77 The pro-
visions for the selection of the members of such a commission would 
be sufficiently restrictive to ensure the choice of the type of individual 
described, without regard to nationality, race, religion, color, or geo-
graphical distribution. It would begin to operate as soon as the con-
70 In addition, it might be noted that the Security Council undoubtedly already 
has the power to make such a decision; that it has, heretofore, in effect made such 
a decision, but always in the context of a call for the cessation of armed conflict so 
found to exist (e.g., S.C. Res. 233, 22 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the 
Security Council 1967, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF /22 Rev.2 (1968), adopted 6 June 
1967, in which the Security Council stated its concern "at the outbreak of fighting" 
in the Middle East and called for "a cessation of all military activities in the 
area"; and S.C. Res. 237, 22 id. at 5, adopted 14 June 1967, in which it recom-
mended "scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treat-
ment of prisoners of war"), and that it has never exercised its power in the con-
text of the proposal under discussion because to do so would be an admission of its 
inability to eliminate completely the breach of the peace involved. 
77 While it is true that States refuse to allow questions relating to their "national 
security" to be decided by international bodies (witness the problems encountered 
in this respect by the International Court of Justice), it would be difficult for a 
State to put forward the contention in time of peace that the delegation to a neutral 
international body of the right to determine when a situation has arisen in which 
that State must apply humanitarian law would be detrimental to its national secu-
rity. (It must be borne in mind that we are dealing here solely with international 
armed conflicts.) 
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stitutive body, consisting of all of the Parties to the Protocol, had 
made the initial selections, and would be a permanent body, preferably 
self-perpetuating through a process of co-option.78 Any Party to the 
Protocol, whether or not itself involved in an international armed con-
flict, could, at any time, request a determination by the commission 
as to whether the then-existing relationship between two or more 
States was such as to bring the Conventions into effect; the States 
involved would be invited to present any facts or arguments they de-
sired but would not otherwise participate in the decisionmaking proc-
ess ;79 an affirmative decision would immediately be binding not only 
upon the States involved in the armed conflict, but on all of the other 
Parties to the Protocol ;80 and a subsequent finding by this commission 
that one or more of the Parties involved in the armed conflict was not 
complying with the provisions of the applicable humanitarian law-
including the law relating to prisoners of war-would automatically, 
and without further action of any kind, require previously prescribed 
action on the part of all of the other Parties to the Protocol not in-
volved in the armed conflict.81 
This proposed solution to the problem of establishing a method 
whereby States will not be able to deny the applicability of the 1949 
Convention in international armed conflict may appear impractical, 
given the current international climate. However, upon reflection this 
78 To gain support at the outset and to ensure complete impartiality, it would 
probably be necessary to deny this body jurisdiction over fact situations existing 
at the time of its creation. 
79 The United Nations General Assembly has, on a number of occasions, called 
upon its members "to make effective use of the existing methods of fact-finding" 
[e.g., G.A. Res 2329, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968) J. 
The basic objective of these resolutions has been to encourage the use of fact-find-
ing bodies in the event of disputes. The present proposal would, in effect, merely 
create a new specialized fact-finding body and provide for certain results to flow 
automatically if specified facts are found. It is a variation and expansion of the 
idea of the ad hoc Commission of Inquiry originally provided for by the First 
Hague Convention of 1899 and used for the first time in the Dogger Bank Incident 
(Scott, Hague Court Rep. 403). 
80 This is really provided for in Article I of the Convention. See pp. 26-27 infra. 
The decision would have no legal effect except to require the application of the 
humanitarian rules contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It would not be a 
determination of the existence of a legal state of war. 
81 The present author first made this proposal in March 1970 in the Working 
Paper for the Fourteenth Hammarskjold Forum. See Carey (ed.), When Battle 
Rages, How Can Law Protect? 8-11 (hereinafter Levie, Working Paper). Subse-
quently, a somewhat similar suggestion was made in the context of Article 3 deal-
ing with internal armed conflict. U.N., Human Rights, A/8052, at paras. 159-61; 
and 1971 GE Report, paras. 192-218. (There does not appear to be any reason why 
the same body could be empowered to act in both areas, even by different groups 
of States, if this were desired.) Another writer in this field has also since made a 
similar suggestion. Bindschedler 56. See also the proposal made to the 1974 Diplo-
matic Conference in para. 8 (b) of the 1973 NGO Memorandum. 
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reaction may become somewhat less valid. Each and everyone of the 
143 States that have become Parties to the Conventions considers that, 
should it become involved in international armed conflict, it would be 
the participant fighting a just war-and that the application of hu-
manitarian provisions of the law of war would be in its favor and 
against the aggressor with whom it would be engaged in international 
armed conflict. Why, then, should it not support a proposal which will 
ultimately be of benefit to it should it be forced to engage in interna-
tional armed conflict? Moreover, to what will it have agreed? Merely 
that a neutral, internationally created body, which it helped to create, 
may determine that a situation in which the State may unexpectedly 
find itself at some future time calls for the application of the humani-
tarian law of international armed conflict. What would that mean to it? 
Only that it could not kill, or otherwise maltreat, protected persons 
such as the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, and civilian noncom-
batants, and that it must meet certain minimum standards in its 
treatment of these individuals.· Can any State advance the argument 
that it refuses to ratify such an international agreement because it 
does not wish to have its "national security" jeopardized by having 
its sovereign power of action limited in these respects, that it wishes 
to retain an unfettered ability to kill and maltreat these individuals at 
will? Moreover, once an international convention covering the fore-
going proposal has been drafted and is presented for signature and 
ratification, the moral and humanitarian pressures to bring about its 
legal acceptance by individual States would be tremendous and there 
would be an excellent possibility of its general acceptance.82 While 
certain States that have adopted obsolete attitudes magnifying na-
tional sovereignty might well strongly oppose such a proposal, it is 
predictable that they would participate, albeit reluctantly, in any dip-
lomatic conference convened to draft such a Protocol and would even-
82 Certainly, the 143 ratifications and accessions to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
which were drafted before many of the acceding States were even in existence as 
members of the international community, were not obtained merely because of an 
overwhelming urge on the part of nations to be bound by these humanitarian rules 
in the event they became involved in international armed conflict. They were ob-
tained because of moral and humanitarian pressures and because few nations were 
willing to be pointed at as not having accepted these great expressions of humani-
tarian aspirations. (Pressure of this same type was brought on the United States 
because of its failure to ratify the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol.) At least one writer 
does not think that the proposal would be acceptable to States. Bond, Proposed 
Revisions 258. However, the final session of the Diplomatic Conference which 
adopted the 1977 Protocol I (see text, pp. 91-01) included therein an Article 90 en-
titled "International Fact-Finding Commission." This Article adopts many of the 
ideas set forth in the text and previously urged elsewhere insofar as inquiring 
into alleged grave and serious breaches of the 1949 Convention and the 1977 
Protocol are concerned. (For a more detailed discussion of Article 90, see pp. 90-1). 
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tually, rather than risk international opprobrium, become parties to 
it. It is believed that in this era of almost ceaseless armed conflict,S3 
the time is past when States may argue "national sovereignty" and 
"national security" as excuses for refusing to participate in the crea-
tion of an international institution the sole function of which will be 
to eliminate excuses for refusing to recognize the existence of inter-
national armed conflict, with the resultant applicability of certain spe-
cific humanitarian laws. 
There is one patent ambiguity in the quoted provisions of the first 
paragraph of Article 2 which requires mention. It will have been noted 
that the paragraph concludes with the phrase "even if the state of 
war is not recognized by one of them." What is the legal situation if 
a state of war is not recognized by two, or several, of the parties to 
the armed conflict? The legislative history of the Article is not helpful. 
Apparently, the drafters did not visualize the possibility that among 
the High Contracting Parties engaged in international armed conflict 
there might be more than one State that refused to recognize that the 
situation was such as to bring the matter within the provisions of the 
Convention, thereby requiring the applicability of its humanitarian 
provisions. Obviously, the literal wording of the Article does not cover 
all of the possible contingencies, including, for example, the situation 
which existed during the armed conflict in Vietnam where neither the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam nor the United States, for different 
reasons, recognized the existence of a legal state of war.84 
This problem was perceived within a short time after the 1949 Dip-
lomatic Conference had completed its work. In 1952 Lauterpacht point-
ed it out and said: "The intention was probably to say by 'one or both 
of them.' This, it appears, is the correct interpretation of the Con-
vention."85 Certainly, his interpretation would seem to be fully justified 
-although it probably does not go far enough. Weare dealing with a 
humanitarian convention. It should be liberally construed in order to 
83 Between 1945 and 1968 there were approximately 130 armed conflicts, of which 
well over 50 percent had international implications. SIPRI, Yearbook of World 
A1'maments and Disa)'mament, 1968/1969, Tables 4A.1 & 4A.2 at 366-73. 
84 The Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) did, at least for some purposes, 
recogniZe the existence of a legal state of war. Ordinance of June 24, 1965, Prom-
ulgating the State of War throughout the Republic of Vietnam. See Prugh, Law at 
War 62. 
85 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 369 n.6. For agreement with this view see Pictet, 
Commentary 23, and Draper, Recueil 73. Two years later the Diplomatic Confer-
ence that drafted the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Prop-
erty in the Event of A)"med Conflict changed the wording of the cognate provision 
(Article 18 (1)) of that Convention to read "even if the state of war is not recog-
nized by one or more of them." (Emphasis added.) One author believes that even 
this could be improved, and any remaining ambiguity removed, by using the phrase 
"pa?" aucune d'entre elle" ("by any of them"). Meyrowitz, Les armes biologiques et 
le droit international 22 n.46. 
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give the maximum protection. It simply does not make sense to say 
that if one of two parties to an international armed conflict (50 per-
cent of those involved) denies the existence of a state of war the Con-
vention is nevertheless applicable; but that if two of twenty parties 
to an international armed conflict (10 percent of those involved) make 
such a denial the Convention is inapplicable. The manifest purpose of 
the Convention was to afford humanitarian protection to individuals. 
Just as States may not make agreements derogatory of the protections 
so afforded,86 they should not be permitted to offer an interpretation 
which will completely eliminate the applicability of the Convention in 
a situation to which it was unquestionably intended to be applicable.87 
Moreover, the provision should be construed in such fashion that no 
matter how many participants take the position that a "state of war" 
does not exist, the actual fact of armed conflict will suffice to make the 
Convention applicable. If it is not so construed, it will have all of the 
pejorative aspects of the much condemned general participation clause 
-with the additional adverse factor that the decision that the Con-
vention is not to be applied will be based not on the indisputable fact 
of the participation in the hostilities of a non-Party to the Convention, 
but on the mere unilateral, subjective whim of belligerents. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 makes the 1949 Convention applicable "to 
all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Con-
tracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed re-
sistance." Once again this was an attempt to prevent a repetition of 
events which had occurred during World War II. Thus, when Poland 
was totally occupied and, in effect, dismembered by Germany and the 
Soviet Union in 1939, the position was taken by the German Govern-
ment that inasmuch as there was no longer a Polish State, there was 
no longer a legal basis for a Protecting Power to protect Polish inter-
ests-which would, of course, include the protection of the rights of 
members of the Polish armed forces previously taken as prisoners of 
war.S8 The German Government thereafter took a similar position with 
respect to Yugoslavia, the Free French, and Italy after 1943.89 All of 
these States had been the subject of complete or partial military oc-
cupation. However, the problems arising here, insofar as the 1949 
Convention is concerned, are really relative to the right of an individ-
ual to continue to be entitled to prisoner-of-war status and to the 
S13 See the discussion of Article 6 of the Convention, pp. 84-86 infra. 
87 One commentator states with, unfortunately, some justification, that "adhering 
parties are not bound to know the undisclosed intentions of the drafters of conven-
tional language that is inconsistent with words actually used." Rubin, Status of 
Rebels 447. 
88 Bastid, D1·oit des gens 334. The author there correctly points out that, to a 
considerable extent, this same position was taken by the Allies after the German 
capitulation in 1945. 
so Pictet, Recueil87-88. See also 1 lCRC Report 35-36, 189-90. 
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position of the Protecting Power. It is believed that these problems are 
more properly included in the discussion of those specific areas.90 
The third paragraph of Article 2 deals with the problem created 
when one of the belligerents in an international armed conflict is not 
a party to the Convention. It will be recalled that the Fourth Hague 
Convention of 1907 included among its provisions a general participa-
tion clause.91 The opposite approach was taken in the 1929 Convention, 
which provided that if one of the belligerents was not a party to it, 
"its provisions shall, nevertheless, remain binding as between the bel-
ligerents who are parties thereto."92 During World War II no bellig-
erent denied the applicability of the 1929 Convention merely because 
of the fact that several of the belligerents, particularly the Soviet 
Union and Japan, were not parties thereto. 'The first sentence of the 
third paragraph of Article 2 is merely a rephrasing of the provision 
contained in its predecessor. It provides that even if "one of the Pow-
ers in conflict"93 is not a party to the Convention, "the Powers who 
are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations." 
This provision should present no problems. However, the second sen-
tence of the paragraph constitutes a somewhat new concept. In order 
to encourage belligerents to comply with the provisions of the Con-
vention even if they are not Parties thereto, it provides that contract-
ing parties shall "be bound by the Convention in relation to the said 
[nonparty] Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions 
thereof." This procedure probably derived from the, at times, success-
ful efforts of the ICRC during World War II to persuade nonparty 
belligerents to comply with the 1929 Convention on a reciprocal basis.94 
Thus, although there is a duty on parties engaged in international 
armed conflict to comply with the provisions of the Convention even 
in the face of noncompliance by an adversary which is a Party-reci-
procity not being a requirement for this obligation95-it is a require-
ment when a nonparty is involved in the international armed confiict96 
inasmuch as the nonparty must both accept and apply the provisions 
of the Convention in order to create the right to expect compliance 
90 See pp. 66-68 infra, and 262-275 infra, respectively. 
91 See note 38 supra. 
92 Article 82. 
93 Once again it would have eliminated possible controversy had the provision 
been made to read "one or more of." See note 85 supra. 
94 1 ICRC Report, 189. For what was a less than successful effort in this regard, 
see ibid., 408-36. 
95 Pictet, Commentary 17-18. Concerning the problem of reciprocity, see pp. 
29-32 infra. 
96 Draper, Recueil 74. He points out that this situation occurred during the 1956 
Suez Conflict, at which time Egypt was already a Party and the United Kingdom 
was not. The latter made a declaration that it would accept and apply the Conven-
tion. 
25 
on the part of the Party to the Convention.97 
It might be asked why a Power would not elect to ratify or accede 
to the Convention, even while it is engaged in international armed con-
flict, rather than to rely 011 its adversary's recognition that it has 
accepted and is applying the Convention. This was apparently fore-
seen as a possibility by the draftsmen, for, while Article 138 (which 
deals with normal ratifications) and Article 140 (which deals with 
normal accessions) both provide for a six-month delay before becom-
ing effective, Article 141 affirmatively provides that when interna-
tional armed conflict as specified in Article 2 occurs, any ratification 
or accession then pending or thereafter made by a belligerent shall be 
given effect immediately. It may be assumed that this is the procedure 
that any State not a party to the Convention would follow if it became 
involved in international armed conflict.9s 
Some years ago a dispute arose with respect to the applicability of 
the Convention in cases involving the United Nations, the suggestion 
having been made that the law of international armed conflict, includ-
ing the 1949 Convention, was binding on any State in conflict with a 
United Nations armed force, but was not binding on the latter.9o This 
suggestion caused quite a furor for a time but there now appears to 
be general agreement that the law of international armed conflict, in-
cluding the 1949 Convention, is applicable to both sides in any United 
Nations enforcement action.loo This is substantially the position taken 
by the United Nations itself.lol 
To summarize, the provisions of Article 2 were intended to, and do, 
make the 1949 Convention applicable in the following: 
(1) All cases of war formally declared between two or more Par-
ties; 
(2) All other cases of armed conflict between two or more Parties; 
(3) All cases of armed conflict between two or more Parties no 
matter what designation such conflict may be given; 
97 This creates a strange situation. Parties to the Convention are bound to com-
ply with its provisions vis-a.-vis nonparties only on a reciprocal basis. By acceding 
to the Convention during the course of the international armed conflict instead of 
merely "accepting and applying" it, the former nonparty can create a legal obliga-
tion on the part of the adversary party to comply with the provisions of the Con-
vention even if the former nonparty does not, in fact comply. In other words, by 
becoming a Party to the Convention the former nonparty belligerent can eliminate 
the requirement of reciprocity on its part! 
os Of course, in view of the number of States already Parties to the Convention 
(see Appendix B), this problem is almost moot. 
00 "Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?" 
1952 Proc. A.S.l.L. 216, 217. 
100 50 Ammail'e de l'Institut de Droit International 376 (II, 1963) ; 54 ibid. 449 & 
465 (II, 1971) ; Soviet International Law 407; 66 A.J.I.L. 465 (1972); Bothe, Le 
droit de la gue1"re et les Nations Unies 187-207; Simmonds, Legal P1'oblems 177-96. 
101 Seyersted, United Nations Forces 190-92. 
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(4) All cases of armed conflict between two or more Parties even 
if the existence of a legal state of war is not recognized, or is denied, 
by one or more of them; 
(5) All cases of the occupation of a part or all of the territory of 
one Party by the armed forces of one or more other Parties, whether 
or not such occupation is preceded, accompanied, or followed by armed 
resistance; 
(6) All cases of armed conflict between two or more Parties even 
if one Power, or more than one Power, to the armed conflict is not a 
Party; and 
(7) All cases of armed conflict involving a Power, or Powers, not 
a Party, on a reciprocal basis, if the Power, or Powers, not a Party, 
accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 
D. COMPLIANCE 
Parallel with the problem of applicability is the problem of compli-
ance. If the international armed conflict is within the provisions of 
Article 2 of the Convention, what are the requirements for compliance 
and how is compliance assured and enforced 1102 
Article 82 of the 1929 Convention stated that "the provisions of the 
present Convention shall be respected by the High Contracting Parties 
in all circumstances." The 1949 Convention made two improvements 
in this stipulation. In the first place, the importance attached to this 
provision by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference (which followed the lead 
of the participants in the preliminary conferences convened by the 
ICRC) was demonstrated by its removal from a position near the end 
of the treaty to one of major prominence as the very first article of 
the 1949 Convention. In the second place, it now provides not only 
that the Parties "undertake to respect" the 1949 Convention "in all 
circumstances"103 (the sole requirement of the 1929 Convention), but 
also that they "undertake . . . to ensure respect for" the Convention. 
Thus, every Party to the Convention has explicitly accepted the obli-
gation of "ensuring" that every other Party to the Convention com-
plies with its provisions ;104 and has implicitly accepted the obligation 
102 See Gass, Can the POW Convention Be Enforced? 27 JAG J. 248. 
103 "In all circumstances" can logically only mean under all of the circumstances 
set forth in A1·ticle 2. Pictet, Commentary 18. 
104 One of the proposals made at the 1971 Conference of Government Experts 
said: 
That there should be collective supervision and enforcement by all States 
Parties to the Geneva Conventions not engaged in the conflict, operating under 
the theory of collective responsibility implicit in Article 1 common to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
1971 GE Report 114, Proposal No. 15. (But see note 110 infra.) Another indica-
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of soliciting and encouraging compliance by nonparties who are in-
volved in international armed conflict. 
The importance of this new aspect of the Article cannot be over-
stated. The change first appeared in the preliminary work done by the 
ICRC during the period between the end of World War II and the 
convening of the Diplomatic Conference in April 1949.105 In explain-
ing this proposed addition to the wording of the Article, the ICRC said: 
The ICRC believes it necessary to stress that if the system of 
protection of the Convention is to be effective, the High Contract-
ing Parties cannot confine themselves to implementing the Con-
vention. They must also do everything in their power to ensure 
that the humanitarian principles on which the Convention is 
founded shall be universally applieq.106 
It cannot be doubted that the moral pressure which could be applied 
to States engaged in international armed conflict, whether or not Par-
ties to the Convention, by the many States which are Parties thereto 
and which are not involved in the particular conflict, would be a tre-
mendous force for compliance-a force which would frequently be the 
determining factor in convincing a belligerent to decide to comply 
with the Convention in the international armed conflict in which it 
is then engaged. Unfortunately, experience since 1949 has demon-
strated a strong reluctance on the part of Parties to the Convention 
to insist, or even to suggest, that Parties so engaged in international 
armed conflict have a duty to comply with its provisions.107 This is 
tion of the generally broad interpretation which this obligation receives is the 
following: 
Thus the International Committee of the Red Cross . . . appears to have 
taken the position that, since the United Nations had not acceded to the Geneva 
Conventions, each contracting party to these Conventions would remain respon-
sible for their application by any contingents they might provide for the 
United Nations, and even that they had a moral obligation to do what they 
could to ensure such application by other contingents, too. 
Seyersted, United Nations Forces 192. 
105 See, e.g., the draft convention submitted by the ICRC to the XVIIth Inter-
national Red Cross Conference which met in Stockholm in August 1948 (Draft 
Revised Conventions 51) and the "Stockholm Draft" adopted by that Conference 
(Revised Draft Conventions 51). 
106 Draft Revised Conventions 5. Article 1 (1) of the 1977 Protocol I is identically 
worded. 
107 The White Paper on the Application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to 
the French-Algerian Conflict, issued by the Algerian Office in New York in 1960, 
said (at 3) : 
In conclusion, we shall point to the need and responsibility of the signatories 
to the Geneva Conventions to use their good offices with the Government of 
France, to achieve its recognition of the obligation it has assumed "to respect 
and ensure respect" for the Geneva Conventions. 
Despite this clarion call for nonbelligerent Parties to take the action which they 
had pledged to take in becoming Parties, in the detailed and well-documented dis-
cussion written by Dr. Bedjaoui concerning the' attempts by the Provisional Gov-
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particularly true with respect to neutral States,IOS but it is often true 
even as to allies.l09 Despite the clear and unambiguous provisions of 
the Convention, many States would very probably consider any such 
efforts as interference in the internal or domestic affairs of another 
sovereign State, even though compliance with the provisions of a 
ernment of Algeria to secure compliance by the French with, first, Article 3 of 
the 1949 Conventions and, later, the Conventions in toto, there is not a single word 
to indicate the intervention of any other Party seeking to ensure respect for the 
Conventions by the French Government. Bedjaoui, Law and the Algerian Revolu-
tion 183-99; 207-20. Even the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya merely 
acted as a conduit between the Provisional Government of Algeria and Switzerland, 
the depositary. Ibid., 183 & 189. 
lOS One of the preambular clauses of Res. XXIII, Human rights in armed con-
flict, 12 May 1968, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, at 18 (1968) stated: 
Noting that States parties to the Red Cross Geneva Conventions [sic] some-
times fail to appreciate their responsibility to take steps to ensure the respect 
of these humanitarian rules in all circumstances by other States, even if they 
are not themselves directly involved in an armed conflict. 
While there were many private voices raised concerning the refusal of India for 
almost two years to comply with the specific release and repatriation provisions of 
the Convention after the December 1971 surrender by the Pakistani forces in East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the official voices of Governments were conspicuous 
by their silence-or perhaps they were just too low in key to be heard, especially 
by India. During the course of the hostilities in Vietnam, some States found it pos-
sible to condemn the United States and the Republic of Vietnam for alleged viola-
tions of the Convention. However, this was probably only because of their animus 
due to the basic fact that the United States was involved in those hostilities. These 
same States made no effort whatsoever to seek to obtain compliance with the Con-
vention by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and by the Vietcong, despite their 
close relations with these two latter, both of which admittedly and publicly refused 
to comply with the Convention as a matter of official policy. 
109 Early in the United States involvement in Vietnam there was severe criticism 
of the United States because it appeared that no action was being taken by the 
latter while the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam publicly violated the 
Convention. See, e.g., Massachusetts Political Action for Peace, What Are We Tied 
to in Vietnam? (1964). Two years later the New York Times reported: "The 
major United States effort, besides setting up its own procedures, has been to per-
suade the South Vietnames.e to go along. [South Vietnamese] Government officials, 
once openly hostile to the Convention, now grudgingly accept the American position. 
Much remains to be done, however, to persuade the average South Vietnamese 
soldier to stop using torture." New York Times, 1 July 1966, at 6 col. 3 Concerning 
the basic legal problem one commentator has stated: "The responsibility of one 
member of a multinational or combined force for the quality of prisoner treatment 
accorded by another is still undefined and awaits further debate to determine the 
extent to which a positive supervisory duty should be imposed." Smith, Appraisal 
902. In Levie, Maltreatment in Vietnam 339, the statement was made that there 
was "no legal duty imposed upon the United States by the 1949 Convention to en-
sure that South Vietnamese troops did not maltreat personnel captured by them." 
As should be clear from the material immediately preceding and immediately fol-
lowing the quoted sentence, what was meant by that statement was that a Party 
was not legally responsible for its ally's failure to comply with the provisions of 
the Convention, particularly if it had used its best efforts, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
obtain compliance. 
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multilateral, almost universal, convention concerning the treatment 
of prisoners of war in international armed conflict would appear to be 
about as "external" and "nondomestic" a matter as could be found.llo 
In order to overcome the reluctance of States to act in this area, 
and to comply with the specific admonition which they accepted in 
Article 1,111 the legal argument has sometimes been advanced that 
this article constitutes a waiver of the provisions of Article 2 (7) of 
the Charter of the United Nations. However, such an argument ap-
pears to embark on too profound, too complicated, and too contro-
versial a legal thesis. The subject matter involved is clearly interna-
tional in scope; authority for the intercession of States not involved 
in a particular international armed conflict is clearly present in the 
specific wording of Article 1 and the obvious intention of the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference; such intercession cannot be considered an un-
friendly act or an unwarranted interference by the interceding State 
in the affairs of the States so engaged in international armed conflict; 
hence, there does not appear to be any need to support compliance 
with this provision with the extremely controversial argument con-
cerning the inapplicability of the Charter restriction. 
The undertaking of each Party to the Convention to respect it under 
all circumstances, together with the concomitant obligation of all oth-
er Parties to the Convention to ensure respect for it, results in an 
obligation which is absolute in character and which is not based upon 
reciprocity. It is in the nature of a statutory obligation owed to all 
other Parties, rather than a contractual obligation owed only to a 
110 Perhaps as a result of the proposal made at the 1971 Conference of Govern-
ment EXperts (see note 104 supra), the 1972 Draft Additional Protocol prepared 
by the JCRC for the consideration of the 1972 Conference of Government Experts 
contained the following provision: 
Article 8. Co-operation of the High Contracting Parties. 1. The High Con-
tracting Parties being bound; by the terms of Article 1 common to the Con-
ventions, to respect and to ensure respect for these Conventions in all circum-
stances, are invited to co-operate in the application of these Conventions and 
of the present Protocol, in particular by making an approach of a humanitar-
ian nature to the Parties to the conflict and by relief actions. Such an approach 
shall not be deemed to be an interference in the conflict. 
1972 Basic Texts 7. Obviously, this was intended as an invitation for concerted 
efforts by neutral Parties to obtain compliance with the provisions of the Conven-
tion in any international armed conflict in which they were not being applied. Un-
fortunately, but perhaps not unexpectedly, the arguments were quickly advanced 
at the 1972 Conference of Government Experts that this would amount to inter-
vention, that there was a duty to respect national sovereignty, that there was a 
duty of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other States, etc. 1972 GE Report 
185. Predictably, the proposed article was not included in the 1973 Draft Additional 
Protocol which was prepared by the ICRC as the working paper for the 1974 
Diplomatic Conference. 
111 Not one State which ratified or acceded to the 1949 Convention made a res-
ervation to the requirements imposed by Article 1. 
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Party's adversary in an international armed confiict.1l2 The question 
then arises as to the extent to which belligerent Parties can be ex-
pected to continue compliance in the face of manifold violations, or 
even utter disregard, of the Convention by the other side. 
When the United States Senate was determining whether it should 
give its advice and consent to the ratification of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, the then General Counsel of the Department of Defense made 
the following statement: 
Should war come and our enemy should not comply with the 
conventions, once we both had ratified-what then would be our 
course of conduct? The answer to this is that to a considerable 
extent the United States would probably go on acting as it had 
before, for, as I pointed out earlier, the tr~aties are very largely 
a restatement of how we act in war anyway. 
If our enemy showed by the most flagrant and general disre-
gard for the treaties, that it had in fact thrown off their restraints 
altogether, it would then rest with us to reconsider what our posi-
tion might be.113 
During the armed conflict in Korea the United States complied with 
the 1949 Convention despite what amounted to almost total disregard 
of its provisions by the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists,114 
During the armed conflict in Vietnam the United States attempted to 
comply with the 1949 Convention despite the denial by both the North 
Vietnamese and the Vietcong that the Convention was even appIica-
ble.l15 Whether the United States, or any other Party to the Conven-
tion, wiII long continue to comply with the COl}.vention in the face of 
a total disregard of its provisions or outright refusal to apply it by 
112 U.N., Human Rights, A/7720, para. 82; Draper, Reclteil 72. Unlike the 1949 
Convention, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict specifically provides, in Article II thereof, for a with-
drawal of protection (limited to the particular property involved), where a viola-
tion occurs and persists. 
113 Testimony of Wilber M. Brucker, 1955 Hearing 11. 
114 None of the particip~nts in those hostilities had as yet ratified or acceded to 
the Convention-but they agreed to be bound by its "humanitarian principles." For 
documentation on the completely unsuccessful efforts of the ICRC to obtain com-
pliance with the four 1949 Conventions by the North Koreans and later by the so-
called Chinese People's Volunteers during the hostilities in Korea (1950-53), see 
ICRC, Conflit de Coree, passim. For the manner in which compliance with the 1949 
Prisoner-of-War Convention in those hostilities by the United Nations Command 
was used for aggressive purposes by the North Koreans and the Chinese, see 
U.N.C., Communist War, passim; U.K., Treatment, passim; and U.S., POlY, 
passim. 
115 While there were undoubtedly numerous violations of the 1949 Convention by 
members of the armed forces of both the United States and the Republic of Viet-
nam, these were the acts of individuals, not the result of the national policy of the 
Parties concerned and, when evidence was available, the individual who committed 
the violation was punished therefor. See, e-g., United States v. Gr((fell. 
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the other side in a future international armed conflict remains to oe 
seen. Certainly, should another such adversary adopt a similar atti-
tude, it can be assumed that the United States might well do what it 
has said it would do-"reconsider what [its] position might be"-if 
for no other reason than to bring pressure to bear to obtain proper 
treatment for members of its armed forces held as prisoners of war, 
treatment which they did not receive in either of the two international 
armed conflicts mentioned. 
Commentators generally appear to be agreed that few States can 
actually be expected to continue to apply the provisions of the Con-
vention in the absence of reciprocity despite the provision to that 
effect contained in the Convention.ll6 At first glance, from a humani-
tarian point of view, this appears to be extremely unfortunate, as it 
means that where one side fails to comply with the Convention, all 
prisoners of war held by both sides will be denied the safeguards of 
the Convention. On the other hand, however, if a Party can only en-
sure that members of its armed forces held as prisoners of war will 
receive the humanitarian treatment contemplated by the Convention 
by affording such treatment to the enemy prisoners of war which it 
holds in custody, this may, in the end, prove more humanitarian than 
unilateral compliance as it may well result in all prisoners of war held 
by both sides receiving Convention treatment. This outcome will, of 
course, depend upon many factors, the principal ones being the gen-
eral national attitude of a Party toward compliance with its inter-
national commitmentsl17 and its concern for the well-being of its own 
HOMiller, The Law of War 219, 230-31, 256, 261, & 262. This problem was dem-
onstrated by events which occurred in the Middle East after the October 1973 
hostilities. Syria refused to furnish the names of the Israeli prisoners of war held 
by her or to allow the ICRC to visit them. Israel, which had furnished the names 
of Syrian prisoners of war, then refused to allow the ICRC to visit them. The 
difficulties escalated and, finally, on 21 January 1974, the ICRC sent an appeal to 
all 135 States Party to the Convention which stated, in part: 
... The competent authorities all too often make reciprocity a condition for 
the application, totally or in part, of the Geneva Conventions. This is equiva-
lent, in prevailing circumstances, to the exercise of reprisals .... The ICRC 
emphasizes that commitments under the Geneva Conventions are absolute, and 
that States, each one to all others, bind themselves, solemnly and unilaterally, 
to observe in all circumstances, even without any reciprocal action by other 
States, the rules and principles which they have recognized as vital. 
14 I.R.R.C. 76-77. 
117 In discussing the problem of compliance, one commentator draws what ap-
pears to be a valid distinction between States which are law-abiding (those which 
are "basically disposed toward compliance with the law of war as a matter of na-
tional policy") and States which are law-defying (those which are "neglectful of 
the law of war or disposed to violate it"). Baxter, Compliance 82. 
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captured personnel.11S 
One of the major reasons why the Austinian school of legal philos-
ophy denies that internatio:nal law is, in fact, law is because of its 
lack of sanctions, its lack of enforcement procedures in the face of 
violations-and the law of international armed conflict in general, and 
that portion thereof relating to prisoners of war in particular, is, un-
fortunately, largely subject to this criticism. As we have seen, great 
reliance was placed by the draftsmen of the 1949 Convention on the 
moral suasion to be applied by other Parties to the Convention who 
were not involved in the international armed conflict, all of whom 
would have agreed to "ensure respect" for its provisions. As we have 
also see, this has been, and can be expected to continue to be, some-
what less than perfect as a method of obtaining substantial compliance 
with the Convention. What other forces for compliance with the Con-
vention are available? One of the recognized experts in this area of 
the law has suggested five: (1) the threat of punishment of individ-
ual violators as criminals; (2) the threat of the award of "compen-
sation" against States which violate the Convention and in favor of 
States which are the victims of such violations; (3) world public 
opinion; (4) third-party protection and inspection; and (5) instruc-
tion of members of the armed forces and annual reporting of the 
nature and extent of such training.119 
The first two "forces" listed are obviously effective only as deter-
rents, as threats of action which will be taken after the act and, usu-
ally, against a defeated foe; the threat of punishment of individuals 
for violations of the Convention is probably just as effective as the 
threat of punishment inherent in any penal code ;120 the threat of the 
118 It is for this latter reason that it is particularly difficult to understand the 
attitude taken by the Soviet Union in 1941-42 when Germany, which held many, 
many more Russians as prisoners of war than the Soviet Union held Germans, was 
willing, on a strictly reciprocal basis, to take some small steps to ease the life of 
the captives held by both sides. The strenuous efforts of the ICRC to effectuate 
that willingness collapsed because of what can only be described as lack of interest 
on the part of the Soviet Union. 1 ICRC Report, 408-25. The miseries endured by, 
and the deaths of, literally hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners of war in 
German hands can be attributed, at least in some small part, to that seemingly 
inexplicable decision of the Soviet Government of that time. 3 ICRC Report 55; 
Dallin, German Rule 426. It can only be explained by the belief, later clearly dem-
onstrated by the same Soviet Government, that all Russian military personnel 
taken prisoners of war were of no further value and either had been, or had be-
come, traitors to their country. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe 469; Fehling, One 
Great Prison ix; Dallin, German Rule 420, 426. See notes VI-79 and VII-141 infra. 
see also Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine 251; Shub, The Choice 44-45; Bethell, 
The Last Secret, passim. 
119 Baxter, Compliance, passim. -
120 Of course, a member of the armed forces of a "law-abiding" State knows 
that he can anticipate punishment by his own national authorities, just as he 
would be punished for any other crime which he committed. See, e.g., note 115 
supra 
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possible award of money damages121 will not be very effective against 
a State which is fighting for its very existence and which is, in any 
event, spending much of its national treasure in prosecuting an inter-
national armed conflict.I:!2 World public opinion is both amorphous and 
ephemeral. It is exceedingly difficult to arouse and almost impossible 
to maintain for a sufficient period of time for it to be effective.123 
Third-party protection and inspection--on-the-spot policing of com-
pliance by a neutral-is unquestionably an effective force for compli-
ance. It is probably the most effective method of securing compliance 
with the 1949 Convention presently available.124 And instruction of 
the members of the armed forces of Parties with respect to the con-
duct legally imposed upon their nation generally and on each of them 
personally by the provisions of the Convention is certainly a matter 
of absolute necessity if individual compliance from the great mass of 
the military is to be obtained.1:!5 But, of course, the imposition of war-
time sanctions against a Party which violates, or permits violations 
of, the provisions of the Convention, discussed above,126 is, most cer-
tainly, a sixth potential method of ensuring compliance with the pro-
visions of the Convention-a method which has not, up to this point 
in time, been exploited.127 
121 Compare Article 3, Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, and Article 131 of the 
1949 Prisoner-of-W ar Convention, and Article 91 of the 1977 Protocol I. 
122 The "reparations" levied against Germany after World War I obviously did 
not deter Nazi Germany from embarking on World War II. 
123 IkIe, After Detection-What? 39 For. AfJ. 208; 209. A notable exception was 
the success of the United States in mobilizing world public opinion against the war 
crimes trials of captured American pilots projected by North Vietnam in 1966. 
Levie, Maltreatment in Vietnam 344-45; Smith, Appraisal 902-04. Pakistan WdS 
considerably less successful in mobilizing world pUblfc opinion when India violated 
the Convention by continuing to detain the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held 
by her for almost two years after the cessation of hostilities. 
124 See the discussion of the Protecting Power at pp. 262-293 infra. 
125 Article 127 of the Convention mandates the obligation "to include the study 
[of the Convention] in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruc-
tion, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and 
to the entire population." Unfortunately, there is no requirement for reports con-
cerning the extent of compliance with the foregoing provisios. However, see 1969 
Implementation, II, at 12-137. See also 1973 Implementation, passim. Article 72 (3) 
of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol was intended to rectify this omission. Con-
cerning this problem, see pp. 93-96 infra. 
121l See pp. 19-22 supra. See also Levie, Working Paper 13-14. 
127 On several occasions the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted 
resolutions [e.g., G.A. Res. 2676, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 77, U.N. Doc. A/8028 
(1971) 1 calling upon "all parties to any armed conflict to comply with the terms 
and provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, of 12 August 1949"; but it has never recommended that sanctions be im-
posed by the Security Council for noncompliance; no matter how patent the viola-
tion or violations may have been. 
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It should be obvious from the foregoing discussion that one area of 
the Convention which greatly needs review and improvement is that 
pertaining to its enforcement; and that the ideal sought-full compli-
ance by all States engaged in international armed conflict-will only 
be attained when all Parties to the Convention affirmatively display a 
willingness to participate in the task of securing compliance without 
regard to the identity of the belligerents. 
E. ENTITLEMENT TO PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS 
We come now to another area of the Convention which was, fore-
seeably, inadequately drafted,128 as has been demonstrated in the 
period since 1949: the identification of the individuals who are 
entitled to be designated prisoners of war and who therefore are en-
titled to the protection of all of the benefits and safeguards set forth 
in the Convention. Article 4, the basic Article dealing with the sub-
ject,129 is the longest and most detailed Article in the Convention. Un-
fortunately, it contains a number of seeds of controversy. 
Article 3 of the Regulations attached to the Second Hague Conven-
tion of 1899 and to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 both stated 
"[i]n the case of capture by the enemy, [members of the armed forces] 
have a right to be treated as prisoners of war."130 (Emphasis added.) 
Article 1 of the 1929 Convention gave prisoner-of-war status to those 
persons within the categories specified in the 1907 Hague Regulations 
who had been "captured by the enemy." The 1947 Conference of Gov-
ernment Experts recommended that the new convention the"n under 
discussion "should itself enumerate these classes of persons" (and not 
incorporate the provisions of another treaty by reference), and that 
they should benefit from the protection of the convention "when they 
fall into enemy hands."131 These recommendations were adopted, and 
the draft convention prepared by the ICRC for the use of the 1948 
Stockholm Conference defined prisoners of war as those individuals 
belonging to one of the categories listed therein "who have fallen into 
enemy hands."132 At Stockholm the quoted phrase was changed to 
"who have fallen into the power of the enemy." This was included in 
128 Baxter, Unprivileged Belligerency 327. 
129 We shall here deal primarily with Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention. However, 
not only will a number of the other articles of the Convention-such as 33, 85, etc. 
-have an impact on this problem, but we must also bear in mind the cognate pro-
visions of the First and Second Conventions. 
130 Only the French version of these Conventions was official. In Articles 4 and 
7 of both sets of Regulations the French version defined prisoners of war as being 
"au pouvoir de" the Detaining Power; but for some unknown reason, while in 
Article 4 this was correctly translated into English as "in the power of," in Article 
7 it was translated as "into whose hands prisoners of war have fallen." See, c.g., 
36 Stat. 2296-97; and Deltenre 258-61. 
l:n 1947 GE Report 104. 
1:12 Article 3, Draft Revised Conventions 52. 
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the opening sentence of Article 4A of the 1949 Convention without 
change. While the change of wording from "captured by the enemy" 
to the present phrase "who have fallen into the power of the enemy" 
was one of the changes adopted in order to make the 1949 Convention 
more inclusive,133 and is something of an improvement, it has, as we 
shall see, solved some problems while creating others. 
Rhetorically, "capture" implies some affirmative act by the military 
forces of the capturing power. On the other hand, an individual can 
have "fallen into the power of the enemy" by means other than cap-
ture, e.g., by voluntary surrender.134 Thus, upon the final collapse of 
Germany in May 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France contended that the hundreds of thousands of German soldiers 
who thereafter passed into their custody were not entitled to prisoner-
of-war status because they had not been "captured" but had volun-
tarily submitted themselves to Allied custody; and the term "Surren-
dered Enemy Personnel" (SEP) was coined135 in order to avoid the 
use of the term "prisoner of war," with all of the legal implications 
which adhered to it.136 The major reason for substituting the term 
"fallen into the power of the enemy" for the word "captured" was to 
preclude the use of such a subterfuge in any future international 
armed conflict and to ensure that military personnel who surrender, 
133 The representative of the ICRC (Wilhelm) who participated in the delibera-
tions of Committee II (Prisoners of War) at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference ex-
plained that "it had been suggested that the words 'fallen into enemy hands' had a 
wider significance than the word 'captured' which appeared in the 1929 Conven-
tion." 2A Final Record 237. See also note II-377 infra, and Wilhelm, Status 29. 
For the sake of brevity, the terms will be used interchangeably herein except 
where the text indicates otherwise. (While the Diplomatic Conference made the 
first paragraph of Article 5 conform to Article 4A, it overlooked the fact that the 
second paragraph of Article 5 contained the phrase I'fallen into the hands of the 
enemy"-and that the first paragraph of Article 12 contained the phrase "in the 
hands of the enemy Power.") 
134 By "voluntary surrender" is meant the act of the individual who, contrary to 
his long-term desire, concludes that in view of the situation with which he is then 
confronted (national capitulation, he is separated from the armed forces to which 
he belongs, he is lost and weaponless, etc.), it is not possible for him to continue 
resistance. (The problem of deserters and defectors is discussed at pp. 76-81 infra.) 
13u JAGA 1946110384,7 January 1947. The term "disarmed personnel" was also 
employed. PMG Review, III, 226-27. The same practice was followed after the 
surrender of Japan. 1 ICRC Report 539-40. 
131) United States v. Kaukoreit. The distinction was discontinued in March 1946. 
1 ICRC Report 540. In the internal armed conflict which occurred in Malaysia in 
the early 1950s there was a reversal of this terminology, the term "captured enemy 
personnel" (CEP) being used to designate individuals who had been captured and 
who were to be treated as criminals, and the term "surrendered enemy personnel" 
(SEP) being used to designate individuals who had voluntarily given themselves 
up and who were to be treated as prisoners of war. This was apparently intended 
to encourage surrenders. Miller, The Law of War 258-59; Brewer, Chieu Hoi 51. 
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even after the collapse of their country's government or military effort, 
will still be entitled to receive the full protection of the Convention.l31 
Having specified the event (falling into the power of the enemy) the 
occurrence of which would entitle certain individuals to prisoner-of-
war status, it was necessary to identify in some fashion the individuals 
who would so qualify. This was accomplished by following the method 
used in predecessor conventions: the enumeration of general catego-
ries. Because so many problems are involved in determining the extent 
of coverage in almost every category, an individual, detailed analysis 
is deemed necessary. 
1. Members of the Armed Forces 
All of the members of the regular armed forces of a nation fall with-
in this category.138 The precise military elements which constitute the 
armed forces of a State is strictly a matter of national law.l30 Each 
State may, and usually will, have laws specifying the components 
which are included within its regular armed forces. l4o As we shall 
see,14l in the next subparagraph of this Article of the Convention there 
are four specific requirements which must be met in order to entitle 
an individual within the category there dealt with to prisoner-of-war 
status. These four requirements, briefly stated, are: (1) having a re-
sponsible commander; (2) wearing a fixed distinctive sign; (3) car-
rying arms openly; and (4) operating in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war. This enumeration does not appear in subpara-
graph 1, dealing with the regular armed forces. This does not mean 
that mere membership in the regular armed forces will automatically 
entitle an individual who is captured to prisoner-of-war status if his 
137 Draper, Recueil109; Kunz, Treatment 105; Olgiati, Croix-Rouge 719; Krafft, 
Present Position 137-38. It will be noted that nowhere in the Convention is the 
term "prisoner of war" defined. Flory, Nouvelle conception 54. 
138 While subparagraph (1) of Article 4A uses the term "armed forces" and 
subparagraph (3) thereof uses the term "regular armed forces," this appears 
merely to have been bad draftsmanship, the intent of the draftsmen having been 
the same in both cases. And, of course, these terms include all of the uniformed 
services which constitute a part of the armed forces of a particular country: 
army, navy, air forces, marines, coast guard, frontier guards, etc. (In the United 
States and, perhaps, in some other countries, the word "regular" is often used to 
designate the professional military careerist. This is not the sense in which it is 
used here. The conscript, the wartime volunteer, the reservist called up for active 
service, and the career soldier are all members of what is here termed "regular 
armed forces." See, e.g., In re Territo 156 F2d at 146.) Article 43 (1) of the 1977 
Protocol I states that "[t]he armed forces of a Party to the conflict consist of all 
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible 
to the Party for the conduct of its subordinates." See also Article 43 (3) thereof. 
]39 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 255. This does not mean, however, that a State may, 
by domestic legislation, bring otherwise unprivileged combatants within the pro-
tection of the Convention. 
140 See, e.g .. 10 U.S.C. §101 (4) ; and Swiss Manual para. 54. 
H] See pp. 44-45 infra. 
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activities prior to and at the time of capture have not met these 
requirements.142 The member of the regular armed forces wearing 
civilian clothes who is captured while in enemy territory engaged in 
an espionage or sabotage mission is entitled to no different treatment 
than that which would be received by a civilian captured under the 
same circumstances.143 Any other interpretation would be unrealistic, 
as it would mean that the dangers inherent in serving as a spy or 
saboteur could be immunized merely by making the individual a mem-
ber of the armed forces; and that members of the armed forces could 
act in a manner prohibited by other areas of the law of armed con-
flict and escape the penalties therefor, still being entitled to prisoner-
of-war status.144 
As long as members of the regular armed forces are in uniform 
there should be no problem with respect to their entitlement to pris-
oner-of-war status.145 There is no legal basis whatsoever for denying 
142 The official ICRC discussion of the Convention refers only to the need for 
members of the regular armed forces to comply with the requirement for a fixed 
distinctive sign, a requirement which is, of course, normally met by the wearing 
of the uniform. Pictet, Commentary 52. This is logical because it can be assumed 
that in the regular armed forces there will always be a responsible commander; 
that the uniformed individual may carry arms in any manner that he desires; and 
that if he violates the laws and customs of war he is still ~ntitled to prisoner-of-
war status even though he may be tried for war crimes. See note 144 infra. While 
the Delegate of the Soviet Union at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference appeared to 
argue that none of the four requirements was applicable to members of the armed 
forces (2A Final Record at 466), it is believed that the interpretation here given· 
is more appropriate and much more widely accepted. 
143 Article 29, second paragraph, 1907 Hague Regulations; British Manual 
para. 96; U.S. Manual para. 74. However, if he claims to be entitled to prisoner-
of-war status he is entitled to have his claim determined by a "competent tri-
buna!." See discussion of Article 5 (2), pp. 55-59 infra. See also Public Prosecutor 
v. Koi; Ali and Another v. Public Prosecutor; Krofan v. Public Prosecutor; and 
Military Prosecutor v. Kassem and Others. For discussions of the Privy Council 
decisions in Koi and Ali, see Baxter, Qualifications 290; and Elman, Prisoners of 
War 178. 
IH A distinction must be made between a conventional war crime allegedly 
committed by an individual concededly within the purview of Article 4 who, under 
Article 85, retains prisoner-of-war status at least until convicted (see pp. 379-382 
infra), and other types of offenses such as acting as a spy or saboteur while 
wearing civilian clothes. Ez parte Quirin; Colepaugh v. Looney; Krofan v. Public 
Prosecutor. For a further discussion of this problem see Draper, Recueil 109-10. 
See also Article 46 of the 1977 Protocol I. (It should be observed that spying, 
while punishable under the law of war, is not a violation of international law. 
U.S. Manual para. 77; British Manual para 326; Swiss Manual paras. 36 & 38; 
Baxter, Unprivileged Belligerency 333.) 
145 The Swiss Manual para. 55 correctly states: "In case of capture, the uniform 
creates a presumption that the individual wearing it belongs to the armed forces." 
(Trans. mine.) See also Article 40 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol. Article 
46 (2) of the 1977 Protocol I specifically provides that a member of the armed 
forces gathering information in enemy territory "shall not be considered as engag-
ing in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces." 
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the benefits and safeguards of the Convention to acknowledged mem-
bers of regular armed forces on the ground that they are guilty of 
making "aggressive war" and are, therefore, "war criminals," as was 
done by the North Vietnamese during the hostilities in Vietnam 
(1965-73).146 
This subparagraph also includes "members of militias or volunteer 
corps forming part of such armed forces." Of course, when such 
troops are, by domestic law, incorporated into and made a part of the 
armed forces of the country, there can be no question of their entitle-
ment to prisoner-of-war status and to the benefits and safeguards of 
the Convention.147 
2. Members of Other Militias and Members of Other Volunteer 
Corps, Including Those of Organized Resistance Movements, 
Belonging to a Party to the Conflict and Operating in or outside 
Their Own Territory, etc. 
Here we have the most complicated, most controversial, and most 
unintelligible provision of the Article. In an effort to clarify the pro-
visions of this subparagraph to the maximum extent possible, it will 
be necessary to analyze it clause by clause, and to include in the anal-
ysis the limiting provisions which immediately follow it. 
a. MEMBERS OF OTHER MILITIAS AND MEMBERS OF 
OTHER VOLUNTEER CORPS 
When this subparagraph of Article 4 was being discussed and re-
drafted at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the representative of the 
United Kingdom requested that there be an independent reference to 
militias inasmuch as in England militias were not a part of the reg-
ular armed forces nor were they voluntary corps. As this particular 
problem was not mentioned again in the lengthy debate on this sub-
paragraph which followed, it must be assumed that the United King-
dom request is the reason for the reference to militias other than those 
146 See notes 142 and 144 supra, and notes 157 and VI-177 infra. Concerning 
the "Commissar Decree," issued by the Nazis in 1940, evidence was given to the 
IlVIT that it provided that "political commissars of the army are not recognized 
as prisoners of war, and are to be liquidated at the latest in the transient 
prisoner of war camps." I.M.T. 472. Under such an interpretation, reminiscent 
of the Religious Wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, law becomes 
irrelevant. Concerning the 'Commando Order," issued by Hitler in 1942, under 
which uniformed members of the Allied armed forces engaged in missions behind 
the German lines were to be dealt with summarily ("slaughtered to the last 
man"), another gross violation of the rights of members of the regular armed 
forces, see I.M.T. 471; The Dostle1' Case; and Kalshoven, Reprisals 184-93. 
14'Thus, in the United States when Reserve or National Guard units are 
called to active duty in the Federal service they are just as much a part of "the 
armed forces of a Party to the conflict" as are the regular (permanent) units. 
The same is true in the United Kingdom with respect to the Territorial Army, 
the Army Emergency Reserve, and the Home Guard. Dl"ifish Manual para. 80 
n.l. See Jones, Status of the Home Guard in International Law, 57 L.Q. Rev. 212. 
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which form a part of the regular armed forces.148 It presumably would 
be applicable to the members of any militia which is not, under na-
tionallaw, a part of the armed forces of the country. This will prob-
ably be a comparatively rare occurrence. 
b. INCLUDING THOSE OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE 
MOVEMENTS 
The inclusion of this clause, and the limiting provisions which fol-
low it, a direct result of the experiences of World War II, was consid-
ered to be a major breakthrough in enlarging the group of individuals 
who would, upon falling into the power of the enemy, be entitled to 
the status of prisoners of war.149 It is now apparent that, considering 
the aforementioned limiting provisions, this attempted enlargement 
of the provisions of prior conyention~ accomplished little or nothing. 
During World War II so-called resistance movements sprang up or 
were created within the territory of most of the countries occupied by 
ail enemy, whether the occupation was partial or total.150 It was with 
respect to the status of members of these types of resistance move-
ments that the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was attempting to make 
provision.lGl However, because of a perhaps understandable reticence 
148 The British position is stated at 2A Final Record 237. The Working Party of 
the Special Committee recommended the double reference to militias (ibid., 414-
15) and it was adopted without real debate. Ibid., 467, 477-78, & 561. The ICRC 
errs in asserting that the captioned provision means "other than those enlisted in 
the regular army." (Emphasis added.) 1973 Commentary 48 n.14. See note 138 
supra. 
149 The official ICRC discussion of the Convention refers to this provision as 
"solving one of the most difficult questions-that of partisans." Pictet, Commen-
tary 49. This was a reiteration of what Committee II (Prisoners of War) of the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference had said. 2A Final Record 561. The two statements 
were both overly optimistic. Baxter, Geneva Conventions 66. 
150 Of course. allies, displaced governments, and governments-in-exile continued 
to fight on so that in most cases there was no question of the continued existence 
of an international armed conflict. The situation in France, where the government 
in power on the ground had signed an armistice agreement while a government-
in-exile, newly created, continued the conflict, was different and created a number 
of unusual legal problems. Pictet, Recueil 87-88. 
l~l It is important to bear in mind that in drafting Article 4A (2) the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference was concerned solely with the World War II "partisan," 
"guerrilla," "resistance fighter," etc.-different names for a particular category 
of participant in international armed conflict-and not at all with the so-called 
"freedom fighter," or "member of a national liberation movement," participants 
in an internal armed conflict, a war of independence. The Soviet Union has im-
plicitly admitted this distinction by opting to attempt to convert wars against 
colonial powers into international armed conflicts. Soviet International Law 402. 
That many of the newly independent States see the Soviet approach as a method 
of helping the various, groups fighting for independence was demonstrated by the 
discussions concerning the amendment to Article 1 of the 1973 Draft Additional 
Protocol adopted by Committee I at the 1974 Diplomatic Conference and approved 
at the Plenary Meeting of the 1977 session of the Conference as Article 1 (4) of 
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on the part of the representatives of some countries which had not 
suffered occupation and who feared the possible adverse future con-
sequences of an overly broad provision,152 a number of limitations were 
introduced, limitations which, in many cases, appear to negate the 
possibility that members of the usual resistance group could qualify 
for prisoner-of-war status if they should fall into power of the enemy. 
If the term "organized" was used as a method of eliminating the 
casual soloist, it was unnecessary, as this type of individual was al-
ready denied prisoner-of-war status because he would not be "com-
manded by a person responsible for his subordinates."153 The use of 
the term "organized" here can, however, certainly be accepted as a 
justifiable excess of caution. 
c. BELONGING TO A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT 
Our concern throughout this treatise is, of course, with international 
armed conflict-armed conflict between States. It is understandable 
that it was considered appropriate that for individuals to receive the 
protection afforded by a convention regulating international armed. 
conflict, they should be required to have some organizational connec-
tion with one of the States which is a Party to the conflict. This pro-
vision arose out of the events of World War II; but, strangely enough, 
it does not even provide with any degree of certainty for all of the 
situations which are recognizable as having occurred during that con-
flict. The Soviet Government could and did claim the resistance move-
ment which operated behind German lines in the Soviet .Union; the 
United States Government could and did claim the resistance movement 
which operated against the Japanese in the occupied Philippines. Each 
of these representative resistance movements was fighting in support 
the 1977 Protocol!. Forsythe, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian 
Law: Some Observations, 69 A.JJ.L. 77; Suckow, The Development of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, ICJ Rev., June 1974, at 50. See also 1969 Reaffirma-
tion 101-02. 
152 The following apt statement appears in 2A Final Record 469: "During the 
course of further discussion Captain Mouton (:t-fetherlands) said that there were 
two points of view: that of the Powers likely to be Occupying Powers in the event 
of another war (those were usually the great Powers) and the Powers whose 
countries were likely to be occupied (the smaller Powers) .... " 
153 Schwarzenberger, Human Rights 252. See also Fooks, Prisoners of War 
34-35. The phrase quoted in the text ("commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates"), a reiteration of one of the provisions of Article 1, 1907 Hague 
Regulations, had already been included in the draft article. It is discussed at 
length at pp. 45-46 infra. The two terms, "organized" and "commanded by a 
person responsible for his subordinates," should be understood in the same sense. 
Bindschedler 41. See also Article 41 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol. This 
Article, with editorial changes, became Article 43(1) of the 1977 Protocol!. The 
relevant portion now states: "Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal 
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict." 
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of, and with the concurrence of, a government with an army in the 
field and indubitably" [belonged] to a Party to the conflict." But what 
of the resistance movements in such countries as Norway,154 Denmark, 
or the Netherlands? Is a "government-in-exile" a "Party to the con-
flict" ?155 And what of a situation such as that which existed in Yugo-
slavia where one indigenous resistance movement, which would prob-
ably have been repudiated by the government in power at the time of 
the occupation, fought the occupying Power, while another, which 
probably would have been acceptable to that government, fought the 
other resistance movement and supported the occupying Power? And 
what of the situation in Italy where, after Mussolini's downfall, an 
indigenous resistance movement opposed the Badoglio Government and 
supported the Germans? And finally, what of the situation in France 
where t1!.e indigenous resistance mov~ment opposed the Government 
in actual power and supported the government-in-exile ?Hi6 While none 
of these situations is specifically covered by the quoted provision of the 
Convention, each one of them, and others not mentioned, had actually 
occurred during the hostilities which had ended just shortly before 
the provision was drafted. It is not difficult to conclude that it was 
intended to cover each of the instances in which the indigenous re-
154 It is here assumed that a government such as that of Quisling in Norway 
during World War II was not an indigenous government but was merely a mas-
querade for the military government of the Occupying Power. This assumption is 
not made with respect to the contemporaneous Petain Vichy Government of 
France. 
Hi5 Subparagraph 4A(3) gives prisoner-of-war status to "[m]embers of regular 
armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recog-
nized by the Detaining Power." See pp. 59-60 infra. At the 1949 Diplomatic Con-
ference the suggestion was made that a similar provision should be included with 
respect to members of organized resistance movements. 2A Final Record 388. No 
action was taken with respect to this suggestion. Such a provision was proposed 
anew in Article 38 (1) of the 1972 Draft Additional Protocol (1972 Basic Texts 
14-15) and in the first paragraph of Article 42 of the 1973 Draft Addition Pro-
tocol (1973 Commentary 47, 50). It is now included in Article 43 (1) of the 1977 
Protocol I. 
150 Article X of the 1940 Franco-German Armistice required the French Gov-
ernment to "forbid French citizens to fight against Germany in the service of 
States with which the German Reich is still at war" and provided (according to 
the unofficial English version) that those individuals who so fought would be 
treated as "insurgents." (The unofficial English version of Article XIV of the 
1940 Franco-Italian Armistice used the term "combatants outside the law.") After 
the Allied landing in France in June 1944 the German commander announced that 
captured members of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) would be treated 
as unprivileged combatants and the German army actually executed 80 of them 
at one time. The FFI then executed 80 members of the German army captured 
at Annecy. The ICRC subsequently obtained informal verbal assurances that cap-
tured members of the FFI would be treated as prisoners of war. 1 ICRC Report, 
520-24. Kalshoven, Reprisals 193-97. (The examples given in the text are not 
intended to be exhaustive.) 
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sistance movement was opposing an Occupying Power; it is somewhat 
more difficult to establish a basis for bringing under the Convention 
those resistance movements which supported the invader. Can it be 
said that they "belonged" to a Party to the conflict? It certainly must 
be assumed that the governmental representatives present at the 
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in 1949 were cognizant of all of 
these variations-but did they intend that the provisions of the Con-
vention be applicable in all of these cases ?I57 The Record of the Con-
ference does not answer this question. 
It has been mentioned above that the Soviet and United States 
Governments, each a Government of a State which was "a Party to 
the conflict," publicly acknowledged the resistance movement which 
was acting in its support.I5S Unfortunately, the situation is not always 
so clear-cut, and the Government of the Party to the conflict is not 
always so eager to claim or to acknowledge the relationship. In this 
event the relationship may be established on behalf of the resistance 
movement by other means, provided that at least a de facto relation-
ship is shown.159 However, it is extremely unlikely that the existence 
157 One extremely distressing facet of this problem is the inordinate likelihood 
that in any international armed conflict in which the Soviet Union is involved, it 
will take the position that members of any resistance movement supporting it, or 
its allies, are fighting in a "just" cause and are, therefore, entitled to prisoner-of-
war status; but that any such individuals supporting its adversary are "aggres-
sors" engaged in an "unjust" war and, accordingly, are not entitled to the bene-
fits and safeguards of the Convention. Trainin, Guerrilla Warfare 561-62; Kul-
ski, Some Soviet Comments 349; Soviet International Law 402 & 423; Kunz, 
Treatment 106; U.K., Treatment 1 & 32; Miller, The Law of War 223-24 & 231-
The laws of war (ius in bello) apply equally to both sides in all international 
armed conflicts, no matter how they originate. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 218; Ford, 
Resistance Movements 369; SIPRI 2-3. Moreover, "crimes against peace" (the war 
crime of making a war of aggression) can be committed only by national policy-
makers, not by individual members of the armed forces. ILC, Niirnberg Principles, 
para. 117; Levie, Maltreatment in Vietnam 351 n.140; SIPRI 1-
158 Some of the other Governments took similar action. See, e.g., the Royal 
Dutch Emergency Decree No. E62 of 5 September 1944. See also 11 Dept. State 
Bull. 263, containing a declaration of the United States concerning the Czechs 
fighting in occupied Czecho:;lovakia. Frequently, however, Governments are reluct-
ant to acknowledge irregular combatants. See U.N., Human Rights: A/8052, 
para. 175. The ICRC has said that the requirement of belonging to a Party to the 
conflict "creates the link whereby a subject of international law can be held inter-
nationally responsible for acts carried out by members of resistance movements." 
1973 Commentary 50. 
159 Pictet, Commentary 56-58. Pictet suggests that specifics such as the delivery 
of arms and other war supplies by the Party to the conflict to the resistance move-
ment establish the de facto relationship. Ibid., 57 n.l. See also U.N., Human 
Rights, A/8052, para. 175. A subsequent ICRC document suggested that this re-
quirement could be met either by de facto liaison with a State or by obtaining 
"recognition by one or more States, or even by the international community." 1971 
GE Documentation, VI, at 17. If the second alternative means recognition by a 
State other than the one to which the resistance movement allegedly "belongs," or 
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of even a de facto relationship would be accepted as evidence that the 
resistance movement "belonged" to a Party to the conflict in the face 
of a denial of any relationship by that Party. 
The ~ituation which was either not considered as possible by the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference, or which was implicitly rejected by the 
Conference without discussion, was the eventuality that the claim 
might be put forward that individuals who are members of a group 
which admittedly does not belong to any Party to the conflict and 
which is, therefore, waging a "private war" against one of the bellig-
erent States, are entitled to prisoner-of-war status when they fall into 
the power of the State against which the efforts of the group have 
been directed. Writers in this field have rejected such a claim;160 and 
one well-reasoned opinion of an Israeli military court has specifically 
held that inasmuch as no Government with which Israel was in a state 
of war accepted responsibility for the acts of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine, its members who fell into the power of 
the Israeli armed forces were not entitled to the benefits and safe-
guards of the Convention.lOl 
d. OPERATING IN OR OUTSIDE THEIR OWN TERRITORY, 
EVEN IF THIS TERRITORY IS OCCUPIED 
This is one provision of the subparagraph which liberalizes rather 
than limits. The usual concept of the organized resistance movement 
is of a group operating in home territory occupied by the enemy. 
Under this provision that concept is inapplicable; the group may also 
an ally thereof, this would undoubtedly be considered by many States to be an 
unwarranted interference in the affairs of other States. It strongly resembles the 
premature recognition of belligerency of another era. 
160 See, e.g., Bindschedler 40; and Draper, Relationship 202. The argument has 
been advanced that inasmuch as the French version of Article 4A (2) uses the 
word "appartenant," it is not necessary that the resistance movement actually 
"belong" to a Party ip. the English sense of that word. Apart from the fact that 
the English and French versions are equally authentic, one major difficulty with 
that argument is that French-English dictionaries translate "appartenir''' as "to 
belong [to]; to be owned [by]." See, e.g., Harrap's New Standard French-English 
Dictionary, I, at A :49 (1972). It is clear that in this instance, unlike a number of 
others, the French and English texts are identical. 
161 Military Prosecutor v. Kassem, 42 I.L.R. at 477-78. The correctness of that 
decision was demonstrated by the action of an Arab guerrilla group, the head-
quarters of which proudly announced to the press that it had captured an Israeli 
soldier during a raid into Israel and that he had been "subjected to interrogation 
by a special committee before he was executed." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 October 
1974, at 7A, col. 2. It does not take much imagination to interpret "interrogation 
by a special committee" as a euphemism for torture; and as the individual cap-
tured was a uniformed Israeli soldier taken during the course of a raid into Israel, 
it would be interesting to learn the alleged justification for his execution. No 
Arab State claimed this group-but there are those who contend that if its mem-
bers are captured they are entitled to the full panoply of the protections of the 
Convention! 
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operate outside of its national territory. Probably what the draftsmen 
had in mind was the resistance group behind enemy lines which with-
draws as the enemy withdraws so that eventually it is operating in 
the territory of an ally which was also occupied by the common enemy, 
or it is operating in the enemy's own territory. This provision does 
not appear to create any insoluble legal problems; but what a State 
will actuallY do when members of an organized resistance movement 
composed of enemy subjects fall into its power in its own territory 
remains to be seen. 
e. THE FOUR CONDITIONS 
During the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) the Germans summar-
ily executed as a franc tireur any individual found bearing arms who 
was not able to produce a special authorization from the French Gov-
ernment.16:! Article 9 of the 1874 Declaration of Brussels163 proposed 
to regularize the status of these individuals by specifically granting 
protection to members of militia and volunteer corps who met four 
listed conditions.16o! These conditions were repeated in Article 1 of 
the 1899 Hague Regulations, in Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Regula-
tions, and in the footnote to Article 1 of the 1929 Prisoner-of-War 
Convention. In the 1949 Convention the four conditions were once again 
included in the text itself and, in addition to being applicable, as here-
tofore, to members of "militias and volunteer corps," they were made 
applicable to members of organized resistance movements. In the 
modern world, it is in this latter respect that the provision assumes 
major importance. But it must be emphasized that in order to qualify 
for prisoner-of-war status, the members of an organized resistance 
movement must clearly fulfill each and everyone of these four condi-
tions,105 and that most Capturing Powers will deny the benefits and 
162 Fooks, Prisoners of War 34. 
163 While this Declaration, based largely on the Lieber Code (see note 28 supra), 
never entered into force, it has been a major source of many of the rules included 
in subsequent international conventions which did become effective. 
164 One noted Soviet jurist designated this decision as a victory for the "repre-
sentatives of democratic states with militia systems." Trainin, Guerrilla Warfare 
541. He thereafter pr9ceeds to indicate why several of the four conditions cannot 
possibly be accepted for application to organized resistance movements. Ibid., 
555-60. However, at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the Soviet representative 
strongly supported the adoption of the Stockholm draft which included the four 
conditions. 2A Final Record 242, 410, 423, 428. 
165 Military Prosecutor v. Kassem, 42 I.L.R. at 476 & 480. One author draws a 
distinction between those requirements for qualification for prisoner-of-war status 
which relate to the resistance group itself and those which relate to the individual. 
Bindschedler 40-44. The ICRC has now adopted this distinction, although its list-
ing does not coincide exactly with that of Madame Bindschedler-Robert. 1973 
Commentary 49. There is considerable merit to the drawing of this distinction-
which means that in certain respects the individual's status is determined by 
matters over which he has little or no control. See text in connection with note 
193 infra. 
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safeguards of the Convention to any such individual who is in any 
manner delinquent in compliance. It must also be emphasized that if an 
individual is found to have failed to meet the four conditions, this may 
make him an unprivileged combatant but it does not place him at the 
complete mercy of his captor, to do with as the captor arbitrarily 
determines. He is still entitled to the general protection of the law of 
war, which means that he may not be subjected to inhuman treatment, 
such as torture, and he is entitled to be tried before penal sanctions 
are imposed.10o 
First condition: that of being commanded by a person responsible 
for his subordinates. As we have already seen,167 this condition is 
closely akin to the requirement that the resistance movement be one 
which is "organized." But exactly what is the meaning of the phrase 
"commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates"? Who is 
such a person? One interpretation is that it means "responsible to 
some higher authority."168 However, it would seem equally important 
that the responsibility go down as well as up. In other words, there 
must be some commander who is giving orders to the individuals who 
are actually conducting belligerent operations: a commander who can 
expect that his orders will normally be obeyed and who can enforce 
some type of disciplinary action to ensure that those orders will be 
obeyed.109 In the words of the ICRC, "the 'responsible leader' estab-
161}1971 GE Documentation VI, at 19. In adhering to the Convention, the Pro-
visional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Vietnam (the Vietcong) 
made a reservation in which it stated that it would not recognize the "conditions" 
set forth in Article 4A (2) "because these conditions are not appropriate for the 
cases of people's wars in the world today." Quoted in McDoweil (ed.), Digest of 
United States Practice in International Law 1975, at 812. (The adherence of the 
Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the former Portuguese colony of Guinea, contains an 
almost identical reservation.) 
107 See note 153 supra. 
168 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 257 n.l. Article 42(1) (a) of the 1973 Draft Addi-
tional Protocol proposed changing the wording of this condition to: "that they 
are under a command responsible to a Party to the conflict for its subordinates." 
The lCRC explanation of the proposed change was that "responsibility for the 
acts of subordinates means that the command is answerable for them to the 
Party to the conflict which bears the responsibility on an international plane!' 
1973 Commentary 50. Such a provision is now included in Article 43 (1) of the 1977 
Protocol!. See note 153 supra . 
• 169 British Manual para. 91 n.l, advances the thesis that in order to meet the 
first condition the individual must be subject to "military law," apparently mean-
ing the national statutory military code governing the conduct of members of the 
regular armed forces. For all practical purposes, this thesis would make Article 
4A (2) an exercise in futility. In the example there referred to, the "Waffen S.S." 
divisions, it is stated that the S.S. organization "had its own code of rules, and 
courts of a kind." This appears to be just about all that can be asked of a unit 
which, by definition, is not a part of the regular armed forces. (Of course, in any 
event, no claim could be made that the "Waffen S.S." was a resistance movement. 
It did have some of the characteristics of an "other militia.") Article 43 (1) of the 
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lishes a link with the subject of international law [the Party to the 
conflict], while constituting the guarantee of a certain order, a certain 
discipline ensuring respect for international law."17o It would seem 
clear that this was the objective sought in the original drafting of 
this condition-a method of securing maximum compliance with the 
laws and customs of warP1 
One maj or aspect of the problem of being commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates which appears to have been largely 
overlooked is how the member of an organized resistance movement 
who is captured by the armed forces of the Occupying Power estab-
lishes that he has complied with this condition and that he is, there-
fore, entitled to be classified as a prisoner of war. The other three con-
ditions, as we shall see, present factual problems which can be resolved 
in the same manner as any other factual problem. But how does the 
captured individual establish, and to the satisfaction of an enemy not 
inclined to magnanimity, that he is a member of an organized resist-
ance movement with a responsible commander? To name or otherwise 
identify his immediate commander or any other persons in the re-
sistance movement's chain of command would, except in a few very 
unusual cases, spell extinction for the movement. It has frequently 
been argued that it is virtually impossible for captured members of an 
organized resistance movement to establish that they have complied 
with the four conditions and are entitled to prisoner-of-war status. 
This is certainly true of the first condition. If the members of an 
organized resistance movement wish to assure their entitlement to 
prisoner-of-war status if captured, their compliance with the second, 
third, and fourth conditions is not impossible-although it will very 
considerably reduce combat effectiveness; but to establish compliance 
with the first condition will make continued operations by organized 
resistance movements virtually impossible.172 
Second condition: that of having a fixed distinctive sign recogniz-
able at a distance. The objective of the original draftsmen of this pro-
vision was probably twofold: (1) to protect the members of the armed 
forces of the Occupying Power from treacherous attacks by apparently 
1977 Protocol I requires only that there be "an internal disciplinary system." See 
note 153 supra. 
170 1971 GE Documentation, VI at 13. 
171 The word "ensuring" is frequently used (or misused) in this context. Full 
compliance with the laws and customs of war can never be "ensured," no matter 
how well trained the members of an armed force or of an organized resistance 
movement may be, nor how strict the discipline. Realistically, all that can be 
sought is maximum compliance so that violations are the exception, rather than 
the rule. 
172 Having called the four conditions a "victory" (see note 164 supra), Trainin 
asserts that the first condition is "directed against the very substance of a war 
of the people." Trainin, Guerrilla Warfare 558. 
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harmless individuals ;173 and (2) to protect innocent, truly noncom-
batant civilians from suffering because the actual perpetrators of a 
belligerent act seek to escape identification and capture by immedi-
ately merging into the general population.174 Each of the two require-
ments for the distinctive sign (that it be "fixed" and that it be "recog-
nizable at a distance") can create problems, cause disputes, and give 
rise to charge and countercharge. 
What is meant by a "fixed" distinctive sign? Must it be sewed on 
or will a handkerchief tied around the arm (which can be restored to 
its normal use with a single tug) suffice? Does a distinctive cap, which 
can be quickly removed and thrown away, meet the requirement? 
These are but a few of the problems of application which can arise. 
These and many others have already arisen and had not been satis-
factorily resolved when the identical terms used in the two prior 
Hague Conventions and in the 1929 Prisoner-of-War Convention were 
incorporated into Article 4A (2) of the 1949 Convention. 
The ICRC has made several statements attempting to offer accept-
able interpretations of the meaning of the term "fixed distinctive 
sign." In 1960 it stated that the sign "must be worn constantly" ;171; 
but in 1971 it backtracked somewhat when it said that the sign must 
be "fixed, in the sense that the resistant should wear it throughout all 
the operation in which he takes part."176 Moreover, at that same time 
the ICRC stated that the sign "might be an armband, a headdress, 
part of a uniform, etc."177 During World War II the listed items were, 
on various occasions, used by resistance groups; but they were fre-
quently removed and disposed of at crucial moments in order to enable 
the individual to escape being identified as a member of the resistance 
and as a participant in the particular belligerent act which had occa-
sioned the search by the Occupying Power-in order to enable him 
"to become invisible ... in the crowd."178 
In One author aptly states: "Thus, if a guerrilla were to disguise himself as an 
innocent peasant, overtake a group of soldiers, and turn around to fire on them, 
this would be treachery, and a violation of the laws and customs of war." Eind-
schedler 43-44. Sce also Lubrano 21. 
174 Another apt statement by Madame Bindschedler-Robert: "[H]e may try to 
become invisible in the landscape, but not in the crowd." Bindschedler 43. 
175 Pictet, Commentary 59. This conclusion was contrary to the opinion of the 
Working Party of the Special Committee at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. 2A 
Final Rccord 424. 
176 1971 GE Documentation, VI, at 11. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Sec note 174 SU1)ra. See also Fooks, Prisol1el'S of War 36. He may legally dis-
card the distinctive sign after the particular operation has been finally concluded. 
1973 Commentary 51. 
48 
If this provision is to have any meaning at all,17O it must be inter-
preted, or redrafted, in such a manner as to ensure that the "fixed 
distinctive sign" is indeed both fixed and distinctive. The candlestick 
maker by day may legally become the resistance fighter by night-
but while he is so acting he must wear some item which will identify 
him as a combatant, thereby distinguishing him from the general 
population, and that item must be such that he cannot remove and 
dispose of it at the first sign 'of danger. A handkerchief, or rag, or 
armband slipped onto or loosely pinned to the sleeve does not meet 
this definition. An armband sewed to the sleeve, a logotype of sufficient 
size displayed on the clothing, a unique type of jacket-these will con-
stitute a fixed and distinctive identifying insignia, effectively separat-
ing the combatant of the moment from the rest of the population. 
The further requirement for the sign is that it be "recognizable at 
a distance." As long ago as 1924 Fooks said of this requirement: "The 
distance at which the sign must be distinguishable is vague and un-
determined."180 The ICRC has taken the, for it, rather unexpected po-
sition that the sign must be "recognizable at a distance by analogy 
with uniforms of the regular army."lSl Certainly, the members of few 
resistance groups have possessed or worn distinctive signs analogous 
to the uniforms of the regular armed forces, nor could they, in the 
vast majority of cases, be expected to do so or be able to do so. 
Lauterpacht goes even further than the ICRC, stating: 
... it is reasonable to expect that the silhouette of an irregular 
combatant standing against the skyline should be at once distin-
guishable from that of a peaceful inhabitant by the naked eye of 
ordinary individuals, at a distance at which the form of an indi-
vidual can be determined.182 
This appears to place a greater requirement on a member of a resist-
ance group than is placed on members of the regular armed forces for, 
apart from a weapon, the skyline silhouette of a fully uniformed and 
helmeted soldier would not distinguish him from a peaceful inhabitant 
at maximum, or near-maximum, naked-eyesight distance, particularly 
at dusk or in the dark. 
179 One very pithy observation concerning this condition says: "Short of pre-
scribing colored or luminous uniforms, an air of unreality has always surrounded 
this particular piece of draftsmanship." Schwarzenberger, Human Rights 252. 
Another equally critical author has stated that "the requirement that combatants 
carry 'a fixed distinctive sign reco&"Jlizable at a distance' has an exotic air when 
seen in conditions of 'underground' guerrilla warfare." Stone 565. 
180 Fooks, Prisoners of War 36. To the same effect see Schwarzenberger, Human 
Rights 252 and Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 257 n.2. 
1S11969 Reaffirmation 116-17; repeated in 1971 GE Documentation, VI at 11. 
182 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 257 n.2. For an example which, perhaps, offers some 
support for the Lauterpacht .position, see Military Prosecutor'll. Kassem 42 I.L.R. 
at 478. 
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Thus, the problems presented by the requirement of having a fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance appear to be such that few, 
if any, members of resistance groups will be able to overcome them. 
For this reason the thesis has been advanced that the requirement of 
the distinctive sign should be eliminated.183 It has been suggested that 
the third condition, that of carrying arms openly, is adequate for iden-
tification purposes and that the wearing of the distinctive sign should 
only be required as an alternative or substitute for compliance with 
the third conditionYH But weapons, like armbands, are easily disposed 
of when the necessity arises-and how do the armed forces of the 
Occupying Power identify the recent resistance fighter, identifiable 
only by the possession of a weapon, who, immediately upon finding 
himself in danger, has disposed of his weapon and has become "invisi-
ble in the crowd" among the true noncombatants who are entitled to 
be protected from belligerent activities, and the effects of those activi-
ties, in which they have had no part? 
By Article 42(1) (b) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol the ICRC 
proposed to substitute for the second and third conditions the require-
ment that "they [members of organized resistance movements] dis-
tinguish themselves from the civilian population in military opera-
tions." This would seem to limit the period of required identification 
to the period of actual military operations, to which, in the nature of 
things, there does not appear to be any major objection.185 The phrase 
requiring them to "distinguish themselves from the civilian popula-
tion" is certainly general enough to permit interpretations which 
would include all possible contingencies. But therein lies its weakness. 
Practically every case will involve a contested factual determination, 
Il>a Trainin's arguments to support this thesis (that even uniforms do not pre-
vent surpdse attacks at night by guerrillas and that "the intention and activity 
of guerriilas would be obvious even without a uniform") appear to miss the point 
completely and, in any event, are not very convinCing. Trainin, Gue1Tilla War-
fare 558. 
HH 1971 GE Documentation VI, at 11. In Soviet International Law 424, the 
position is taken that both the second and the third conditions" would place parti-
sans at a clear disadvantage." Professor Kozhevnikov, the author of this chapter 
of the Soviet treatise, does not state why he believes that partisans should be 
given an advantage vis-a-vis the regular uniformed soldier, a result which would 
necessllrily follow if those two conditions were completely eliminated. 
18~ See note 178 supra, and pp. 53-54 infra, of the text. Such a provision, con-
siderably modified, was ultimately included in Article 44 (3) of the 1977 Protocol 
I which reads: 
Article 44-Combatants and prisoners of war 
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects 
of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation prepara-
tory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed con-
flict where, owing to the nature of the hostilities [,] an armed combatant cannot 
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one which will be made by the Occupying Power-and few Occupying 
Powers will be inclined to be magnanimous in reaching factual deter-
minations as to the entitlement to prisoner-of-war status of individ-
uals who have, perhaps within the hour, engaged in hit-and-run tactics 
that have severely hurt the Occupying Power, particularly the morale 
of its armed forces. Nevertheless, the proposed provision does have 
merit and could, to a limited extent-if reasonably applied-solve 
some of the problems involved in attempting to balance the protection 
to which captured members of organized resistance movements would 
be entitled with the protection to which members of the regular armed 
forces are entitled against the activities of illegal combatants. 
Third condition: that of carrying arms openly. This is, unquestion-
ably, the least ambiguous of the four conditions.18G A sidearm or hand 
grenade or dagger concealed in the clothing does not constitute com-
pliance with this condition.ls7 A rifle or a submachine gun carried 
openly would constitute compliance. In each case the facts should not 
be particularly difficult of ascertainment nor subject to insoluble dis-
pute. 
Fourth condition: that of conducting their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war. It would seem indisputable that if 
the members of organized resistance movements are to be permitted 
to claim the protection of the relevant laws and customs of war, they 
must, in turn, themselves comply with those laws and customs. Obvi-
ously, it would be of little practical avail to attempt to urge upon a 
so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, 
in such situations, he carries his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a 
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is 
to participate. 
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered 
as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c). 
l8G1971 GE Documentation, VI, at 13. But see U.N., Human Rights, A/8052, 
para. 178; and Soviet International Law 424. Article 42(1) of the 1973 Draft 
Additional Protocol did not include the requirement of carrying arms openly. But 
see Article 44 (3) of the 1977 Protocol I, quoted in note 185 supra. 
187 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 257 n.3. See also Military Prosecutor v. Kassem, 42 
I.L.R. at 478-79. In Vietnam individuals who were apparently civilian noncombat-
ants (women, children, working farmers, etc.) would approach American service-
men in seeming innocence and then suddenly toss a hand grenade at them. (See 
note 173 supra.) After a very few such incidents the soldiers understandably came 
to distrust all civilians while they were in the field and frequently took definitive 
action upon suspicion and without waiting to ascertain the facts. Thus, the orig-
inal illegal actions taken by the guerrillas subsequently endangered the members 
of the civilian population who, as noncombatants, were entitled to be protected in 
their st'\tus. One author believes that this provision is contrary to the principle 
that compliance with the Convention is not based on reciprocity, Kleut, Guerre de 
partisans 103. See the reference to Article 42 (1) of the 1973 Draft Additional 
Protocol and to Article 44 (3) of the 1977 Protocol I in note 186 supra. 
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State engaged in international armed conflict that captured members 
of an organized resistance movement were entitled to prisoner-of-war 
status and to treatment in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war, including the 1949 Convention, even though those same resistance 
fighters had been conducting their operations against the armed forces 
of that State in complete disregard of those very laws a.nd customs-
as, for example, by killing members of the State's armed forces cap-
tured by them, thus denying the very protection which they them-
selves would now be seeking.188 Moreover, if members of organized 
resistance movements were not held to this standard, this could even 
be advanced as an excuse for noncompliance with the various other 
provisions of this subparagraph already discussed! 
Despite the weight of the foregoing arguments, the contention has 
at times been advanced, in an attempt to justify the elimination of this 
condition, that to require compliance with the laws and customs of 
war by resistance fighters would render it impossible for them to op-
erate.189 This same argument has, of course, been put forth with re-
spect to every limitation, or attempt to place limitations, on the opera-
tions of irregular combatants. But if one side in an international 
armed conflict is to be permitted to operate with no restraints what-
soever on its conduct, it is inevitable that the other side will eventually 
do likewise-and we have then turned the calendar back many centu-
ries to the days when international armed conflict was almost com-
188 Pictet, Humanitarian Law 105. See note 161, supra. Article 41 (1) (c) of the 
1973 Draft Additional Protocol would have required only that the "new category 
of prisoners of war" therein created conduct their military operations "in accord-
ance with the Conventions and the present Protocol." Since Article 2 of that Pro-
tocol defined "Conventions" as meaning only the four 1949 Conventions, compli-
ance with other laws and customs of war, such as those contained in the 1907 
Hague Regulations, would not have been required. This has been rectified in the 
1977 Protocol I where Article 43 (1) requires the enforcement of "compliance with 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict" and Article 44 (2) 
specifies that "all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict," while Article 2 (b) defines the term as mean-
ing "the rules applicable in armed conflict set forth in international agree-
ments to which the Parties to the conflict are Parties and the generally recognized 
principles and rules of international law which are applicable to armed conflict." 
189 See the arguments collected in Bindschedler 41-43 and in U.N., Human 
Rights, A/8052, para. 180. See note 161 supra. Those who advance this thesis are 
really concerned with the so-called freedom fighter who is engaged in armed con-
flict with the armed forces of a colonial power. See G.A. Res. 2852, 26 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. 29, at 90, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1972; and note 151 supra. See' also Article 
1 (4) of the 1977 Protocol!. They would probably be among the strong supporters 
of the condition if the resistance movement were operating against them in an 
international armed conflict. 
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pletely lacking in restraints. Fortunately, there appears to be compar-
tively little real support for this position.190 
One rather difficult problem can arise with respect to the fourth 
condition. Does violation of the laws and customs of war by one, or 
several, members of an organized resistance group constitute a failure 
to comply with the requirements of the condition and thereby dis-
qualify all of the members of the group? Perhaps an even more diffi-
cult question is the entitlement of an individual member of an organ-
ized resistance group to prisoner-of-war status upon capture when 
he has himself scrupulously complied with the laws and customs of 
war, but the group of which he is a member has perhaps announced 
that it does not consider itself bound by such laws and customs and 
it has, in fact, admittedly violated them. 
It would seem that where, as a matter of policy and official direction, 
the great majority of the members of an organized resistance move-
ment conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war, there has been compliance with the fourth condition, even if 
there have been individual instances of yiolations.l9l The converse is 
190 1971 GE Documentation, VI, at 14 & 16; Bindschedler 41; U.N., Human 
Rights, A/8052, para. 179. The Soviet position, as set forth in Soviet International 
Law 423, states: 'The laws and customs of war apply not only to armies in the 
strict sense of the word, but also to levies, voluntary detachments, organized reo 
sistance movement [sic] and to partisans." Trainin's arcane statement on this 
matter is probably to the same effect. Trainin, Guerrilla Warfare 560. But see 
note 164 supra. This condition was probably the most objectionable to the Viet-
cong. See note 166 supra. Nevertheless, this condition, considerably strengthened 
by the Diplomatic Conference, was ultimately included in the 1977 Protocol I. See 
note 188 supra. 
191 The U.S. Manual para. 64 (d) states: 
This condition is fulfilled if most of the members of the body observe the 
laws and customs of war, notwithstanding the fact that the individual mem-
ber concerned may have committed a war crime. 
See also 1971 GE Documentation, VI, at 14; and U.N., Human Rights, A/8052, 
para. 179. Article 42 (2), 1973 Draft Additional Protocol, specifically provides that 
nonfulfillment of the conditions listed in Article 42 (1) by individual members of 
a resistance movement does not deprive the other members of that movement of 
the status of prisoners of war if captured. It further provides that the particular 
individual who fails to fulfill those conditions would, if prosecuted, be entitled to 
the judical safeguards of the Convention and, even if sentenced, would retain his 
status as a prisoner of war. See note 197 infra. The Diplomatic Conference did 
not deem it necessary to include a provision in the 1977 Protocol I protecting the 
law-abiding members of the movement, probably because Article 44 (1) thereof 
gives entitlement to prisoner-of-war status to all "combatants," except those who 
have allegedly violated the law of war prior to capture. These latter are, under 
Article 44(3) and (4), entitled to protections equivalent to those contained in the 
1949 Convention and the 1977 Protocol I, including specifically the judicial safe-
guards. 
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not true. Inasmuch as compliance with all four of the conditions is 
"constitutive" in nature,192 the failure of the organized resistance 
movement as a whole to meet the fourth condition makes it impossible 
for any of its members to qualify for prisoner-of-war status. This is 
one of the several instances where the individual member of an or-
ganized resistance movement has only indirect and limited control over 
the factors which will determine his right to prisoner-of-war status 
in the event that he should fall into the power of the enemy.193 
It is believed that the foregoing discussion has demonstrated the 
validity of the qualms earlier expressed concerning the problems in-
herent in the interpretation and implementation of this aspect of 
Article 4 of the Convention. That the present author is not alone in 
questioning the possibility of a truly humanitarian interpretation and 
implementation of these provisions during a period of international 
armed conflict is obvious from the numerous works that have been 
written dealing with this subject, many of which have been noted. 
In 1971 the ICRC concluded that "the accent should be placed on" 
the third and fourth conditions: carrying arms openly and operating 
in accordance with the laws and customs of war.194 It then went on 
to say that "throughout each military operation" the guerrilla in in-
ternational armed conflict must "clearly mark his status as a com-
batant" and that this could be done either by a distinctive sign or by 
carrying arms openly, the objective being to make it possible for any 
observer to discern immediately the fact that an individual is a com-
batant and not a member of the civilian population.195 
Article 38 of the 1972 Draft Additional Protocol proposed by the 
ICRC was an attempt to eliminate some of the problems discussed 
above. It provided that the resistance movement could belong to a 
"government or ... authority not recognized by the Detaining Power" ; 
that in order to qualify, the resistance movement had to comply ,vith 
the laws of armed conflict; that in conducting military operations the 
members of the resistance movement had to show their combatant 
status by displaying their arms openly or had to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population by a distinctive sign or by other means; 
192 1971 GE Documentation, VI, at 14; Bindschedler 41. In other words, it is 
only by complying generally with all of the conditions that the organized resistance 
movement brings its members within the provisions of Article 4A (2) of the Con-
vention. See also 1973 Commentary 51. For conduct which precludes recognition of 
the entire resistance movement as legal combatants, see note 161 supra. 
19:1 See note 165 supra. Other instances are the requirements that the group be 
organized, that it belong to a Party to the conflict, and that it have a responsible 
commander. The individual would still be entitled to the protection of the last para-
graph of Article 5 of the Fourth Convention. Stone, Legal Controls 566. 
HH 1971 GE Documentation, VI, at 16. As the ICRC there notes these are the 
only two conditions mentioned in Article 4A (6) as requirements to qualify mem-
bers of the levee en masse for prisoners-of-war status. See pp. 64-66 infra. 
195 Ibid., 17. 
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that they had to be organized and to have a responsible commander; 
that individual violations would not forfeit the right of the other mem" 
bers of the resistance group to prisoner-of-war "treatment" ;196 and 
that individuals not meeting these requirements would, as a minimum, 
receive the treatment provided for in Article 3 of the Convention 
(dealing with armed conflict not of an international character). 
Finally, Article 42 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol proposed 
by the lCRC, drafted after the intervening 1973 Conference of Gov" 
erninent Experts, while basically only a redraft of the 1972 proposal, 
had two maj or changes: the provision concerning the requirement of 
carrying arms openly or wearing a distinctive sign was changed to 
require merely "that they distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population in military operations"; and members of the resistance 
movement guilty of violating the 1949 Conventions and the Protocol 
were to be given the protection of the judicial guarantees of the Con" 
vention "and, even if sentenced, retain the status of prisoners of 
war."197 
Neither of these proposals adequately solves many of the problems 
which exist with respect to the attempt to bring the members of or-
ganized resistance movements within the protection of the 1949 Con" 
venti on ; nor does it appear that there is much likelihood of the drafting 
and general acceptance of any other useful substitute for the present 
provisions which are, for the most part, both ambiguous and compara-
tively ineffective despite the fact that they have four times been 
adopted by the international community and now have three quarters 
of a century of international usage.198 
196 If the word "treatment" was used as a synonym for the word "status," it was 
improperly used. "Prisoner-of-war treatment" is not legally the equivalent of 
"prisoner-of-war status." Rubin, Status of Rebels 479-80. It may be that the use 
here was intentional. See U.N., Human Rights, A/8781, para. 161. See also note 
256 infra. 
197 The latter provision is found in Article 42 (2) of the 1973 Draft Additional 
Protocol. Presumably, it refers to violations of Article 13, 130, etc., of the Con-
vention, offenses which constitute conventional war crimes, and not to a failure 
to meet the requirements of Article 42(1) of that Protocol. 1973 Commentary 
51-52. This provision would, then, merely reitt'rate the provisions of Article 85 
of the Convention. If this presumption is incorrect, it was indeed a strange pro-
posal inasmuch as those who failed to meet the requirements for qualification for 
prisoner-of-war status, set forth in Article 41 (1) of the Protocol, and were con-
victed of being illegal combatants, would "retain" prisoner-of-war status! Article 
44 of the 1977 Protocol I is more clearly drafted. See note 191 supra. 
HlS An excfeUent summary of the difficulties which confront the draftsman who 
attempts to solve the problem just discussed is to be found in Schwarzenberger, 
Human Rights 253, where the author says: " ... any proposed change of the law 
in the direction of relaxing an)' of the existing conditions of the legality of irreg-
ular armed forces and armed risings is unlikely to result in a greater protection 
of guerrilleros. If a belligerent must expect that in combat zones and occupied ter-
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Before leaving this subject it is appropriate to point out that the 
probability of controversy in areas involving the identification of per-
sons entitled to prisoner-of-war status was not overlooked by the 
draftsmen of the Convention. During World War II the decision that 
an individual was not entitled to prisoner-of-war status had frequently 
been made summarily and by persons of very low rank.1!!!! There was 
no formal "recognition" process as such and, concededly, for the most 
part no such process was required.20o Nevertheless, the problem had 
arisen on occasion-and it was not difiicult to foresee that a new and 
greatly enlarged provision on entitlement to prisoner-of-war status 
would correspondingly increase the number of problems arising in this 
area. Accordingly, the 1948 Draft Revised Convention contained a 
new and novel proposal which ultimately became the second paragraph 
of Article 5 of the 1949 Convention. That paragraph states: 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having commit-
ted a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the ene-
my, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such 
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until 
such time as their status has been determined by a competent 
tribuna1.201 
Obviously, this provision serves a double purpose: (1) it prohibit..c; 
the procedure sometimes followed in the past of executing first and 
ritories daytime civilians become nighttime irregulars, he is likely to cease distin-
guishing between genuine civilians and irregulars in civilian disguise and treat the 
whole of the civilian enemy popUlation as potential-and unprivileged-belliger-
ents. 
"More likely than not, excessive permissiveness in the redrafting of the relevant 
rules would merely lead to total repression practiced against guerrilleros and the 
civilian population alike." 
Moreover, as stated in Prugh, Current Initiatives 263: "They [humanitarian 
objectives] cannot be achieved by drafting protocols that will not stand up to the 
test of the battlefield, they cannot derive from conventions that few nations will 
sign, fewer ratify, and fewer still adhere to [i.e., comply with]." 
199 2B Final Reco/'d 270; Ford, Resistance Movements 377. 
200 When he made his study of prisoners of war immediately after World War 
II, Feilchenfeld concluded that "there is no such thing und('1' existing law as a 
formal 'recognition' of prisoners of war." Feilchenfeld, P1'isoncl's of War 23. He 
went on to urge that "the growth of such a new institution should not be en-
couraged. Every captive should enjoy the treatment of a prisoner of war until he 
is proved otherwise." Ibid. The draftsmen of the 1949 Convention apparently dis-
regarded his admonition against institutionalizing the process of recognition of 
prisoner-of-war status, but did adopt the suggestion that all combatants falling 
into the power of the enemy should be afforded the protection of the Convention 
until their nonentitlement is formall;\T established. 
:!lIl The provisions of this Article are, of course, applicable to the identification 
of persong allegedly falling within any of the various categories enumerated in 
Article 4. It is discussed at some length at this point because it is with respect to 
Article 4A (2) that the vast majority of cases requiring sllch a determination 
will arise. 
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investigating later-the individual who falls into the hands of the 
enemy is entitled to the protection of the Convention until the contrary 
is established ;20:! and (2) it provides for the determination of cases 
involving disputes as to the entitlement of individuals to prisoner-of-
war status to be made by a "competent tribunal"-without, however, 
indicating exactly what is meant by the term.!103 
When the Law of Land Warfare was issued by the United States 
Army in 1956, it stated that the "competent tribunal" should consist 
of "a board of not less than three officers.":!O! Similarly, a Royal War-
rant issued in 1958 included Prisoner of War Determination of Status 
Regulations which provide that in the British army the determination 
of the entitlement to prisoner-of-war status in questionable cases will 
be made by a "board of inquiry."205 Neither of these provisions had 
202 In legal jargon it would be said that there is a presumption of entitlement 
to prisoner-of-war status subject to rebuttal by the Detaining Power. While there 
is no indication as to where the ultimate burden of proof is placed, it would prob-
ably be on the individual inasmuch as he is advancing the claim to a privileged 
status. See Public Prosecutor v. Koi, [1968] A.C. at 855. But see Baxter, Qualifica-
tions 293-94. Article 45 (1) of the 1977 Protocol I provides that a person who has 
participated in hostilities and who has fallen into the power of the enemy "shall be 
presumed to be a prisoner of war" and, therefore, entitled to the protection of the 
1949 Convention, "if he claims the status of prisoner of war, or if he appears to be 
entitled to such status, or if the Party on which he depends claims such status on 
his behalf." It further provides that if there is doubt as to his entitlement, he shall 
continue to have prisoner-of-war status until his actual status has been determined 
by a "competent tribunal." (See note 203 ini'ra.) Article 45 (2) of the Protocol 
provides th:lt the decision a5 to entitlement to prisoner-of-war status shall be made 
by a "judicial tribunal" and that "[w]henever possible ... this adjudication shall 
occur before the trial for the offence." (But see note 216 infra.) 
203 The provision first appeared as Article 4 of the Draft Revised Convention 
submitted by the ICRC to the 1948 Stockholm Conference (D1"C!/t Revised Conven-
tions 55: "some responsible authority") and was there approved with minor editing 
(Revised Draft Conventions 53-54: " a responsible authority"). At the 1949 Diplo-
matic Conference the wording moved to "by military tribunal or by a competent 
military authority with officer's rank" (2A Final Reco)·d 480), to "military tri-
bunal" (ibid.), to "competent tribunal" (2B Final Rcco'rcl270-72). It is clear that 
the term "competent tribunal" was not intended to limit jurisdiction to make the 
decision to the "regular" courts (2A Final Record 563). Conversely, there is no 
reason to believe that a regular civilian court would not constitute a "competent 
tribunal." 
20! U.S. Manual para. 71 (c). Note that the burden is placed on the individual 
to assert that he is entitled to prisoner-of-war status in older to activate the pro-
cedure. Public Prosecutor v. Koi, [1968] A.C. at 855, 859. See note 202 supra. The 
U.S. Manual further provides [in para. 71 (d)] thlt if a board's decision is 
against entitlement to prisoner-of-war status, the individuals concerned still "may 
not be executed, imprisoned, or otherwise penalized 'without further judicial pro-
ceedings to determine what acts they have committed and what penalty should be 
imposed therefor." 
205 Bl'itish Manual, Appendix XXVII, First Schedule. The constitution and pro-
cedeure of a "board of inquiry" :is governed by the Army Act, 1955, and by the 
Rules issued thereunder. 
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ever been implemented or applied, and no reported use had been found 
for the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 5, during most 
of the international armed conflicts which have occurred since 1949.:!OG 
It was only in Vietnam, with its large-scale irregular 0Yarfare, that 
the problem assumed Homeric proportions which requIred the imple-
mentation and application of the above-quoted provisions. As early as 
May 1966, the United States Army reacted to the problem of the need 
to have a formalized procedure for deciding the doubtful cases of en-
titlement to prisoner-of-war status of individuals captured by its 
forces. It issued a directive on the subject207 which was probably the 
first one issued by any armed force fully implementing the provisions 
of the second paragraph of Article 5.208 
Briefly stated, the directive provided that when a detained person 
had committed a belligerent act and it was doubtful that he was en-
titled to prisoner-of-war status, or it had been determined informally 
that he was not so entitled and he disputed this determination, his 
case would be referred to an "Article 5 tribunal" ;209 the tribunal was 
to consist of three or more officers who should be, and at least one of 
whom was required to be, military lawyers ;210 the tribunal was di-
rected to conduct a hearing in accordance with the procedure therein 
specified at which the person whose status was in question had a right 
to counsel ;211 and the tribunal had to reach a decision as to entitlement 
or nonentitlement to prisoner-of-war status, a decision of entitlement 
being final, but a decision of nonentitlement being subject to legal 
review and an order for a rehearing or an administrative grant of 
:!OlJ Few disputes concerning the identity of individuals entitle a to prisoner-of-
war status occurred during the several Middle East armed conflicts or in the sev-
eral Indo-Pakistani armed conflicts. In fact, in the armed conflict between India 
and Pakistan which occurred in 1971, some thousands of individual Pakistanis 
were categorized as prisoners of war who obviously did not fall \vithin that class-
ification. Levie, Indo-Pakistani Agreement 95 n.6. Even in Korea the problem was 
relatively minor. 
:!1J7 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Directive 
20-5, 17 May 1966, Prisoners of War-Determination of Status. This directive was 
subsequently refined and reissued on several occasions. The version to which ref-
erence wiII be made herein is that of 15 March 1968 which is reproduced in part 
at 62 A.J.I.L. 768. 
208 In Milita1'y Prosecutor v. Kassem, decided in 1969, the Israeli Military Court 
said (42 I.L.R. at 472): "We do not know whether a 'competent tribunal,' within 
the meaning of Article 5, has been set up in any part of the civilized world either 
under the Geneva Convention or any other international agreement." At that time 
the United States Army directive being used in Vietnam was almost three years 
old, had been redrafted and reissued on at least two occasions in the process of its 
refinement based on experience, and had probably been applied in a substantial 
number of cases. Unfortunately, it had received very little publicity. 
20[1 MACV Directive 20-5, 15 March 1968, para. 5f. 
210 Ib id •• para. 6e (1) and Annex A, para. 3. 
211 Ibid., Annex A, particularly paras. 8 & 9. 
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prisoner-of-war status by the commanding general.212 (This directive 
has been set forth in some detail because of the fact that it undoubted-
ly broke new ground in the area of the determination of the entitle-
ment of a particular individual to prisoner-of-war status. Of course, 
the value of such a directive depends largely upon the spirit in which 
it is applied. In this respect, unfortunately, little information appears 
to be available.) 21:: 
Several proposals have been made with respect to the "judicial" de-
terminations of entitlement to prisoner-of-war status. Thus, it has 
been suggested that any international agency created for the purpose 
of ensuring the protection of human rights in armed conflicts could 
also perform the functions of the "competent tribunal" of Article 5 ;2H 
and it has also been suggested that the determinations could be made 
by the use of a writ to a proposed "Special Tribunal of World Habeas 
Corpus."215 Neither of these suggestions appears to be of a nature 
which would be acceptable to States. It does appear, however, that 
when the "competent tribunal," however established, finds against 
entitlement to prisoner-of-war status, there should be a required re-
view procedure, even if it is no more than review of the file by a 
senior commander, or even by a specifically designated senior member 
of his staff. The membership of the tribunals will, in all probability, 
frequently include lower echelon and low-ranking combat officers who, 
understandably, will not be overly inclined to be generous towards a 
recent enemy. By requiring review by a senior commander of decisions 
212 Ibid., para. 6g. The directive also provided for the reference to a tribunal of 
all cases in which an original informal classification as a prisoner of war was 
later challenged by the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam, the Power to whom 
custody had been transferred under Article 12 of the Convention, and the individ-
ual concerned claimed that he had been properly classified. Ibid., Annex E. See 
Haight, Shadow TV ar 49. 
213 The subject has not been mentioned in any of the Annual Reports of the 
ICRC issued during the relevant period. According to one author the ICRC Dele-
gate in Saigon was highly complimentary of this and a parallel directive [United 
States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)], Directive 381-46, 27 
December 1967, Military Intelligence: Combined Screening of Detainees). See 
Haight, Shadow War 47. 
214 U.N., Human Rights, A/8052, para. 116. It has also been suggested that 
there should be a right of appeal to an international body when there has been 
an adverse decision made under proposed Article 42 of the 1973 Draft Additional 
Protocol. See para. 8(b) of the 1973 NGO Memorandum. (There is no indication 
in this Memorandum that the draftsmen were aware of the "existence of the pro-
visions of the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Convention.) 
215 Kutner, World Habeas Corpus 744. It seems extremely unlikely that the very 
States with respect to which the need for third-party decision would be most 
compelling would ever become parties to a treaty creating an individual right of 
habeas corpus to an international tribunal. But see the McDougal & Reisman 
Working Document, "Establishing a Convention for World Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and Regional Courts of World Habeas Corpus." 
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adverse to the individual, there would be more assurance that a proper 
decision had been reached, while at the same time avoiding a procedure 
that would be completely unacceptable to many States-intervention 
on an international basis.216 Of course, the individual would retain the 
protection of the Convention until any adverse decision had been 
finally approved by the reviewing authority. 
3. Members of Regular Armed Forces Who Profess Allegiance to a 
Government or an Authority Not Recognized by the Detaining 
Power 
Once again the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was attempting to sup-
ply a rule which would cover situations which had caused numerous 
problems during World War II with its many "governments-in-exile" 
and, not infrequently, with competing such governments.217 In June 
1944 the French Provisional Government, then located in Algiers, 
sought, through the ICRC, to ensure that prisoner-of-war status 
would be accorded to captured members of the "French Forces of the 
Interior" (FFI) fighting in occupied France in support of the Allied 
landing in Normandy. It was contended, and apparently not disputed, 
that these forces and their members conformed fully to the four con-
ditions of the 1907 Hague Regulations and, thus, to Article 1 of the 
1929 Prisoner-of-War Convention. The German Government replied 
to the ICRC that "it has no knowledge of the existence of any Provi-
sional Government at Algiers."218 As such problems multiplied, the 
ICRC addressed a note to all of the belligerent States in which it 
said, in part, with respect to the entitlement to prisoner-of-war status 
of all persons who fell into enemy hands and who had complied with 
the four conditions: 
:nG It will be recalled that the MACV directive provided for the type of review 
suggested herein. See text in connection with note 212 supra. Article 45 (2) of the 
1977 Protocol I requires that "whenever possible" the adjudication of entitlement to 
prisoner-of-war status by the "judicial tribunal" should take place prior to the trial 
for the offense and, normally, in the presence of the Protecting Power. See note 
202 supra. There is no provision for review of the decision on status. It is believed 
that the adjudication of entitlement of prisoner-of-war status will, not infrequent-
ly, have to be made by the court to which a case has been referred for trial of the 
substantive offense. This was the procedure followed in such cases as Public Pros-
ecutor v. Koi; Ali and Another v. Public Prosecutor; Military Prosecutor v. Kas-
sem and Others; etc. 
217 See, e.g., 1 ICRC Report 525 n.l. 
218 Ibid., 522. See note 156 supra. (While that particular episode involved the 
status of members of a resistance group, rather than of the regular armed forces, 
it is indicative of the problems which occur when a government participating in 
an international armed conflict is not recognized by the enemy Power.) Pictet says 
that the ICRC was successful in obtaining prisoner-of-war status for captured 
members of the uniformed de Gaulle armed forces in Africa and in Italy and for 
captured members of the regular Italian armed .forces who fought the Germans 
under Badoglio after the 1943 Armistice. Pictet, Humanitarian Law 101. 
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The International Committee are of [the] opImon that the 
principles stated must be applied, irrespective of all juridical 
arguments as to the recognition of the belligerent status of the 
authority to whom the combatants concerned belong.2I9 
The opinion so expressed became the basis for Article 3 (2) of the 
Draft Revised Convention submitted by the ICRC to the 1948 Stock-
holm Conference22o which, with one major change, became Article 
4A(3) of the 1949 Convention.221 
There is little question but that in such cases as the uniformed 
forces of the Danes, Dutch, French, Poles, etc., who continued to fight 
the Germans after the original defeats, each did profess allegiance 
to a "government" and, moreover, to a government which was not 
recognized by the Germans.222 But what is the meaning of the term 
"authority"? Apparently, it was intended to cover such contingencies 
as a goverment which had ceased to exist and had not been replaced, 
even by a "government-in-exile."223 
One very interesting problem with respect to this provision has 
already been the subject of official discussion. Does the provision pre-
clude trials for treason under domestic law where the individual has 
fought in support of a government installed in a country by the Oc-
cupying Power? The Nordic Experts, no doubt concerned about future 
Quisling governments which might recruit forces to fight on behalf 
of the enemy, answered this question in the negative.224 
4. Persons Who Accompany the Armed Forces without Actually 
Being Members Thereof 
Article 13 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provided that certain 
individuals who followed the armed forces without directly belonging 
to it ("such as newspaper correspondents and reporters, sutlers and 
contractors") and who fell into the hands of the enemy, were to be 
treated as prisoners of war provided they were in possession of a 
certificate from the military authorities of the army which they were 
accompanying. This article was carried over into Article 81 of the 
1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention.225 Subsequently, ,vith an 
219 1 ICRC Report, 518. 
220 Draft Revised Conventions 52. 
221 The original draft article contained a final clause which read "particularly 
if they act in liaison with the armed forces of one of the Parties to the conflict." 
Ibid. This clause was eliminated at Stockholm. Revised Draft Conventions 52. See 
also the comment contained in note 155 supra. 
222 It has been suggested that "there must be some recognition by third States." 
Draper, Recueil114. 
223 2A Final Record 415. 
224 Nordic EXIJerts 166. 
225 The French (official) versions of the 1907 Regulations and of the 1929 
Articles are substantially identical except for verb tense. 
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enlargement of the enumeration of categories and some other changes, 
this became Article 4A(4) of the 1949 Convention.226 
The first of three additions to the enumeration of categories was 
"civilian members of military aircraft crews." This was, of course, a 
new phenomenon and one which was considered to include a sufficient 
number of individuals to warrant special mention.227 The second ad-
dition to the enumeration of categories was "members of labour units." 
During World War II questions arose, for example, concerning the 
status of civilians captured while working for the German Organisa-
tion Todt in France.228 It was apparently this type of individual for 
whom the added protection of specific reference was intended. And 
the third addition to the enumeration of categories was members of 
"services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces," Presum-
ably this category would include entertainers,229 civilian ambulance 
drivers,230 and the like-individuals who are either temporarily or 
permanently concerned with the well-being of the troops.231 (As a 
result of events in Vietnam, where a number of war correspondents 
covering that conflict were captured by the Vietcong and were then 
killed, or were captured by them and then disappeared, efforts were 
initiated to give members of the press exceptional protections, beyond 
that of prisoners of war.232 Inasmuch as the Vietcong refused to apply 
the 1949 Convention, it is doubtful that the existence of any such new 
provision would have changed the course of events.) 
226 Apart from minor editorial changes, the paragraph adopted by the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference was that adopted the yea:r; before at Stockholm. Revised 
Draft Conventions 52. A British proposal, which was not adopted, would have 
completely eliminated the enumeration of categories. 3 Final Record 60-61 (Annex 
90). 
227 The Finnish representative proposed to eliminate the mention of this category 
on the ground that "civilians had no place in military aviation." 2A Final Record 
417. He was dissuaded by arguments which the Rapporteur did not consider it 
necessary to include in the record. Ibid. 
228 Sec Lewis & Mewha 214. 
220 For example, individuals brought into the combat area to entertain the troops 
by such entities as the United Services Organization (USO), an American organ-
ization. 
230 For example, the American Field Service of World War I and the Friends 
Field Service of World War II. 
231 In the past, some armies have provided prostitutes for their combat forces. 
Presumably, these ladies would fall within the compass of the provision under 
discussion. 
232 See, e.g., Protection of Journalists on Dangerous Missions in Areas of Armed 
Conflict" G.A. Res. 3058, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 73, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). 
Sec also, Pilloud, Protection of Journalists on Dangerous Missions in Areas of 
Armed Conflict, 11 I.R.R.C. 3 (1971). Article 79 and Annex II of the 1977 Pro-
tocol I are concerned with journalists. They appear to have added little to the 
provisions of Article 4A (4) of the 1949 Convention. 
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The problem presented by this provision for entitlement to prisoner-
of-war status is not so much who falls within its provisions as how 
this fact is established. Each successive convention has included a 
proviso concerning identifying matter to be issued to these individuals 
by the armed force which they accompany.233 A subtle change has, 
however, now been introduced into the language used. The 1929 Con-
vention and its predecessor gave prisoner-of-war status to persons 
within the enumerated categories of civilians accompanying the army 
"provided they are in possession of a certificate from the military 
authorities." (Emphasis added.) Possession of the identity card was, 
then, a sine qua non to entitlement to prisoner-of-war status. What 
of the individual who has had such a certificate issued to him but who, 
for some reason, perhaps beyond his control, is no longer in possession 
thereof?234 The Stockholm Draft made no change in the 1929 Conven-
tion.235 At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the suggestion was made 
that the wording be changed so that an individual who had been issued 
a card but who no longer had it in his possession would not thereby 
be deprived of the protection of the Convention.236 The ICRC repre-
sentative pointed out that the Stockholm Draft continued to make the 
actual possession of the official identification card mandatory for en-
titlement to prisoner-of-war status ;237 and he later proposed an amend-
ment to the paragraph which, it was agreed, established that if, in the 
absence of an identity card, the individual could prove that such a 
card had in fact been issued to him, this, too, would suffice to entitle 
him to prisoner-of-war status.23S This proposal, with some editorial 
changes, was adopted.239 Thus, the status of the civilian accompanying 
the armed forces is no longer dependent entirely upon the actual pos-
session of an identity card issued to him by the military authorities 
of the armed force which he is accompanying; it is now dependent 
upon proof that he had received authorization from the military au-
thorities to accompany that armed force-and that proof may consist 
of an identity card itself, or of some other evidence. 
233 The provision of the 1949 Convention goes a step further than heretofore by 
specifying that the identity card issued shall be "similar" to the model set forth 
in Annex IVA of the Convention. 
234 During World War II it was not uncommon for the capturing troops to take 
custody of identity cards along with all other documents in the possession of cap-
tured individuals and this procedure can undoubtedly be expected in any future 
international armed conflict. For an analogous problem which reached gargantuan 
proportions, see note III-29 infra. 
235 Revised Draft Conventions 52. The suggesti,?n for change had been made and 
rejected. 1947 GE Report 113. 
236 2A Final Record 238. 
237 Ibid., 250. 
238 Ibid., 416-18. 
239 Ibid., 389. 
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5. Member of Crews ••• of the Merchant Marine and the Crews of 
Civil Aircraft of the Parties to the Conflict, Who Do Not Benefit 
by more Favorable Treatment under Any Other Provisions of 
International Law 
Chapter III (Articles 5-8) of the Eleventh Hague Convention of 
1907 provided that when a merchant vessel of a belligerent was cap-
tured, the members of its crew who were enemy nationals were not 
to be made prisoners of war but were to be released upon making a 
formal promise not to undertake services connected with the opera-
tions of war. This provision proved ineffective during World War I, 
and at the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1929 Geneva 
Prisoner-of-War Convention a proposal was made that the crews of 
captured enemy merchant vessels be considered to be prisoners of war. 
The proposal met with such a clear-cut rejection that a Conference 
report went to the extreme of including a negative-pointing out 
specifically that the crews of captured enemy merchant vessels were 
not included within the term "prisoners of war."240 During World War 
II the provisions of the Eleventh Hague Convention of 1907 were again 
completely disregarded,241 with the result that there was no assurance 
as to exactly what the status of a captured merchant seaman would 
be.242 In order to remedy this situation, it is now specifically provided 
that merchant seamen will be prisoners of war. This applies to all 
members of the crew, officers and men. It also applies to the crews of 
civil aircraft, a category which was no doubt included because civil 
aircraft are more and more frequently used instead of merchant cargo 
vessels for quick deliveries to the combat area, and the position of the 
two types of crews is, so far as relevant, identical. It should also be 
noted that for the members of the crew to be entitled to prisoner-of-
war status upon capture, the merchant vess~1 or civilian aircraft must 
fly the flag of a Party to the conflict.243 
240 1 IeRe Report 552; Scott, Reports 737. 
241 Perhaps because of the si omnes clause (2A Final Record 419), but more 
probably because it was not in the national interests of the Powers concerned. 
242 1947 GE Report 110-11; de La Pradelle, Nouvelles conventions 46. 
243 During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani hostilities neither government granted pris-
oner-of-war status to the captured members of the crews of enemy merchant ves-
sels. IeRe Annual Report, 1972, at 50. Article 4A (5) even contemplates the pos-
sibility that these crew members may "benefit by more favorable treatment [than 
that to which they would be entitled as prisoners of war] under ... other proviSIons 
of international law." In the light of actual State practice during two World 
Wars, this appears extremely unlikely. Yingling & Ginnane 405. 
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6. Inhabitants of a Nonoccupied Territory, Who ••. Spontaneously 
Take Up Arms to Resist the Invading Forces .•. Provided They 
Carry Arms Openly and Respect the Laws and Customs of War 
This is the so-called levee en masse244 which first attained wide-
spread attention in modern warfare in the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-71), when many members of the civilian population of France 
rose up spontaneously to oppose the advance of the invading Prussian 
army.245 It has been given institutional status by Article 10 of the 
unratified Declaration of Brussels of 1874 and by every convention on 
the law of land warfare which was subsequently adopted,246 even 
though it has, as a practical matter, probably disappeared as a phe-
nomenon of modern warfare.247 However, because it has been included 
in the Convention and because historical incidents do have a way of 
recurring, it is deemed appropriate to mention some of the problems 
raised by this provision. 
The paragraph begins with the clause "inhabitants of a non-occu-
pied territory" (emphasis added) , a specification used originally in the 
1874 Declaration of Brussels and since maintained. It is a logical 
provision which, in effect, properly distinguishes between the attempt 
of the civilian population in unoccupied national territory to resist 
the forward movement into, and the occupation of, the homeland by 
the enemy army [the levee en masse of Article 4A (6)] and the oppo-
sition mounted by the civilian population to the enemy army which 
has already occupied some or all of the national territory [the organ-
244 There appears to be no well-recognized English translation of this term. 
"Mass levy" does not have the nuances of the French term. Lauterpacht calls it a 
"levy en masse," an unsatisfactory half-solution. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 257. For 
discussions of the levee en masse, see Greenspan, Modern Law 62-64; Flory, Pris-
oners of War 31-33. 
245 The Prussian army treated these members of the French civilian .population 
as francs tireurs (another untranslatable term), as illegal combatants, and sum-
marily executed those who did not possess documentary identification from the 
French Government. See text in connection with note 162 supra. But see Lieber's 
Code, Article 51 and 52. 
246 Article 2, 1899 Hague Regulations; Article 2, 1907 Hague Regulatio1ts; note 
to Article 1, 1929 Prisoner-of-War Convention; and the captioned provision of the 
1949 Convention. 
247 2A Final Record 239; 1947 GE Report 107. This appears to be one of those 
cases where the draftsmen were not making law on the basis of the last previous 
war, as they are usually accused of doing, but on the basis of a war several times 
removed! (However, the levee en masse may have occurred in Crete during W orId 
War II. Swiss Manual para. 61n.) 
65 
ized resistance movement of Article 4A (2)] .248 It is clear that the 
levee en masse can, by definition, legally exist only in territory not yet 
occupied.249 
The paragraph continues with a requirement that the action of the 
civilian population be "spontaneous." Lauterpacht includes under the 
term levee en masse the situation which exists when a belligerent "calls 
the whole population of the country to arms."250 This is very. probably 
the origin of the term itself, inasmuch as the word levee implies an 
act by a qualified authority; but whatever it may have meant origi-
nally, under the provision of the Convention spontaneity of action by 
the members of the civilian population (the "inhabitants") is required 
in order to bring captured individuals within the coverage of the 
Convention. 
The "four conditions" required in order to qualify captured mem-
bers of organized resistance movements for prisoner-of-war status 
have already been discussed at length.2G1 Here, logically, only the third 
(carrying arms openly) and the fourth (respect for the laws and 
customs of war) conditions are imposed as requirements for the quali-
fication of a captured member of the levee en masse for prisoner-of-
war status.2u2 
A levee en masse will, as the very term itself indicates, be a mass 
action by a substantial part of the civilian population in the area which 
the enemy army is approaching. Under the circumstances, the advanc-
ing army will have no way of identifying specific individuals as being, 
!!48 British Manual para. 97. A proposal to do away with the distinction was 
specifically rejected at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. 2A Final Record 421-22 
& 435. The British Manual para. 89 n.8 (a), appears to suggest a third possibility: 
the "spontaneous" organization of the civilian population and its attack on the 
occupying armed forces in conjunction with the advance of the national armed 
forces seeking to drive the enemy out of the homeland. This seems to resemble 
quite closely one of the major activities of any organized resistance movement op-
erating against the Occupying Power. I 
249 U.N., Human Rights, A/7720, pat'a. 87. Soviet International Law (at 423) 
lumps the two situations together. This could be an intentional effort to obfuscate 
which will permit the Soviet Union to justify advancing one contention if con-
fronted again with a situation such as that of 1941-44 (enemy troops occupying 
Soviet territory), and the opposite contention if confronted with a situation such 
as that of 1945 (Soviet troops in enemy territory). Miller, The Law of War 223. 
250 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 257. This is what the Prussian Government did to 
resist Napoleon in 1813. Flory, Prisoners of War 31. However, this interpretation 
was specifically rejected at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. 2A Final Record, 
420-21. 
2ul See pp. 44-54 supra. 
252 British Manual paras. 89 (iii) & 97. For some inexplicable reason Lauterpacht 
has substituted the requirement of "some organization" for the requirement of 
carrying arms openly. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 257. The substitution is particu-
larly inappropriate because the Convention provi~ion itself specifically includes 
reference to the fact that the inhabitants must have acted "without having had 
time to form themselves into regular armed units." 
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or not being, a part of the levee en masse. It will, therefore, in all 
probability, in its own defense, consider all of the inhabitants of the 
area as being included in the levee en masse2u3 and make prisoners of 
war of all such inhabitants whom it captures, thereafter denying 
prisoner-of-war status to those who, it determines, have failed to meet 
the requirements of the provision of the Convention. :!fH A number of 
statements have been made to the effect that the enemy army would 
be justified in treating "all the males of military age as prisoners of 
war."255 Under modern conditions, with women serving in the armed 
forces of a great many countries and otherwise demonstrating that 
they are competent and willing to handle a rifle or a grenade as ex-
pertly as the male, it is extremely unlikely that the suggested action 
on the part of the enemy army would be limited to the men of the area 
involved. 
It was believed that two other general categories of individuals 
warranted specific coverage in the Convention in order to eliminate 
some of the obviously unjust actions which had been taken during 
World War II. These two categories are dealt with in Article 4B (1) 
and (2).256 
7. Members of the Armed Forces of an Occupied Country 
During World War II the German armed forces occupied, wholly 
or in part, a substantial number of the States of continental Europe. 
In many such cases, the military personnel of the occupied country 
who had been captured or who had surrendered were released from 
custody and converted to civilian status ("demobilized") by the Ger-
mans. Thereafter they were not considered to be entitled to the bene-
fits and safeguards of the provisions of the 1929 Prisoner-of-War 
253 British Manual para. 99. 
25,1 The determination would, of course, have to be made in accordance with the 
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 5, discussed at pp. 55-59 supra. If 
the determination is against prisoner-of-war status, the individual concerned 
would usually fall within the provisions of Article 4 of the Fourth Convention and 
would be entitled to the protection of that Convention, subject, of course, to the 
right of the Occupying Power to try him for illegal acts of belligerency. 
255British Manual para. 100; U.S. Manual para. 65; Greenspan, Modern 
Law 63. 
256 It is interesting to note that while paragraph A of Article 4 opens with the 
sentence H[p]risoners of war ... are persons belonging to one of the following cate-
gories ... ," paragraph B opens with the statement H[t]he following shall likewise 
be treated as prisoners of war .... " (Emphasis added.) See note 196 supra. The 
IORC representative at the discussion of this article at the 1949 Diplomatic Con-
ference (Wilhelm) indicated that paragraphs A and B dealt respectively "with 
prisoners of war and with persons assimilated to prisoners of war." 2A Final 
Record 436. 
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Convention, even if they were again taken into custody.251 If they at-
tempted to escape to England to join the forces of their government-
in-exile and were caught, they were severely punished, although as 
prisoners of war they would have been subject only to disciplinary 
punishment for "attempted escape."258 
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the Soviet representative raised 
a question with respect to this procedure which, unfortunately, he did 
not put in the form of an amendment to be added to the provision 
then under discussion. He questioned whether an Occupying Power 
has the legal authority to "demobilize" the members of the armed 
forces of the occupied State, or whether all that the Occupying Power 
could do was to release prisoners of war from its custody without 
changing their legal status.259 Clearly, as he indicated, only the gov-
ernment of a State can change the status of members of its own armed 
forces. If an Occupying Power (or any other Detaining Power) re-
leases prisoners of war from custody, this does not change their juri-
dical status as members of the regular armed forces of their country; 
and if they are subsequently taken back into custody by the Occupying 
Power, they would once again be prisoners of war.260 A formal ac-
knowledgment of the foregoing in the Convention could only have 
helped to clarify the matter. 
What the 1949 Diplomatic Conference did approve was a paragraph 
[Article 4B (1)] granting prisoner-of-war treatment to members of 
the armed forces of an occupied country who, while hostilities continue 
outside of the occupied territory: (1) are released by the Occupying 
Power and then are subsequently interned; or (2) are unsuccessful 
in an attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong; or (3) 
fail to respond to a recall order of the Occupying Power, the purpose 
of which is to take them into custody. It is important to bear in mind 
that the foregoing provisions explicitly contemplate that the govern-
ment of the unoccupied part of the territory of the State the members 
of whose armed forces are in question, or that State's allies if it has 
been completely occupied, are continuing the hostilities. The mere ex-
251 Ibid. 431; British Manual para. 125 n.!. See German Regulations, No. 15, 
para. 116, which stated: "These persons are 'internees', regardless of whether 
they have previously belonged to the enemy armed forces, and include, for in-
stance, released prisoners of war." (Emphasis in original.) 
2u8 Article 54 of the 1929 Convention. See In re Siebers, 17 I.L.R. at 399-400. 
For a discussion of the comparable provision of the 1949 Convention, see pp. 405-
407 infra. 
259 2A Final Record 432. 
260 Of course, frequently this would be academic because the Occupying Power 
could certainly exert sufficient pressure on an indigenous government (such as 
the Vichy Government in France or the Quisling Government in Norway during 
World War II) or on a Chief of State in its custody (such as Leopold of Belgium 
during World War II) to obtain an order of demobilization. 
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istence of a government-in-exile after the complete cessation of hos-
tilities would not suffice to make the provision applicable. In other 
words, this provision was not intended to apply to the situation which 
arises when the capitUlation of a State is followed by the complete 
termination of armed hostilities.261 It was apparently felt that this 
latter situation was adequately covered by the first paragraphs of 
Articles 5 and 118, the former making the Convention applicable "from 
the time they [covered personnel] fall into the power of the enemy 
and until their final release and repatriation,"262 and the latter requir-
ing that prisoners of war "be released and repatriated without delay 
after the cessation of hostilities."263 
8. Members of Belligerent Armed Forces in Neutral or 
Non-belligerent Countries 
The Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 contains provisions establish-
ing the rights and duties of a neutral State with respect to members 
of the armed forces of a belligerent (Article 11-13), or the sick and 
wounded of the armed forces of a belligerent (Articles 14-15), who 
enter its territory during the course of the hostilities.264 Article 4B (2) 
supplements those provisions, once again attempting to provide spe-
cific solutions for problems that arose during World War II. 
Under general principles of international law, a neutral Power has 
no obligation to give asylum to troops attempting to enter its territory 
in order to avoid capture by the enemy, or to individuals who have 
escaped from prisoner-of-war camps and who attempt to enter its 
territory either as a place of refuge or as a lap in the route back 
home.265 Under Article 11 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 the 
261 The provision would, therefore, not apply in a situation such as that which 
existed upon the capitulation of Japan in 1945. 
262 Were it not for the provisions of Article 4B (1), an Occupying Power that 
released members of the armed forces of an occupied State from custody in the 
territory of their own country might well have contended that this was a "final" 
release pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 5 and that the individuals so 
"released and repatriated" were not thereafter entitled to the benefits and safe-
guards of the Convention even if again taken into custody. 
263 Yingling & Ginnane 405-06. For unstated reasons, the United States repre-
sentative unsuccessfully proposed the elimination of Article 4B (1). 2A Final Rec-
ord 431-32. 
264 Article 15 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 refers to "[t]he Geneva 
Convention." This reference was to the 1906 Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, later re-
placed by the 1929 Convention of the same name and, stiIllater, by the First Con-
vention of 1949. 
:!r,~ When World War II ended, the Swiss Government closed its borders to 
escaped prisoners of war, while the Spanish Government admitted them. 1, ICRC 
Report 56",-65. Each Government was completely within its rights in acting 
as it did. 
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neutral Power has an obligation to intern individuals falling within 
the first class mentioned immediately above when it does permit them 
to enter its territory.266 Under Article 13 of that same Convention, the 
neutral Power must leave at liberty individuals falling within the sec-
ond class mentioned immediately above when it does permit them to 
enter its territory, although it may assign them a place of residence.267 
Article 4B (2) of the 1949 Convention only relates to the first class of 
individuals, as it specifies that it applies to the persons falling within 
the provisions of the overall Article 4 who are permitted to enter the 
neutral territory "and whom these Powers are required to intern un-
der internationallaw."2GS It provides that individuals so interned shall 
be "treated" as prisoners of war under the Convention, certain spe-
cifically enumerated provisions thereof being excepted.269 These ex-
cepted provisions include Articles 8 (Protecting Powers), 10 (Substi-
tutes for Protecting Powers), 15 (Maintenance), 30 (Medical Atten-
tion) ,270 58-67 (Financial Resources of Prisoners of War), 92 (Unsuc-
cessful Escape),271 and 126 (Supervision) .272 
260 This was a custom which was merely codified in the 1907 Convention. See, 
e.g., von Moltke, The Franco-German War of 1870-71 at 398-99; and Howard, 
The Franco-Prussian War 430-31 & 431 n.2. During the course of World War II 
well over 100,000 members of various belligerent armed forces were interned in 
neutral States. 1 ICRC Report, 557. Perrot, L'internment en Suisse (1940-1941), 
23 R.I.C.R. 132. 
267 See pp. 404-405 infra. Switzerland and Sweden, the sole neutrals adjacent to 
belligerents, were the meccas sought by almost every escaped prisoner of war. 
20S Nordic Experts 166. Article 4B (2) of the 1949 Conventions refers to "neu-
tral or non-belligerent Powers." The Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 refers only 
to "neutral Powers." "Nonbelligerency" is a comparatively recent phenomenom of 
the law of international armed conflict. 
209 During World War II Switzerland and Sweden both replied negatively to an 
ICRC request that the 1929 Convention be applied to military internees. Switzer-
land objected primarily because of the restrictions on the punishment which 
could be adjudged for attempted escape; and Sweden felt that it would impose un-
necessary and complex problems on the neutral Power of refuge. 1 ICRC Report, 
559; 2A Final Record 244. 
270 Article 15 provides that the Detaining Power must provide maintenance and 
medical care "free of charge." The last paragraph of Article 30 provides that the 
cost of medical care "shall be borne by the Detaining Power." By eliminating 
these provisions as far as neutral Powers are concerned, Article 12 of the Fifth 
Hague Convention of 1907 remains applicable. This Article provides that on the 
conclusion of peace the expenses incurred by the neutral State "shall be made 
good." Presumably, this means that the neutral State will be reimbursed by the 
Power of Origin for all expenses incurred for the maintenance and medical care 
provided to its military internees. 
271 See note 269 supra. The other provisions of the Convention relating to penal 
and disciplinary sanctions (Article 82-108) are applicable to military internees. 
Baxter, Asylum 494. 
272 Ar.ticle 126 is one of the provisions relating to visits to prisoner-of-war in-
stallations by representatives of the Protecting Power and the ICRC. See PP. 281-
284 and 309-311 infra. In view of the general practice followed during World War 
70 
Even though Articles 8 and 10, relating to the designation of 
Protecting Powers and their substitutes, are thus specifically stated 
not to be applicable under any circumstances, for some reason the 
draftsmen of the Convention found it appropriate to be redundant 
in this respect and to provide additionally in general terms that, where 
diplomatic relations continue to exist between the neutral Power and 
the Power of Origin of the interned military personnel (as they un-
doubtedly will in most cases), the articles of the Convention with 
reference to the Protecting Power would be included among the ex-
cepted provisions ;273 and that, in this event, the Power of Origin is 
itself authorized to perform the functions of the Protecting Power.274 
This latter procedure appears both logical and adequate, as there cer-
tainly can be no question but that the diplomatic representatives of 
the Power of Origin will be capable of, and motivated toward, super-
vision of the treatment which their interned fellow nationals are re-
ceiving in the territory of the neutral Power. It is regrettable, how-
ever, that by including Article 126 among the excepted articles, the 
lCRC, with its wealth of expertise, has been deprived of the right to 
visit the military internee camps located in the territory of neutral 
Powers which maintain diplomatic relations with the Power of Ori-
gin.276 
9. Medical Personnel and Chaplains 
The final paragraph (Article 4C) admonishes that the provisions 
of that Article "shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel 
and chaplains." A discussion of the significance of this provision ap-
pears also to provide an appropriate point for a brief review of the 
cognate provisions of the First and Second Conventions relevant to 
the status of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, members of the medical 
profession, and chaplains-on land and sea-when they fall into the 
power of the adverse Party. 
Both the First and Second Conventions contain an Article 13 which 
II of permitting ICRC visits to military internee camps in neutral States (1 ICRC 
Report 560-62), it is difficult to understand why Article 126 was included among 
the exceptions. 
273 3 Final Record, Annexes 91 and 93, at 62; 2A Final Record 466. 
274 But Article 126, probably the most important article with respect to the func-
tions of the Protecting Power, has been specifically excepted. See note 272 supra. 
Surely, this does not mean that visits to military internee internment installations 
are to be omitted from the functions of the Protecting Power which are to be per-
formed by the representatives of the Power of Origin. 
27;' It should be mentioned that Article 9, the Article which establishes the basic 
international juridical status of the ICRC under the Convention, is not among the 
excepted artic!~s and it may be that the ICRC could use this and other provisions 
to support the al"l;Ument that, just as it may normally operate in parallel with the 
Protecting PoweJ', here it may so operate with the Power of Origin, 
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is identical with Article 4A of the Third Convention.276 Article 14 of 
the First Convention (Article 16 of the Second) provides that "the 
wounded and sick [and shipwrecked] of a belligerent who fall into 
enemy hands shall be prisoners of war."277 This means that the Third 
Convention is applicable in its entirety to any individual who comes 
within any of the classifications established by Article 4A (or its iden-
tical counterparts, Article 13 of the First and Second Conventions), 
and who, while wounded, sick, or shipwrecked, falls into the hands 
of the enemy. Actually, it would appear that these articles were in-
cluded in the First and Second Conventions from an excess of caution 
inasmuch as, even without them, the individuals concerned would have 
come '\vithin the purview of Article 4A of the Third Convention. If an 
individual is, for example, a member of the regular armed forces of a 
belligerent, the fact that he was wounded or sick at the time that he 
fell into the power of the enemy could· scarcely affect his entitlement 
to prisoner-of-war status. It is therefore obvious that the only prob-
lems which will arise in this respect are those which have already been 
discussed and which will arise whether the individual who falls into 
the power of the enemy is hale and hearty, wounded or sick, conscious 
or unconscious. The unique problems which arise in this area arise 
not with respect to the patients, but with respect to the people whose 
function it is to care for them.278 Medical personnel, and the assisting 
staff, engaged exclusively in the collection, transport, ,and treatment 
of the wounded and sick, or in the prevention of disease, are entitled to 
276 The First Convention is concerned with the wounded and sick of land armies; 
the Second is concerned with the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea. As the 
provisions of these two Conventions that are of interest here are largely identical, 
all references will be solely to the First Convention and its provisions except where 
specific reference to the Second Convention is deemed appropriate. The First Con-
vention of 1949 is the fourth chronologically (1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949) of the 
series known as the "Red Cross" Conventions. Prior to 1949 they had been made 
applicable to naval warfare by "adaptation" treaties (Third Hague Convention of 
1899 for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Con-
vention of August 22,1864; and Tenth Hague Convention of 1907 for the Adapta-
tion of the Principles of the Geneva Convention [of 6 July 1906] to Maritime 
Warfare). 
277 The Coordination Committee of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, charged with 
coordinating the language and substance of the several conventions being drafted, 
failed to note that at Stockholm the year before the term "fallen into enemy hands" 
in the Third Convention had been changed to "fallen into the power of the enemy." 
See p. 34 supra. 
278 See generally, Watson, Status of Medical and Religious Personnel in Inter-
national Law, 20 JAG J. 41. For the most part medical personnel and chaplains 
are dealt with together in this area of the Conventions. See, e.g., the first two para-
graphs of Article 33 of the Third Convention. Accordingly, references in the text 
hereof to medical personnel should be construed as including chaplains unless the 
wording used clearly indicates otherwise. 
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be respected and protected at all times.279 When they fall into the power 
of the enemy, they are not prisoners of war-but they are entitled, 
as a minimum, to the benefits and protections of the Third Conven-
tion ;280 they may be retained by the Detaining Power only to the 
extent that their services are required for the care of prisoners of 
war ;281 while their services are so used, the Detaining Power must 
afford these "retained personnel" the opportunity and the facilities 
for performing their professional functions ;282 and the Detaining Pow-
er has an obligation to release them and to return them to their Power 
of Origin if their retention is not "indispensable."283 
The 1929 Wounded-and-Sick Convention provided for the return of 
medical personnel "as soon as the way is open for their return," 
absent an agreement to the contrary between the Detaining Power 
and the Power of Origin.284 A number of such agreements were 
reached ;285 and very few retained persons were ever returned to their 
Power of Origin during the course of hostilities.286 Realizing that 
similar problems would be presented by the very provisions that it was 
including in the new First Convention, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference 
adopted a resolution which requested the ICRC to draft model agree-
ments implementing Articles 28 and 31 of the First Convention, deal-
ing with the relief and retention of medical personnel and chaplains.287 
2i9 Article 24, First Convention; Article 37, Second Convention. The latter pro-
vides that the retained "religious, medical and hospital personnel" are, upon land-
ing, subject to the provisions of the First Convention. 
280 First paragraph, Article 33, Third Convention; second paragraph, Article 28, 
First Convention. Pictet, Commentary on the First Convention 243. 
:!81 The prisoners of war for whom their professional services are required 
should be "preferably those of the armed forces to which they themselves belong." 
Second paragraph, Article 28, First Convention. 
282 See the first two paragraphs of Article 33, Third Convention. The author was 
told by several officers of the Pakistani Army Medical Corps that after two em-
bryonic escape tunnels (with which they had had no connection) were discovered 
by the authorities at their prisoner-of-war camp in India in the spring of 1972, 
the seven retained medical officers were no longer permitted to perform their pro-
fessional functions on behalf of the prisoners of war. Never,theless, they were only 
released by the Indian authorities a year and a half later, in February 1974, as a 
part of the general repatriation. This was, of course, a blatant violation of Articles 
28 and 30 of the First Convention and of Articles 4C and 33 of the Third Con-
vention. 
283 Article 30, First Convention. 
284 Article 12, 1929 W ounded-and-Sick Convention. 
:!85 1 ICRC Report 202; Rich, Brief History 497-98. 
286 1 ICRC Report 202; 1947 SAIN 5. 
:!ili Resolution 3, 1 Final Record, 361. Article 31 of the First Convention provides 
for special agreements concerning medical personnel "to be retained"; Article 28 
of the First Convention and the third paragraph of Article 33 of the Third Con-
vention both provide for special agreements concerning the relief of retained 
personnel. 
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The ICRC did SO,288 but, of course, this merely means that models 
exist and will be available for possible use when the occasion arrives. 
Whether, and to what extent, States will make use of them will only 
become evident in the event. The ICRC itself has said that "[iJt can 
be foreseen that, in a future conflict, retention will become the rule."289 
Individuals who, although trained in a medical or dental profession, 
are not attached to the medical service of the armed force in which 
they are serving at the time that they fall into the power of the adverse 
party may, nevertheless, be required by the Detaining Power to per-
form medical functions on behalf of prisoners of war who depend on 
the same Power of Origin that they do. While they are so engaged, 
they are entitled to the same treatment as retained personnel, and 
they cannot be required to do any other work. However, they continue 
to be prisoners of war.290 
In most armies there are a number of functions that are performed 
by individuals who are not normally involved in combat. ThesE'} indi-
viduals frequently have a secondary duty to act as stretcher-bearers 
and emergency medical personnel in time of need.291 If they fall into 
the power of the enemy while they are engaged in their primary func-
tions, they are, of course, ordinary prisoners of war. However, if they 
fall into the power of the enemy while actually engaged in medical 
functions, although they are prisoners of war, their employment in a 
prisoner-of-war camp is to be on medical duties "in so far as the need 
arises."292 There is no indication as to the method by which a prisoner 
of war will be able to establish the exact function that he was per-
forming at the time when he fell into the power of the enemy. 
One problem in the medical personnel area which was not covered in 
the 1929 Wounded-and-Sick Convention, and which is only tangentially 
covered in the 1949 Conventions, concerns the disciplinary powers of 
the Detaining Power when medical personnel act improperly. During 
World War II the Germans issued an order providing that attempted 
escapes by medical personnel could be punished by "a temporary or 
permanent suspension of their privileges, in full or in part."293 There 
was probably no legal basis for the issuance of this order. but cer-
tainly the Detaining' Power has to have some power of discipline. 
288 lCRC, Model Agreement. 
289 Ibid. at 8 (Trans. mine). 
290 Article 32, Third Convention. 
291 For example, bandsmen, mess personnel, clerks, etc. For a problem of iden-
tification encountered during World War II, see Rich, Brief History 517. 
292 Articles 25 and 29, First Convention. 
293 German Regulations, No.6, para. 5. One writer has raised the issue of the 
effect on medical personnel of the United States armed forces of the 'Provisions of 
the so-called Code of Conduct, Sec. III of which makes it the duty of any member 
of the United States armed forces who has been captured to "make every effort to 
escape." Smith, Code of Conduct 98-99. 
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Article 33 (c) of the Third Convention now provides that these indi-
viduals are "subject to the internal discipline of the camp in which 
they are retained."294 It would therefore appear that they could now 
legally be disciplined for attempted escape to the same extent as a 
prisoner of war.29(iBut what of the physician in the power of the 
enemy who, perhaps for some ideological reason, refuses to perform 
any professional duties and will not provide medical treatment for the 
sick and wounded members of the armed forces of his own Power of 
Origin? This was the procedure followed by most of the North Viet-
namese medical personnel captured in Vietnam.29B The South Viet-
namese responded by treating them as ordinary prisoners of war.20i 
Once again, there was probably no specific legal basis for such action; 
but certainly, if a member of the medical profession refuses to employ 
his professional abilities, even for the benefit of his own countrymen, 
he -is denying his professional status and, under those circumstances, 
there is little that a Detaining Power can do except to remove him 
from the category of a retained person and to place him in a general 
prisoner-of-war status (unless his recalcitrance is to be rewarded by 
repatriation) . 
10. Problems of General Import 
There are a number of categories of individuals concerning whom 
special problems arise when they fall into the hands of a belligerent 
Power; and while in some such categories the numbers of individuals 
involved have been comparatively small, nevertheless the problems 
which they create are considered worthy of mention. 
a. NATIONALITY 
Normally, the nationality of the individual falling within one of the 
categories enumerated in Article 4 is that of the belligerent Power for 
294 The Article goes on to prohibit the Detaining Power from compelling them to 
do any work other than medical or religious. The provision quoted in the text refers 
only to disciplinary matters (Articles 89-98, Third Convention. See pp. 324-330 
infra. Presumably, there is no question of the right of the Detaining Power to im-
pose penal sanctions for crimes (Articles 99-108, Third Convention). See pp. 330-
342 infra. 
295 See Articles 91-94, Third Convention, and the discussion thereof at pp. 403-
407 infra. 
296 Actually, those doctors who refused to function in their professional capaci-
ties probably did so because of specific orders received before capture, orders based 
upon the desire to place a greater burden on the medical facilities of the armed 
forces in South Vietnam. 
:!lli Vietnam, A1·ticle-by-Article Review, Article 32. In Korea many of the cap-
tured North Korean medical personnel had participated in the prisoner-of-war 
camp mutiny conspiracy. U.N.C., Communist War, part II, sec. B, para. 10, at 16. 
No action was taken against them. 
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which he is fighting.!lOS However, he may have the nationality of a 
neutral, or of an ally of the belligerent in whose armed forces he is 
serving at the time that he falls into the power of the enemy--or even 
of the adverse Party, or one of its allies. Does this affect his entitle-
ment to prisoner-of-war status? Apparently there is no dispute with 
respect to the entitlement to prisoner-of-war status of an individual 
who is a national of a neutral State or of a State which is an ally of the 
belligerent in whose armed forces he is serving.299 However, the en-
titlement to such status of an individual who is a national of the Cap-
turing Power, or of one of its allies,30o is the subject of dispute. 
Several writers, notably Lauterpacht, have taken the position that 
the national of the Capturing Power who falls into its power while 
serving in the armed forces of the enemy is not entitled to prisoner-
of-war status or to the protection of internationallaw.301 This position 
has been cited and approved by the Privy Council302 in a decision 
which has been the subject of criticism.303 Certainly, the individual 
concerned could be tried for treason under the municipal law of the 
Capturing Power whose nationality he carries; but this does not mean 
that he is not entitled to the protection of prisoner-of-war status at 
298 This is undoubtedly the basis for the invention of the term "Power of Ori-
gin" to indicate the Power upon which the prisoner of war depends, although it 
may, in a particular case, be a complete misnomer. 
200 Flory, Prisoners of War 33-35; Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 261; Greenspan, 
International Law 32; Elman, Prisoners of War 180. In German Regulations, No. 
32, para. 513, the German order said: 
513. U.S. pI'isoners of war in British uniforms. Prisoners of war of U.S. 
nationality captured as members of Canadian armed forces are considered 
British prisoners of war regardless of whether they joined the Canadian 
services before or after the entry of the United States into the war. 
The German orders on this subject systematically followed the principle that the 
nationality of the individual for prisoner-of-war purposes was decided by the 
uniform which he was wearing at the time of his capture. Ibid., No.1, para. 1; 
No. 13, para. 56; No. 32, para. 513; No. 33, para. 561. This was also the position 
of the United States. See 12 Dept. State Bull. 864 (1945). 
300 No specific discussion has been found of the problem involved when the 
captured individual is a national of an ally of the Capturing Power. However, this 
would probably make no difference as the Capturing Power could transfer the 
individual to its ally under Article 12 of the Convention and the individual would 
then be in the custody of his own nation as Detaining Power. 
301 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 268. See also Flory, Prisoners of War 29-30. The 
latter emphasizes that the contrary is true if the individual has been naturalized 
by the belligerent State in whose armed forces he was serving at the time of 
capture. Dual citizenship in the two opposing belligerents would also present a 
problem under Lauterpacht's thesis. 
302 Public Prosecutor v. [(oi. 
303 Baxter, Qualifications 291-94; Elman, Prisoners of Wa1·180-95. 
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least up to and during the trial. 304 
The problem has been adverted to by the courts of the United States 
on two separate occasions. Writing in 1942, the United States Supreme 
Court said: 
... Citizens [of the United States] who associate themselves with 
the military arm of the enemy government ... are enemy bellig-
erents within the meaning of the [Fourth] Hague Convention [of 
1907] and the law of war.305 
And in 1946, in a case involving an Italian prisoner of war who had 
sought habeas corpus on the ground that he was an American citizen 
and that he could not, therefore, be held as a prisoner of war by the 
United States, the United States Court of Appeals said: 
We have reviewed the authorities with care and we have found 
none supporting the contention of petitioner that citizenship in 
the country of either army in collision necessarily affects the 
status of one captured on the field of battle.306 
It is believed that the principle to be extracted from these two opinions 
expresses the proper rule of international law, and that any individual 
who falls into the power of a belligerent while serving in the enemy 
armed forces should be entitled to prisoner-of-war status no matter 
what his nationality may be, if he would be so entitled apart from any 
question of nationality; subject to the right of the Detaining Power 
to charge him with treason, or a similar type of offense, under its 
municipal law and to try him in accordance with the guarantees con-
tained in the relevant provisions of the Convention.307 
b. DESERTERS AND DEFECTORS 
There has been much confusion in the use of these and related 
terms.308 In the discussion which follows, the word deserter is used to 
!l04 Lauterpacht said: "The privileges of members of armed forces cannot be 
claimed by ... traitorous subjects of a belligerent who, without having been mem-
bers of his armed forces, fight in the armed forces of the enemy .... " Lauter-
pacht-Oppenheim 268. If he refers solely to the right of the Detaining Power to 
try them for treason under its municipal law, he is correct. However, if he would 
deny them the protection of the Convention from the very outset of captivity, 
then it is believed that the quoted statement no longer represents the international 
law rule, the Privy Council in Public Prosecutor v. Koi to the contrary notwith-
standing. Elman, Prisoners of War 180 & 184. See also Wilhelm, Status 32-34 .• 35 
R.I.C.R. at 686-87. 
!l05 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38. 
aOG In 1'e Territo, 156 F.2d at 145. This case was found to be unpersuasive by 
the Privy Council in Public Prosecutor v. Koi. 
:107 See pp. 330-342 infra. 
::08 Thus, when Gm'cia-Mora writes at length concerning deserters, it is patent 
that the individuals to whom he is referring are actually those who will be here 
referred to as defectors. Garda-Mora, Asylum 103-07. The same confusion is 
found in Clause, Status 34-35. Although it is believed that he errs in other re-
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connote one who absents himself from his place of duty without the 
permission of his proper authorities. In the context of this study he 
thereafter comes into the custody of the enemy armed forces, perhaps 
by voluntary surrender, seeking the dubious refuge of a prisoner-of-
war camp primarily as a means of escaping from the fears and dangers 
of the battlefield.309 His change in status is motivated by a lack of 
amenability to military life in general, and to combat in particular, 
and not by ideology. The word defector, on the other hand, is used to 
connote one who deliberately seeks refuge with the enemy because he 
disagrees with the policies and politics of his own Government and 
agrees with those of the enemy.310 He is motivated by ideological con-
siderations, and when he leaves his place of duty he probably desires 
and intends, if possible, to join the enemy armed forces in order to 
help hasten the attainment of his ultimate objective: the victory of 
the enemy and the defeat of his own country. Obviously, both these 
categories involve some identical and some different problems. 
The deserter, like any other member of the regular armed forces of 
his country who falls into the power of the enemy, becomes a prisoner 
of war.31I The fact that he deserted and, perhaps, on his own initiative, 
sought an opportunity to surrender does not change his position under 
international law and, insofar as the Capturing Power is concerned, 
whatever may be his legal status under the civil and military law of 
his own country. One man, wounded, surrenders because he is physi-
cally unable to continue to fight; another man, a deserter, surrenders 
because he has lost the will to fight. The reason for the surrender is 
immaterial. Both of these men, as members of the regular armed forces 
of their country, come within the provisions of Article 4A (1) of the 
spects, Hess draws the proper and necessary distinction between deserters and 
defectors. Hess, Post-Korea 55. So, too, do Esgain & Solf 555. 
3011 The deserter does not necessarily come under the power of the enemy. He 
may seek refuge in a neutral country; or, if he is located in his own national ter-
ritory, or in territory contiguous to his own national territory, he may return 
home or seek to lose himself among the civilian population. 
310 For this reason, one author writing shortly after World War I speaks of 
defectors as "refugees." Fooks, Prisoners of War 83. A SEATO directive defines 
a defector as follows: 
A defector ... is any person who is voluntarily or involuntarily serving the 
enemy, either as a member of its Armed Forces or otherwise, who voluntarily 
terminates his service to the enemy for the purpose of bearing arms on 
behalf of SEATO, or to otherwise assist the SEATO cause, and who immed-
iately upon capture or submission to SEATO control, gives express notice 
that he no longer desires to serve the interests of the enemy state. 
SEASTAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Captured or Otherwise Detained Personnel 
(CDP), Annex C, para. 4 (1970). 
311 Flory, Prisoners of War 30. 
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Convention and are entitled to prisoner-of-war status.312 
It has been suggest~d that the deserter is not entitled to prisoner-
of-war status on the basis of either of two arguments: (1) that the 
failure to mention deserters specifically in the enumeration contained 
in Article 4 was a deliberate omission;313 and (2) that deserters do 
not "fall" into the power of the enemy.314 The first argument is un-
convincing ,because the member of the armed forces who deserts and 
surrenders to the enemy is, neverthless, a member of the armed forces 
within Article 4A (1) of the Convention; hence, it was no more neces-
sary to include deserters as specifically being within that category 
than it was to include cooks, artillerymen, or noncommissioned officers, 
all of whom are equally members of the armed forces. And the second 
argument is also unconvincing because, as we have seen,3Hi the words 
"fallen into the power of the enemy" were substituted for the word 
"captured," previously used, precisely in order to ensure prisoner-of-
war status to those who surrender voluntarily. 
One other problem remains with respect to deserters who surrender 
to the enemy-their disposition upon the cessation of active hostilities. 
Historically, for obvious reasons, they were not repatriated upon the 
termination of hositilities. However, this policy changed during the 
nineteenth century.316 Under the 1949 Convention the Detaining Power 
would be required to repatriate all prisoners of war, including de-
serters, upon the cessation of active hostilities. However, if the policy 
of "voluntary repatriation," and "no forcible repatriation," can be 
considered as a proper interpretation of Article 118, and as indicative 
of the manner in which belligerents will interpret and apply Article 
118 as a matter of practice-and it is believed that it is3l7-the de-
serter could, and presumably in most cases would, elect to decline to be 
repatriated. 
A defector has been defined above as one who seeks refuge with the 
enemy because, in effect, ideologically he supports its objectives and 
opposes those of his own country. As a member of the armed forces 
312 So-called surrender leaflets-leaflets released behind enemy lines by artil-
lery shells or by air drops encouraging surrender-usually promise good food and 
good treatment as prisoners of war in a comfortable prisoner-of-war camp far 
removed from the perils of war, promises which are not always kept. Shub, The 
Choice 63-64. 
313 Clause, Status 16; Garcia-Mora, Asylum 103-04. 
314 Wilhelm, Status 29, 35 R.I.C.R. at 682. 
315 See pp. 34-36 supra. 
:1l6 Garcia-Mora, Asylum 104. He further states that the practice of incorporat-
ing amnesty clauses in peace treaties gave the necessary protection to repatriated 
deserters. Ibid. This may have been true at one time but it certainly is not so at 
present. 
317 See the discussion of voluntary versus involuntary repatriation at pp. 421-426. 
infra. See generally, Schapiro, Repatriation 310-11; Garcia-Mora, Asylum 103-06; 
Clause, Status, passim. 
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of his country he, too, has a right to prisoner-of-war status; and under 
Article 7 of the Convention this is a right which he cannot renounce.3lS 
However, there have been numerous occasions upon which defectors 
have affirmatively sought, or have been encouraged, to serve in the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power.31S To permit them to do so is a 
violation of Articles 4, 5, and 7 of the Convention.320 This does not 
mean that defectors may not voluntarily assist the Detaining Power 
while remaining prisoners of war. They may, for example, without 
bringing the Detaining Power into conflict with the provisions of the 
Convention, act as interpreters, draft surrender leaflets,321 write radio 
propaganda scripts, give indoctrination lectures, and even act as under-
cover informers on their fellow prisoners of war.32!! Defectors were 
permitted to give up their prisoner-of-war status and to join the armed 
forces of the Detaining Power during World War 1323 and World War 
II.324 This was one of the maj or reasons for the inclusion in the Con-
318 See pp. 91-93 infra. 
:110 Article 130 makes it a grave breach of the Convention to compel a prisoner 
of war "to serve in the forces of the hostile power." See pp. 361-363 infra. 
:120 Under Article 4A (1) they are, upon falling into the power of the other side, 
prisoners of war. Under Article 5 this status continues from the time of falling 
into the power of the other side until "final release and repatriation." And under 
Article 7 prisoners of war may not renounce in part or in their entirety the 
rights secured to them by the Convention. 
321 During the armed conflict in Korea (1950-53) a question arose within the 
United Nations Command (U.N.C.) concerning the legality of the use of Chinese 
prisoners of war who had volunteered to draft surrender leaflets to be dissemi-
nated among the members of the "Chinese People's Volunteers." The decision 
reached was that they could be given this task but that it would be necessary to 
notify the IeRC (the de facto Protecting Power for prisoners of war captured by 
the U.N.C.) of their location as a work detachment so that the ICRC could con-
tinue to assure that only true volunteers were being so used. 
322 The North Koreans and the Chinese both made extensive use of this latter 
technique during the armed conflict in Korea. U.S. POW 27; U.K. Treatment 20; 
Schein, Patterns 257; Anon., Misconduct 727-28. It is, of course, extremely de-
moralizing to the great body of prisoners of war who are and remain loyal to 
their own country, so it serves a dual purpose for the Detaining Power. It was 
a major reason for the promulgation by the President of the United States of the 
Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, Sec. IV 
of which is a direct attempt to reduce participation in this type of activity by 
members of the armed forces of the United States who become prisoners of war. 
Prugh, Code of Conduct 687-88. 
323 For example, the German-created "Irish Brigade" composed of captured 
Irish members of the British armed forces. U.S., POW 55-56. See p. 361 infra. 
:124 The Soviet Union created units of captured Germans, the Germans created 
units of captured Russians, etc., etc. See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack 145. 
Concerning the recruitment of Indian prisoners of war by the Germans and by 
the Japanese during World War II, see Calvocoressi & Wint 804-05 & 806-09. (It 
should be noted, however, that in both World Wars the majority of the individuals 
who served in the enemy's armed forces after having been captured were not ori-
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vention of the provisions of Article 130, prohibiting involuntary, and 
Article 7, effectively prohibiting voluntary, service by a prisoner of 
war in the armed forces of the Detaining Power.325 
The defector, then, like the deserter, is a prisoner of war and the 
1949 Convention, with all its prohibitions and safeguards, is fully ap-
plicable to him.326 Obviously, the question of whether he is to be repa-
triated upon the cessation of active hostilities is even more important 
to him than it is to the deserter, particularly if he has been permitted 
to serve in the armed forces of the Detaining Power. Once again, it 
would appear that this question presents no problem if legal and 
humanitarian considerations require that Article 118 be so interpreted 
as to permit each prisoner of war to make his own personal determina-
tion as to whether he desires to be repatriated, particularly when it is 
obvious that his repatriation inevitably means either a very long term 
in prison or even a death sentence.327 
It must be emphasized that the foregoing discussion of deserters and 
defectors is strictly from the point of view of international law in 
ginally defectors but were ordinary prisoners of war who were induced by prom-
ises, or by more forcible methods of persuasion, to join the Detaining Power's 
armed forces.} See also note VI-79 infra. 
325 During the armed conflict in Korea the North Koreans justified the disap-
pearance of literally tens of thousands of admittedly captured members of the 
Republic of Korea Army by insisting that after "reeducation" they had all elected 
to join the armed forces of North Korea. See note VI-81 infra. In Vietnam both 
sides "reeducated" their captives and then inducted them into their respective 
armed forces. The "Chieu Hoi" ("open arms" or "welcome return") program of 
the Republic of Vietnam was, to a considerable extent, a violation of the Conven-
tion. For a discussion of this latter program and the results which it is claimed 
to have attained, see Brewer, Chieu Hoi, passim. One author argues that as the 
Republic of Vietnam was dealing with its own citizens, and not foreign nationals, 
"the Chieu Hoi program may be defended as an act of amnesty or pardon." Bond, 
Proposed Revisions 238. There are merits to this contention, particularly as the 
Republic of Vietnam itself decided that permitting members of the armed forces 
of the People's Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) to join the Chieu Hoi pro-
gram violated Article 7 of the Convention. Vietnam, Article-by-Article Review, 
Article 7. 
326 For a contrary view, see Hess, Post-Korea 52. However, that author does 
seem to indicate that this is a matter which is subject to individual national polit-
ical decisions, decisions which can be based upon the arguments discussed above 
(see text in connection with notes 314 and 315 supra) with respect to the inter-
pretation of the term "fallen into the power of the enemy." Ibid., 58. See also 
U.N., Human Rights, A/7720, para. 88; British Manual para. 126. (The latter 
draws a distinction between defectors, who are stated not "to be entitled to be 
treated as prisoners of war" and prisoners of war who defect during captivity 
who "retain their status and cannot be deprived of it." Ibid., n.1. This position 
would, of course, preclude "Irish Brigades" (see note 323 supra) in future armed 
conflicts. 
327 See the discussion of Article 118 at pp. 417-429 infra. With respect to the 
humanitarian considerations, see Garda-Mora, Asylum 106-07. 
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general and the 1949 Convention in particular, and does not purport 
to concern itself with municipal law questions. Certainly, if the de-
serter is, by any means, returned to the custody of his national armed 
forces he may be tried for desertion,328 or for any other appropriate 
violation of municipal law. Under similar circumstances, the defector 
may likewise be tried for desertion,329 treason, or any other appropri-
ate violation of municipal law. And, of particular relevance, it appears 
to be generally accepted that the defector who subsequently falls into 
the power of his own national armed forces-the armed forces from 
which he defected-while serving in the armed forces of the enemy, 
is not entitled to prisoner-of war status.330 
c. COMMANDOS 
It has long been a generally accepted rule of the law of war that 
members of the armed forces of a belligerent, captured in uniform 
while engaged in missions behind the enemy lines, are entitled to 
prisoner-of-war status.331 During World War II Hitler became incensed 
as a result of the successful operations of the Allied commandos. He 
thereupon issued the so-called Commando Order,332 under which all 
commandos were "to be exterminated to the last man, either in combat 
or in pursuit" and no quarter was to be given to them. After the war 
a number of German officers were tried and convicted of war crimes 
arising out of their implementation of what was almost universally 
regarded as an obviously illegal order.333 Post-World War II service 
manuals emphatically reiterated the old rule.334 And Article 37 of the 
1972 Draft Additional Protocol was even more specific in attempting 
to assure prisoner-of-war status for uniformed members of the armed 
forces captured while behind the enemy lines.335 
328 Clause, Status 33. 
320 Ibid. 
330 Flory, Prisoners of War 142; Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 268; British Manual 
para. 103; Draper, RecueilllO. 
331 Second paragraph of Article 29, 1899 Hague Regulations and 1907 Hague 
Regulations. 
332 This is the Fiihrerbefehl of 18 October 1942, reproduced at 1 L.R.T.W.C. 
33-34 and at 11 L.R.T.W.C. 20-21. See note 146 supra. 
33a See, e.g., the Dostler Case and the Falkenh01·st Case. See also, Kalshoven, 
Reprisals 184-93. The various aspects of the order were directly violative of Arti-
cles 23 (c) and (d) of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 
334 U.S. Manual para. 63; British Manual para. 105; Swiss Manual, paras. 41-42. 
335 1972 Basic Te:cts 14. The article was somewhat ineptly drafted in that it 
merely referred to the need to comply "with the conditions laid down in Article 4 
of the Third Convention." 1973 Commentary 46. Article 46 (2) of the 1977 Protocol 
I provides specifically that a member of the armed forces who gathers information 
in enemy territory does not engage in espionsge "if, while so acting, he is in the 
uniform of his armed forces." In Military Prosecutor v. [{assem (42 I.L.R. at 483) 
the opinion indicates that being in possession of civilian clothes at the time of cap-
ture, even if they were not being worn, might be a basis for a denial of prisoner-
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One matter collateral to the problem of commandos, that of airmen, 
should be mentioned, if for no other reason than because they are 
frequently referred to in tandem with commandos in service manu-
als.3:lG There appears to be no dispute that parachute troops are active 
combatants during the course of their jump and may be fired upon 
while in the air and subsequently on the ground until they are actu-
ally captured by the enemy and become prisoners of war. However, 
the treatment of airmen in distress, the members of crews who have 
bailed out of their aircraft after it has been rendered nonairworthy, 
has occasioned some problems. During World War II the Nazis adopted 
an official policy of failing to protect these individuals from the wrath 
of the much-bombed civilian population even after they were in official 
custody and were, therefore, entitled to be protected as prisoners of 
war.:!:l7 And the Egyptians have taken the rather novel position, which 
has no precedent in practice and no legal justification in either cus-
tomary or conventional international law, that the distressed airman 
is entitled to protection en route to the earth (and to prisoner-of-war 
status thereafter) if he will land in territory controlled by the enemy, 
but not if he will land in territory controlled by forces friendly to 
him.aas 
d. SPIES AND SABOTEURS 
Little discussion of these two categories is required here. As we 
have seen,a39 even individuals who fall within the categories specifically 
enumerated in Article 4 are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status if, 
at the time of capture by the enemy, they were dressed in civilian 
of-war status. As the defendants in that case were found not to be entitled to the 
protection of the Convention for other reasons, the statement in the opinion may 
be regarded as debatable dictum. 
336 See, e.g., U.S. Manual para. 63. 
:137 IMT 472. After the war ended a number of members of the German armed 
forces were convicted of the war crime of failing to protect prisoners of war from 
physical attacks by civilians. See, e.g., the Essen Lynching Case and the Trial 
of Bury. 
:1:18 The argument advanced by Egypt was that a pilot was more valuable than 
the plane he flew and that a pilot shot down over friendly territory could be flying 
another plane in combat a few hours later. (Under this thesis the Germans could 
have machine-gunned British fighter pilots parachuting from their destroyed 
planes during the Battle of Britain.) The ICRC apparently supported the position 
of "modern military manuals" which prohibited attacks on air crews in distress 
even when they would land in friendly territory. 1973 Commentary 45. As adopted 
in committee during the 1976 session of the Diplomatic Conference, Article 39 (1) 
included the Egyptian proposal ("unless it is apparent that he will land in terri-
tory controlled by the party to which he belongs or by an ally of that party"). 
However, at the 1977 session of Committee III that phrase was eliminated in its 
entirety from what became Article 42(1) of the 1977 Protocol I. 
339 See pp. 36-37 supra. See also Eo; parte Qub'in 367 U.S. at 31; Draper, Re-
cueil109-10. 
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clothes and were engaged in an espionage or sabotage mission behind 
enemy lines. It necessarily follows that all other individuals-those 
who do not fall within the enumeration contained in Article 4 of the 
Convention-are likewise denied prisoner-of-war status when they are 
captured while engaged in such a mission.340 
e. OTHERS 
Historically, a number of other categories of persons were subject 
to capture and to prisoner-of-war status, persons such as the Chief 
of State, whether sovereign or president, members of his family, and 
his chief ministers.341 This is no longer true.3!2 If such individuals fall 
into the power of the enemy when the latter overruns their national 
territory, they will come within the protection of the Fourth (Civil-
ians) Convention, and they may only be placed in assigned residence or 
interned. If they are taken into custody by the enemy as a result, 
for example, of a commando raid into territory controlled by their 
own national armed forces, or of the capture of a vessel on the high 
seas, they would not come within the ambit of the Third Convention, 
but, once again, they would benefit from the appropriate provisions of 
the Fourth Convention. 
In the past, military attaches or other diplomatic representatives 
of neutral nations have sometimes been permitted by the country to 
which they are accredited, or to which they are sent for the specific 
purpose, to accompany its armed forces in the field as observers. When 
taken into custody by the armed forces of the adverse Party, they are 
not prisoners of war but they may be ordered out of, or removed from, 
the theater of war by the Party into whose hands they have fallen.343 
This assumes that they have taken no part in the hostilities.344 If they 
have acted as "military advisers," thus actually rendering military 
assistance to the armed forces opposing those of the belligerent Power 
into whose hands they have fallen, it could be argued that they fall 
:140 Article 29, first paragraph, 1907 Hague Regulations; U.S. Manual para. 76; 
B1·itish Manual para. 326; Swiss Manual para. 38. See generally, Article 46 of the 
1977 Protocol 1. 
:141 Davis, Prisoner of War 531; Risley, The Law of War 129. 
:l4:! It remains true for the Chief of State if he is, by statute or constitution, the 
commander in chief of the armed forces; and for a minister if he is, in addition 
to his political office, a member of the regular armed forces or is accompanying 
the armed forces in the field in one of the categories included in Article 4A. Brit-
ish Manual para. 127. 
:Wl British Manual para. 129; U.S. Manual (1940 ed.) para. 77; U.S. Manual 
para. 83. A note in the Bl·itislz Manual states that during the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904-05) a British naval attache and two American military attaches accompany-
ing the Russian forces were captured by the Japanese at Mukden. They were sent 
to Tokyo and turned over to their respective Ministers. Concerning this episode 
see Ariga, Guen·e l·usso-japonaise 122. 
:lH This is stated as one of the requirements in each of the sections of the man-
uals cited in the previous note. 
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within the ambit of Article 4A (4) 345 and that they are therefore en-
titled to prisoner-of-war status.346 
11. Conclusions 
The above discussion involving the determination of entitlement to 
prisoner-of-war status under the 1949 Convention should not be con-
sidered exhaustive either as to the categories of persons entitled to that 
status,347 or as to the problems which may conceivably arise in this 
area of the law of armed conflict,318 particularly as the characteristics 
of armed conflict, and of the combatants participating therein, are in 
an extraordinary period of change. Despite the minimal attention paid 
to the subject of prisoners of war in general and entitlement to pris-
oner-of-war status in particular in the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol, 
the decisions in this area made by the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts and included in the 1977 Protocol I dem-
onstrate that the subject continues to be in a state of flux and is one 
in which major changes may be anticipated, changes which may come 
about by negotiation, but which will more probably evolve out of the 
practice of nations. 
F. SOME GENERAL PROBLEMS 
1. Agreements between Belligerents 
While it is far from easy to obtain agreements between opposing 
belligerents during the course of international armed conflict, par-
ticularly with respect to matters involving the conduct of that conflict, 
345 The enumeration contained in that article is merely illustrative as is indicat-
ed by the fact that it starts with the words "such as." 
346 The practice followed by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese does not 
furnish a particularly strong precedent with respect to the status of "military 
advisers" inasmuch as neither of them gave prisoner-of-war status to any cap-
tured Americans, whether serving as military advisers to the Republic of Vietnam 
armed forces or, subsequently, as members of combat units. However, inasmuch 
as all such individuals were treated (or maltreated) equally, it may be argued 
that it does furnish a precedent of sorts supporting the premise contained in the 
text. The problem of the status of military advisers, either before or after capture, 
has received suprisingly little attention from commentators. 
347 See note 345 supm. U.S. Manual para. 70; British Manual para. 127 n.l. More-
over, as the two manual provisions point out, there is nothing to preclude a Detain-
ing Power from granting prisoner-of-war status or treatment to individuals, or cate-
gories of individuals, who cannot conceivably fall within the provisions of Article 
4. For an example of this, see note 206 supra. One category of individuals specific-
ally removed from eligibility for prisoner-of-war status by Article 47 of the 1977 
Protocol I is that of "mercenaries." 
348 For example, as one author points out, in the Republic of Vietnam the status 
of "civil defendant" was to be preferred over that of prisoner of war, despite the 
fact that the latter had originally been intended to be the most desirable status for 
an individual in the custody of the enemy, Haight, Shadow War 46. 
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it is possible, and numerous agreements between such belligerents have 
been reached in past conflicts.349 Many articles of the Convention con-
tain specific references to agreements between the belligerents ;350 and 
there are matters covered in other articles that could also conceivably 
be the subject of such agreements.35l In fact, the first paragraph of 
Article 6, which is concerned with special agreements between the 
belligerents, specifies that the belligerents are not restricted to the sub-
jects enumerated in that Article,352 that they may conclude agreements 
on any subjects that they deem appropriate.353 
There are two major limitations contained in the Convention with 
respect to the making of special agreements. First, the lead paragraph 
of Article 6 prohibits any such agreements that "adversely affect the 
situation of prisoners of war" ; and, perhaps of even more importance, 
it prohibits any such agreements that "restrict the rights which it [the 
Convention] confers upon them." Hence, special agreements between 
belligerents may improve the lot of the prisoner of war, but may not 
in any manner remove or limit any of the rights, privileges, or safe-
guards assured to them by the Convention.35·1 And second, the fifth 
paragraph of Article 10 prohibits any special agreement derogating 
from the preceding provisions of that Article (which are concerned 
with the selection of a substitute for a Protecting Power) when the 
freedom of one Power is restricted "by reason of military events, more 
349 See, e.g., the agreements listed in note 39 supra. We are, of course, here con-
cerned exclusively with agreements concerning prisoners of war reached by the 
Detaining Power and the Power of Origin. 
350 The first paragraph of Article 6 lists 17 articles of the Convention that con-
tain some type of provision for agreements between belligerents. 
351 For example, agreements concerning prisoner-of-war food, amplifying the 
first paragraph of Article 26 even though it contains no mention of the possibility 
of such agreements, are not inconceivable. See p. 126 infr.a. Again, it would 
frequently be helpful for the belligerents to enter into an agreement concerning 
comparable ranks, even though the first paragraph of Article 43 is not among 
those referring to the possibility of agreements between belligerents. See p. 168 
infra. 
352 During World War II the United States and Germany reached an agreement 
that called for a head-for-head exchange of prisoners of war who had been sen-
tenced to death for the murder of fellow prisoners of war (Lewis & Mewha 76-
77), certainly a subject not referred to in the Convention. 
353It might be asked why sovereign States, as the belligerents in international 
armed conflict would presumably be, must be granted permission to enter into 
agreements during the course of hostilities. One answer advanced, and with con-
siderable merit, is that the Convention creates multilateral obligations running 
between all of the Parties thereto, and the first paragraph of Article 6 permits 
bilateral amplifications to which agreement of all of the Parties to the Convention 
would otherwise be required. See Wilhelm, Le caractere 579-81. 
354 In Pictet, Commentary on the First Convention 75, this provision of the first 
paragraph of Article 6 is termed "a landmark in the process of renunciation by 
States of their sovereign rights in favour of the individual and of a superior juri-
dical order." 
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particularly where the whole, or a substantial part, of the territory 
of said Power is occupied." This provision arose out of the experiences 
of W orId War II when the Scapini Mission replaced the Protecting 
Power in the supervision of the treatment of French prisoners of war 
held by the Germans.355 It is unfortunate, however, that the decision 
was made to limit this particular prohibition to the provisions of 
Article 10, concerned solely with substitutes for a Protecting Power, 
as the same problem can arise in many other areas.356 
The second paragraph of Article 6 provides that when the belliger-
ents reach a special agreement for the benefit of prisoners of war, 
the latter shall have the benefits of the provisions of that agree-
ment until (1) it expires by its own terms; or (2) it is superseded by 
a subsequent and, presumably, more favorable agreement; or (3) the 
Detaining Power has taken measures more favorable than those con-
tained in the agreement.357 This provision parallels the first paragraph 
of Article 5 of the Convention, which provides that the Convention 
itself protects prisoners of war from the time that they fall into the 
power of the enemy until their final release and repatriation. SpeCial 
agreements, once negotiated, have the same duration with the three 
exceptions noted. 
2. Disputes between Belligerents 
Inevitably, disputes arise between the opposing belligerents during 
the course of practically all international armed conflicts, with charges 
and countercharges passing back and forth, some of which wiII be 
fully justified ;358 some of which will be unwarranted, but wiII have 
been made in good faith on the basis of apparently reliable information 
received and believed to be true ;359 and some of which wiII be made 
when known to be completely without foundation, and, perhaps, on the 
basis of evidence known tQ be manufactured. 360 Not infrequently, such 
355 See notes 52 supra, and IV-70 infra. See also, Pictet, Recueil 87-88; Bastid, 
Droit des gens 335; Wilhelm, Le caractere 576. Substantially the same problem 
arose with respect to the T'Serclaes Mission in occupied Belgium. See note IV -70 
infra. 
356 See, e.g., 1 ICRC Report; and Pictet, Commentary on the First Conven-
tion 71. 
357 Article 41 requires the Detaining Power to post in every prisoner-of-war 
camp a copy of the Convention and "the contents of any special agreements" in 
the language of the prisoners of war therein incarcerated. See p. 166 infra. 
358 See note VI-115 infra. 
359 See note VI-116 infra. 
360 The charge made by the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and 
North Korea (not all of whom were admitted belligerents) in 1952 that the 
United States was using bacteriological weapons in Korea (see note 372 infra) 
is typical of this last category. A demand by the United States for an impartial 
investigation was, of course, unanswered. The Soviet Union has, by subsequent 
actions, implicitly admitted the lack of validity of that charge. Levie, Working 
Paper 17. Similarly, the Nazi charge that the British had sunk the Athenia in 
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disputes will involve the treatment, or alleged maltreatment, of pris-
oners of war. The Convention provides two methods of resolving such 
disputes. 
Article 11 provides that, in the interests of the prisoners of war, 
Protecting Powers "shall lend their good offices" with a view to settling 
disputes between belligerents, particularly those involving "the appli-
cation or interpretation of the provisions of the present Convention."361 
The second paragraph of Article 11 supplements this by providing 
that, in such a case, the Protecting Power may, at the request of a 
belligerent or on its own initiative,362 propose to the opposing belliger-
ents a meeting of their representatives, particularly those responsible 
for prisoners of war, the meeting to take place "possibly on neutral 
territory suitably chosen."363 It continues with the provision that the 
belligerents to whom a proposal for a meeting of their representatives 
is made "shall be bound to give effect to the proposals made to them 
for this purpose" ;364 and it concludes with an authorization for the 
Protecting Powers, if they deem it necessary, to propose an individual 
from a neutral nation, or selected by the ICRC, "who shall be invited 
to take part in such a meeting." Presumably, such individual would 
act as a catalyst, a combined conciliator-mediator, whose presence and 
activities would make it possible for the representatives of the oppos-
ing belligerents to negotiate and to reach agreements, despite the 
handicaps th~t confront any representatives of opposing belligerents 
September 1939 to create a German atrocity story was made originally on the 
basis of a complete lack of information, and was later adhered to despite official 
German reports establishing that a German submarine had been responsible. Von 
der Porten, The German Navy in W01·1d War II 36. 
361 Article 87 of the 1929 Convention referred only to "the application of the 
provisions of the present Convention." The addition of the words "or interpreta-
tion" was unsuccessfully opposed by the Soviet Union. 2B Final Record 353-54. 
362 The cognate provision of the last paragraph of Article 87 of the 1929 Con-
vention said that the Protecting Powers "may, for instance, propose to the bellig-
erents." In Pictet, Commentary 125, the position is taken that, unlike the last 
paragraph of Article 11 of the 1949 Convention, this provision of the 1929 Con-
vention implied that Protecting Powers could not act on their own initiative, "the 
initiative being taken by the Party to the conflict whose interests they represent." 
No basis can be found for this interpretation of the language of the 1929 Conven-
tion. However, the last paragraph of Article 11 of the 1949 Convention clearly 
leaves no room for dispute in this regard. 
363 Neither from the identical wording of the last paragraph of Article 87 of 
the 1929 Convention, nor from the tl·avaux preparatoires of the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference, can any clue be obtained as to the interpretation to be given to the 
words "suitably chosen." Draper, Recueil145. 
304 Despite Colonel Draper's contention (ibid.) that by this provision the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference was "establishing a duty where none previously existed," 
the second paragraph of Article 87 of the 1929 Convention actually provided: 
"The belligerents shall be required to give effect to proposals made to them with 
this object." 
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attempting to perform these functions during the actual course of 
hostilities. 
During World War I a great many such meetings took place on 
neutral territory, and a great many bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments were reached by the opposing belligerents.365 During World 
War II not one such meeting took place,366 primarily because Switzer-
land, which was the Protecting Power of the great majority of bellig-
erents, did not propose any meetings-probably because it evaluated 
the probability of successful negotiations at such a meeting as being 
exceedingly low.367 Apparently, the participants at the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference were not optimistic for the future because, while they 
attempted to clarify and strengthen the provisions of Article 11, they 
also adopted a Resolution recommending that "in the case of a dispute 
relating to the interpretation or application of the present Conven-
tions," the opposing Parties should attempt to reach agreement on 
referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice.3GS Nothing 
is more unlikely than that such an agreement could ever be reached; 
or, if it were, that the Court would be able to reach a decision before 
the ultimate cessation of hostilities! 
The second method of resolving disputes between belligerents is 
the "enquiry" provided for in Article 132. Its value is difficult to 
estimate because there was no comparable provision in the 1929 
Convention.369 However, it appears to present built-in problems. The 
first paragraph of Article 132 proyides that at the request of a bellig-
erent an inquiry concerning any alleged violation of the Convention 
"shall be instituted." This has been construed by some as being "obli-
gatory";370 while others assert that the institution of an inquiry is 
consensual.371 Inasmuch as this paragraph of Article 132 also provides 
that the inquiry is to be instituted "in a manner to be decided between 
the interested Parties," it is difficult to see how an inquiry can be 
instituted, or conducted, in the absence of agreement between the 
Parties.372 Moreover, this conclusion is borne out by the next para-
365 See, e.g., the agreements listed in note 39 supra. 
366 J anner, Puissance protect1'ice 51; Pictet, Commentary 125. The agreements 
referred to in note VII-67 infra, were reached by diplomatic correspondence, not 
by face-to-face negotiation. (It could not be ascertained how the agreement re-
ferred to in note 352 supra was reached.) 
367 Janner, Puissance protect1'ice 51. 
368 Resolution J, 1 Final RecQ1'd 361. 
369 Article 30 of the 1929 Sick-and-Wounded Convention may be considered to 
be the progenitor of this article of the 1949 Prisoner-of-W ar Convention. It ap-
parently was never used. Draper, Recueil 149; Pictet, Commentary 632. 
370 Ibid. 
371 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 36. 
372 During the hostilities in Korea the Communists charged that the United 
States was using bacteriological weapons. 2 JCRC Conflit de Coree, Nos. 396-99, 
at 84-86. The United States proposed that an investigation of this charge be made 
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graph of Article 132, which attempts to establish a procedure to be 
followed should the opposing belligerents be unable to agree on the 
manner in which the inquiry is to be conducted. Under those circum-
stances the belligerents "should agree on the choice of an umpire 
who will decide upon the procedure to be followed." Once again, agree-
ment between the belligerents is required; this time, agreement on a 
third party who is to set the procedure for the inquiry upon which 
the belligerents were themselves unable to agree. It seems rather 
unlikely that it will be any easier for the belligerents to reach agree-
ment on the selection of an umpire with the far-reaching power to 
establish the inquiry procedure than it will be for them to reach agree-
ment on the procedure themselves; and if they do not, the inquiry 
does not take place.373 However, if a procedure for the inquiry is 
established, either by the belligerents pursuant to the first paragraph 
of Article 132, or by the umpire selected pursuant to the second para-
graph of Article 132, the inquiry is conducted in accordance with that 
procedure; and if the inqury establishes a violation of the Convention, 
the third and last paragraph of Article' 132 requires the belligerent 
found to be in violation of the Convention to repress the violation as 
quickly as possible.3i4 Of course, if the inquiry determines that there 
has been no violation, no problem arises. 
As has been indicated, the value of the provisions of Article 132 
concerning inquiries is dubious. Realizing this, a proposal has been 
made for the creation of a "United Nations Commission of Inquiry 
into Breaches of the Humanitarian Conventions."375 The functions of 
this Commission would encompass "investigating all complaints of 
violations during armed conflicts" of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Con-
ventions, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and the 1949 Gene,!a Conventions, 
For the reasons already set forth, the allocation of quasi-judicial 
functions of this nature to any body owing its existence to a political 
organization such as the United Nations is a procedure to be regarded 
with considerable apprehension.376 There have, perhaps, been some 
by the ICRC. Ibid., No. 406, at 89. The ICRC offered to conduct such an investiga-
tion, "subject to the agreement of both Parties." Ibid., Nos. 407-11, at 89-93. The 
Chinese and the North Koreans did not answer the ICRC and the idea of an in-
vestigation was abandoned. Ibid., No. 437, at 109. 
37:1 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 395; Pictet, Commentary 632. For an example of 
the difficulty of securing an agreement between the adversaries for an inquiry (in 
the Middle East), see ICRC Annual Report, 1974, at 18-19. 
3U See Draper, Recueil149-50. The last paragraph of Article 132 provides that 
"the Parties to the conflict shall put an end" to any violation established by the 
inquiry. (Emphasis added.) Presumably, one belligerent requested the inquiry 
because it believed that its adversary was violating the Convention. When this 
belief is established as a fact, it would appear that the belligerent so found to be 
in violation of the Convention would be the only one with the burden of repression. 
375 U.N., Human Rights, A/8370, para. 164. 
376 See pp. 18-19 supra. 
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United Nations fact-finding commissions that have determined facts 
on the basis of facts and not on the basis of politics; if so, such com-
missions are few and far between.377 And even though the proposal 
referred to above would have the commission composed of "persons, 
independent of any government, and chosen because of their high 
moral character and their capacity to conduct inquiries in accordance 
with generally recognized judicial principles," qualifications closely 
resembling those previously suggested herein,378 the overriding dif-
ference is that the present proposal would have the members of the 
commission selected by the political prvcesses of the United Nations, 
a method not conducive to the selection of persons who will actually 
meet the stated qualifications. 
At its final (1977) session the Diplomatic Conference considering 
the ICRC's 1973 Draft Additional Protocol to the 1949 Conventions 
adopted and included in the 1977 Protocol I a completely new Article 
90 entitled "International Fact-Finding Commission." This Article, 
which is probably the longest and most detailed in the Protocol, creates 
a Commission of 15 members "of high moral standing and acknowl-
edged impartiality," to be elected by the Parties every five years, with 
the Commission itself filling casual vacancies. The members are to 
serve in their personal capacity. The Commission may inquire into 
alleged grave breaches or other serious violations of the 1949 Con-
ventions or the 1977 Protocol; may facilitate the restoration of an 
attitude of respect for the Conventions and the Protocol; and, in 
other situations, may institute an inquiry at the request of one Party 
and with the consent of the other Party or Parties concerned. The 
Commission is to function by Chambers consisting of five members 
plus one ad hoc member to be appointed by each side. (No nationals 
of the Parties may be included in the Chamber.) The Chamber may 
hear evidence submitted by the Parties; may itself seek evidence; and 
may carry out an investigation in loco. Its report is not to be made 
public unless the Parties so request. Unfortunately, the entire Article 
is subject to a provision (similar to the optional clause of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice) requiring the filing of a declara-
tion recognizing the competence of the Commission to act in relation 
to any other Party accepting the same obligation. It is not unlikely 
that many of the very Parties who have heretofore demonstrated 
their unwillingness to comply with the law of war, even that included 
in international agreements to which they voluntarily became Parties, 
377 See the constructive criticism of the methods of fact-finding employed by 
one United Nations investigatory body in the humanitarian field in Carey, UN 
Protection of Political and Civil Rights 84-126. Other subsequent United Nations 
investigations continue to be subject to the same criticisms. 
378 See pp. 19-22 supra. 
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wiII decline to file a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. 
The settlement of disputes between opposing belligerents in inter-
national armed conflict is an inherently difficult process that will only 
be successfully accomplished when both sides consider such a result 
to be in their own self-interests; but however difficult it may be, and 
however weak the provisions of the Convention dealing with the 
subject may be, the mere fact of their existence may, on occasion, 
serve as the basis for negotiations leading to the settlement of a 
dispute. Certainly, this possibility more than justified their inclusion 
in the Convention.379 
3. Prohibition against Renunciation of Rights 
As we have seen, the penultimate paragraph of Article 10 pro-
hibits certain agreements between belligerents when, because of 
military events, they are not able to negotiate on a basis of equality. 
Obviously, prisoners of war can never negotiate on a basis of equality 
with the Detaining Power. This truism was repeatedly demonstrated 
during World War II and it resulted in the adoption of Article 7 of 
the Convention, a provision that had no counterpart in any previous 
Convention dealing with the subject of prisoners of war.380 In absolute 
terms, it prohibits them from renouncing any or all of the rights 
secured to them by the Convention or by any special agreement 
reached by the belligerents for their benefit.381 
The belief that any new convention should provide that the rights 
secured to prisoners of war by that convention must remain inviolate 
and inviolable for the entire duration of the hostilities was evidenced 
370 Article 121 also provides for an "enquiry," but of a different kind. The first 
paragraph of Article 121 mandates that the Detaining Power will itself promptly 
institute an official inquiry into every death or seriou's injury of a prisoner of war 
caused by another person, whether guard, prisoner of war, or stranger, as well as 
into every death the cause of which is unknown; the second paragraph of Article 
121 requires the Detaining Power to notify the Protecting Power of the fact that 
the inquiry is being conducted and, upon its completion, to provide the Protecting 
Power with a copy of the report, together with copies of the statements of all wit-
nesses; and the last paragraph of Article 121 requires the Detaining Power to 
prosecute any individual whose guilt is indicated by the inquiry. See p. 289 
infra, and, particularly, note IV-128 infra. During World War II the Germans 
followed a procedure identical to that prescribed by the first two paragraphs of 
Article 121, at least ,vith regard to British prisoners of war. German RegUlations, 
No. 15, para. 114. 
380 Pictet, Commentary 87. See Flory, Prisoners of War 142-44. 
381 In The Ministries Case (667-68) the Tribunal found that the provisions of 
Article 6 of the 1907 Hague Regulations prohibiting the use of prisoners of war 
on work connected with the operations of war did not apply when the prisoner of 
war volunteered. The first paragraphs of Articles 50 and 52 of the 1949 Convention 
still permit limited volunteering in the work area .. See pp. 231-233 infra. See also, 
Pictet, Commentary 90. 
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as early as the 1946 Preliminary Conference.382 While this idea was, 
for some unknown reason, not specifically implemented by the 1947 
Conference of Government Experts, it did appear as Article 6 of the 
lCRC draft submitted to the 1948 Stockholm Conference. That draft 
provided that" [p] risoners of war may in no circumstances be induced 
by constraint, or by any other means of coercion to abandon" any of 
the rights contained in the draft convention.3s3 The Stockholm Con-
ference deleted the words "be induced by constraint, or by any other 
means of coercion to abandon" and substituted the one word "re-
nounce."384 This was a wise decision, as the original draft did not 
prohibit voluntary abandonment of rights conferred by the rest of 
the draft convention and thus left it open for the Detaining Power to 
assert, in every case, that the prisoner of war's decision was voluntary 
and that no constraint or coercion had been used to assist him in 
reaching his decision abandoning the protections of the convention.3SG 
Subsequently, the lCRC raised the issue that throughout the conven-
tion being drafted obligations were imposed upon the Parties (really, 
upon the Detaining Power) while proposed Article 6 imposed an obli-
gation directly on the prisoner of war himself; and it offered modi-
fications that would have imposed the obligation in regard to renun-
ciation on the Detaining Power rather than on the prisoner of war.3S0 
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference several other amendments were 
also offered,387 but none gained the necessary support and the draft 
article approved at Stockholm was ultimately accepted without 
change.3ss This provision, now Article 7, constitutes an absolute ban 
on even a voluntary renunciation by a prisoner of war of any of the 
rights conferred upon him by the other provisions of the Convention 
or by any special agreement entered into by his Power of Origin and 
the Detaining Power for his benefit.389 
Article 7 is, unfortunately, an oversimplification of a complex 
matter and numerous problems concerning its application have already 
arisen, while others are apparent. Does it apply to the defector, the 
ideologist who, while a member of the armed forces of his own 
country, seeks out the enemy with the object of joining its armed 
forces to fight against his country? While disputed by some, it is 
difficult to understand how Article 7 can be meaningful if a Detaining 
382 1946 Preliminary Conference 70. 
383 Draft Revised Conventions 55. 
384 Revised Draft Conventions 54. 
385 2B Final Record 18. 
386 Remarks and Proposals 39; 2B Final Record 17; Wilhelm, Le caractere 561. 
387 2B Final Record 17-18; Pictet, Commentary 89. 
388 2B Final Record 28. 
389 As aptly put by one writer: "Thus, prisoners of war are no longer protected 
only against the enemy; they are also protected against themselves." Pictet, Re-
cueil85 (trans. mine). However, see note 381 supra. 
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Power may permit a member of the enemy armed forces in its power, 
no matter how he so came to be, to volunteer for service in the armed 
forces of the Detaining Power.300 Nothing would then prevent a 
Detaining Power from contending that every member of the enemy 
armed forces who came into its power was a defector who had never 
had but one thought-to leave the armed forces of his Power of Origin 
and to join the armed forces of the Detaining Power.301 
The question of the extent of the coverage of Article 7 was directly 
raised during the armistice negotiations in Korea in connection with 
the problem of repatriation under Article 118. Is it a violation of 
Article 7 to permit a prisoner of war to reject repatriation and to 
seek asylum either in the territory of the Detaining Power, or else-
where, when hostilities cease? The decision ultimately reached in that 
controversy, one that had the support of a large majority of the 
United Nations General Assembly as then composed, was that Article 
7 was not violated if it could be established in a satisfactory manner 
that the prisoner of war was actually making an informed, voluntary, 
and personal choice.392 It probably can be assumed that the decision 
made with respect to this matter in Korea has established a precedent 
with respect to the application of Article 7 to the repatriation of 
prisoners of war after the cessation of hostilities.893 
4. Dissemination of and Instruction on the Convention 
A convention on the treatment of prisoners of war is of little value 
if it is not known to and understood by two major groups: (1) those 
who are potential prisoners of war or who have actually become pris-
oners of war; and (2) those who are responsible for handling, guard-
ing, and, in general, supervising the activities of prisoners of war on 
behalf of the Detaining Power.30o! Instruction in the provisions of the 
Convention thus serves a dual purpose: (1) it ensures that members 
of armed forces who fall into the power of the enemy will be aware, 
at least generally, of their rights as prisoners of war; and (2) it 
300 See pp. 78-80 supra. 
SOl The North Korean "reeducation" program and the South Vietnamese "Chieu 
Hoi" program almost went this far. See note 325 supra. 
302 See pp. 421-426 infra. One acknowledged expert in this field, who was an 
active delegate at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, takes the position that to hold 
otherwise would be Ita travesty of the purpose of that Article." Gutteridge, Re 
patriation 214. 
SDS For a wide-ranging discussion of the prohibitions against changing the 
status of a prisoner of war, either in accordance with his desires, in accordance 
with an agreement between his Power of Origin and the Detaining Power, or by 
unilateral act of the Detaining Power, see Wilhelm, Status, passim. It does not 
discuss Article 7 of the Convention in the context of the Korean repatriation prob-
lem, probably because publication began in July 1953, while that problem was 
still sub judice. 
S04 Concerning this latter category, see p. 165 infra. 
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ensures that the personnel of the Detaining Power who capture pris-
oners of war or who have the direct responsibility for the prisoners 
of war in its custody are aware of the rights and protections to which 
prisoners of war are entitled and the obligations in this regard that 
rest upon the Detaining Power's personne1.39;; 
Article 84 of the 1929 Convention merely required that that Con-
vention, in the native language of the prisoners of war, be posted in 
the prisoner-of-war camps so that it could be consulted by them.30o 
The 1947 Conference of Government Experts considered this to be 
inadequate and suggested that the enlargement of that Article include 
a provision requiring the Parties to bring the stipulations of the Con-
vention to the knowledge of the members of their armed forces.307 In 
preparing the draft convention to be submitted to the 1948 Stockholm 
Conference, the ICRC thought it advisable to separate these two 
ideas.39s With some amendments and editing, the new provision calling 
for dissemination of and instruction on the Convention became the 
first paragraph of Article 127 of the 1949 Convention. That Article 
contains three undertakings by the Parties: (1) the widespread dis-
semination of the Convention in their territories; (2) the inclusion of 
the study of the Convention in programs of instruction of members 
of their armed forces; and (3), if possible, the inclusion of study of 
the Convention in programs of instruction of their civilian popu-
lation.399 
Provisions such as those contained in Article 127 are, of course, 
absolutely indispensable inasmuch as a convention the contents of 
which are completely unknown, or are known only to a limited group 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, perhaps, in the Ministry of 
Defense, is obviously of no value whatsoever.-100 Moreover, with 
nations, as with individuals, there is frequently a great distance 
between the promise and the performance; and here, as in many other 
areas of the Convention, a good rule has been laid down but no pro-
vision has been made for ensuring that it is being applied, particularly 
395 During World War II the chairman of the Mixed Medical Commission func-
tioning in the Uniteo States (concerning these Commissions, see pp. 411-412 
infra) found that there was U a considerable lack of knowledge concerning the pro-
visions of the Geneva Convention on repatriation and of [sic] sick and wounded 
priso;ners of war." Rich, Brief History 502. 
396 This is now found in the first paragraph of Article 41. See pp. 165-166 infra. 
397 1947 GE Report 261. 
39S Draft Revised Conventions, Articles 34 (at 76) and 117 (at 133). 
390 The text of the Convention is to be disseminated in time of peace as well as 
in time of war. (The provisions of the first paragraph of Article 127 were adopted 
in almost identical form in Article 25 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of A1'med Conflict.) 
400 "In order to 'implement' the Geneva Conventions, not only their existence 
but also their contents must be fully known, especially by those responsible for 
application." 1965 Implementation 1. 
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in peacetime. In 1966, on its own initiative, the rCRC sent a memo-
randum on the subject to the 114 States then Parties to the 1949 
Conventions and to their National Red Cross Societies, requesting 
information concerning the implementation of the first paragraph of 
Article 127. The responses received could not, for the most part, be 
considered as indicating a very widespread and heartfelt compliance 
with its provisions.401 
The 1973 Draft Additional Protocol included a provision intended 
to remedy this situation. Article 72 (3) provided that each Party 
"shall report" to the Depositary of the Conventions (Switzerland) 
and to the ICRC "at intervals of four years on the measures they 
have taken" to comply with the obligations of dissemination and in-
struction assumed under the first paragraph of Article 127 of the 
Convention and under Article 72 (1) of the Protoco1.402 Such a pro-
vision might well go far beyond its surface appearance in procuring 
a more universal compliance with the dissemination and instruction 
provisions.403 
One aspect of the provision with respect to civilian instruction is 
worthy of note. Under the draft article submitted to and approved 
by the 1948 Stockholm Conference, the Parties would have under-
taken "to incorporate the study [of the Convention] in their pro-
gramme of military and civil instruction."404 Because of the constitu-
tional limitations of some Federal systems of government, under 
which civilian education is frequent!y not a Federal function,405 
401 Twenty-five truly responsive answers were received. 1969 Implementation, 
II, at 9. A similar ICRC memorandum sent in 1972 inspired 30 responsive answers 
out of the 133 States then Parties to the 1949 Conventions. 1973 Implementation 5. 
A few additional answers were received later and were reprinted in two addenda. 
402 Committee I of the 1975 Diplomatic Conference approved Article 72 (3) of 
the Protocol without change by a vote of 22-17-19. See 1975 Report of Committee 
I, at 29-30. At the 1977 session of the Diplomatic Conference the paragraph was 
eliminated in its entirety from what became Article 83 of the 1977 Protocol I. 
403 See note 402 supra. 
404 Revised Draft Conventions 99. Programs of instruction on the 1949 Con-
ventions, and any Protocol thereto, for members of the armed forces present prac-
tical problems only, not legal ones. See the Guidelines developed by the Seminar 
on the Teaching of Humanitarian Law to the Armed Forces, 13 I.R.R.C. 42 
(1973). See also the U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.77, 5 Novem-
ber 1974, DOD Program for the Implementation of the Law of War. 
40ti Draper, Recueil152. In Pictet, Commentary on the First Convention 349, the 
author asserts that "the propriety of [these constitutional scruples] is open to 
question," and in Pictet, Commentary 615, the statement is made that "[s]ome 
delegations, therefore, having a scrupulous regard for constitutional niceties 
which may be thought unfounded . ... " (Emphasis added.) Without attempting to 
detract from the expertise of the author of those statements in the area of American 
constitutional law, it is fairly obvious that he is totally unfamiliar with the Amer-
ican doctrine of "states' rights" (and of the parallel Canadian doctrine with re-
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Canada and the United States proposed, and the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference accepted, an amendment changing the above-quoted word-
ing to read, in pertinent part, "program of military and, if possible, 
civil instruction."406 (Emphasis added.) 
Finally, the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol introduced a completely 
new concept into the law of international armed conflict when it in-
cluded, in its Article 71, a provision obligating the Parties to ensure 
that their armed forces have "qualified legal advisers," not only to 
act as legal advisers to military commanders, but also to "ensure that 
appropriate instruction be given to the armed forces."407 While a 
number of armed forces have long included legally trained persons on 
their rolls, there are many who do not, or, if they do, presently have 
so few that they could not possibly perform the functions assigned 
to them by this provision. 
spect to the rights of provinces). If the Article of the Convention had remained 
as originally drafted, the United States Senate would, in all probability, have in-
sisted that the ratification of the Convention by the United States include a res-
ervation to it. (For the lCRC's persistence in this respect, see note 406 infra.) 
4062B Final Record 70, 112. Nevertheless, under Article 72(1) of the 1973 
Draft Additional Protocol the Parties would have undertaken to include the study 
of the Convention "in their programmes of military and civil instruction." At 
the 1975 session of the Diplomatic Conference Committee l, perhaps more real-
istically inclined than the lCRC in this particular area, adop.ted by consensus an 
amended version pursuant to which the Parties undertake to include the study of 
the Convention in their programs of military instruction "and to encourage the 
study thereof by the civilian population." 1975 Report of Committee l, at 29-30. 
As so worded, the provision was adopted as Article 83 (1) of the 1977 Protocol!. 
407 Committee I of the 1975 Diplomatic Conference adopted this article by con-
sensus after making several amendments that improved it without changing the 
objective sought to be attained, 1975 Report of Committee l, at 29; See Fleck, 
The Employment of Legal Advisers and Teachers of Law in the Armed Forces, 
13 loR.R.C. 173. With only minor changes this provision became Article 82 of 
the 1977 Protocol I. 
